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Preface
Advances in ubiquitous computing have resulted in changes to the way
we access and use everyday applications, e.g. reading mail and booking
tickets. At the same time, users interact with these applications in a va-
riety of ways, each with different characteristics, e.g., different degrees
of bandwidth, different payment schemes supported and so on. These
are highly dynamic interactions, as some of the applications might be-
come unavailable (either temporarily or permanently) or their behaviour
may change. As the user has to deal with a large number of proactive
and dynamic applications every day, he will need a personal assistant
that possesses similar characteristics. The agent paradigm meets this
requirement, since it exhibits the necessary features. As a result, the
user will provide its personal agent assistant with a goal, e.g. I need a
smartphone which costs less than three hundred pounds, and the agent
will have to use a number of applications offering information on smart-
phones so that it finds the requested one. This, in turn, raises a number
of issues regarding the organisation and the degrees of access to these
services as well as the correctness of their descriptions.
In this work, we propose the organisation of applications around the
concept of artificial agent societies, to which access would be possible
only by a positive evaluation of an agent’s application. The agent will
provide the Authority Agent with the role it is applying for and its
competencies in the context of a protocol, i.e., the messages that it can
utter/understand. The Authority Agent will then check to see if the
applicant agent is a competent user of the protocols; if yes, entry is
granted.
Assuming that access is granted, the next issue is to decide on the pro-
tocol(s) that agent receives. As providing the full protocol will cause
security and overload problems, we only need to provide the part re-
quired for the agent to play its role. We show how this can be done and
how we can repair certain protocols so that they are indeed enactable
once this role decomposition is performed.
xxv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The advent of ubiquitous computing opens up new possibilities for appli-
cations and changes the way that users interact with a variety of devices
to perform everyday tasks [115, 116]. Bulky computing devices have
now turned into minuscule ones that users can take with them and use
in their day to day life. As a result, small devices - e.g. mobile phones,
PDAs and watches - acquired capabilities that only powerful desktop
computers had in the not so distant past like surfing the Internet at
high speeds and accessing e-mails. The final aim of ubiquitous comput-
ing is to seamlessly integrate all these devices into people’s everyday life
so they should be able to perform tasks like making bookings or partic-
ipating in auctions without going through the burden of understanding
the technicalities involved.
In the tasks of accessing the Internet or sending an e-mail, location
and/or configuration do not play a role - the services that the user is ac-
cessing are static. In some tasks, however, location and/or configuration
can play a crucial role. As an example, think of a tourist who is visiting
a place for the first time and he is interested in finding out the near-
est restaurant or tourist centre. Another example might be a purchase
application that accepts card payments among other ways of payment,
but there is a last minute problem with the component that deals with
that aspect and a replacement has to be found or the application has to
be reconfigured and the card payments taken off as an option.
Furthermore, the time span that the application will be needed for could
be really small [109] and the device will have a number of providers to
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choose from. In addition, the applications should exhibit a goal-oriented
and proactive behaviour (in the case that reconfiguration is needed or a
choice between providers has to be made).
These observations raise the issue of how this kind of applications will
be implemented and organised as well as how access to them will be
regulated. In terms of implementation, a number of paradigms exist
such as distributed objects [107] and network programming. More recent
is that of Service-Oriented Architectures (SOA) [39, 94] in many cases
applied through web services [63, 77].
On the other hand, web services do not address the issues of pro-active
and goal-oriented behaviour; rather, the interaction is limited to pre-
defined courses of interaction as specified in each party’s configuration.
The agent paradigm [19, 78] is well suited for this purpose as proactive
and goal-oriented behaviour are amongst the fundamental notions of
agency. Moreover, in complex services each agent can implement a part
of the protocol to add flexibility to the approach (e.g. one agent could
implement the purchase service, another the payment one and a third
one could implement the shipping service).
Artificial agent societies [82, 90] can be used to model such applications
as individual agents offering various services. The services will be offered
to society members, so if an agent needs to make use of a service offered
by one of the society member agents, it will have to join the society.
Each service of the society will be represented through a set of protocols
that the agent will have to participate in. The protocols will specify
the behaviour of the participants (expressed in the form of roles) and
co-ordinate the moves that they can make in the context of executing
the protocol.
When representing a protocol, a familiar metaphor would provide the
advantage of abstracting away from the technicalities and presenting
the user as well as the designer with something that they can easily
understand and use without problems [104]. In this context, we are
treating protocols as games and every move made by a participant in a
protocol is treated as a move made in a game. This is the case as both
games and protocols are rule-governed and additional components (e.g.
protocol variations) could be easily added.
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1.2 Admittance of agents to semi-open so-
cieties
Agents typically have a set of goals they are trying to fulfill. In order to
fulfill these goals, an agent may need to get access to a set of resources
relevant to this goal and collaborate with other agents to achieve sub-
goals [109]. However, these resources will have to be accessed from a
variety of locations, in a variety of ways and each one of them will
exhibit different properties - varying degrees of bandwidth on the con-
nection they use for example or varying accuracy, price and so on. We
choose to represent the agents providing these resources as an artificial
society. Such a society may be identified by a set of network locations,
will be governed by a set of rules and will be associated with a degree
of openness. Agents requiring a resource will need to join a society that
holds the resource and conforms to the rules of that society if admitted
to it.
We look at openness from a membership viewpoint [27], not from one
considering agent architectures, standards or ontologies. In this con-
text, new agents can be accepted to the society but they will have to go
through an application process first. The application will be assessing
the agent’s competence to interact with the other agents in that society;
informally, the agent will be allowed entry to the society if it can make
conversation with the other member agents. We will be defining compe-
tence formally later in Section 3.9, as well as describing the interactions
between an agent, on one hand, and a society on the other. The latter
will be represented in the interactions by its Authority Agents ; these are
agents that are assumed to know all the societal rules regarding what
protocols the society makes available and what roles participate in each
of them.
We will be using UML [41] to represent the activities of the interaction
between agents and societies in the form of activity diagrams. The use of
the extended set of UML diagrams as the modelling language for agent-
based systems [52] has been proposed as the result of agents having
richer properties than objects [79] and, also, some UML diagrams (e.g.
class diagrams) lacking formal semantics [88].
Our interest at this stage, however, is to represent the various interac-
tions between the applicant agent and the authority agent of the society
the applicant wants to join. Put another way, our representation is in-
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tended to be at a high-level of abstraction rather than describing all the
details. As a result, we are trying to show the flow of interactions by
grouping interactions serving similar purposes into activities; activity
diagrams are very useful in this context, due to their processing-thread
semantics [79] - this will give us the flexibility of describing activities
that happen in parallel. We should note here that AUML [12] could
have been used for the same purpose as activity diagrams in both UML
and AUML are based on Petri Nets; in fact, most of the enhancements
suggested by the AUML project are now part of UML 2.0.
In general, for societies where membership is conditional the lifetime of
the agent in an artificial society can be divided into three phases [66]:
(i) application phase, where the competence of the agent is assessed
with regards to the role(s) that it is applying for (application
phase);
(ii) the phase where the assignment of roles to the agent happens and it
pursues the goal(s) for which it entered the society (societal phase)
- this is where the interaction with the other agents happens;
(iii) the phase where the agent’s goal(s) was (were) achieved or it is
expelled from the society (exit phase).
In this context, this thesis is primarily concerned with the study of phase
(i) with the additional focus on the communication capabilities of agents
at the time of application.
1.2.1 Joining a semi-open society
The agent will be motivated for joining a society, because it needs the re-
sources available therein to accomplish its goal. The application process
is described in Figure 1.1.
The process starts when the Authority Agent of a society receives an
application from an individual agent to occupy a role (or roles) in the
society (as an example, the role of the auctioneer in an auction house).
When the application is made, we assume that is judged on two grounds:
• a set of social qualifications ; these represent anything that is not
related to the societal protocols, but might be a prerequisite for
using them. In the auction example, an agent might have to go
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Individual Agent Authority Agent
Application form for
Social Position
Receive application
Social
Qualifications
Skills
Evaluation
Formulate
Reply
Receive
Reply
Terminate
Negotiation
Negative
Enter
Society
Positive
Additional
Negotiation
Conditional
Fork
Merge
Figure 1.1: Application process for an agent to join an agent society
through a number of credit checks before its application can be
processed further.
• a set of social skills ; these relate to the communicative acts that the
agent in question is capable of uttering. These acts will be checked
against the protocols that the agent will participate in under the
role(s) it is applying for, should it be accepted as a member to the
society. An example of skills could be acts like bid, register and so
on. In judging that, all other agents will be assumed to behaving
according to the protocol rules.
In the case that the agent receives a positive reply, then it enters the
society while if a negative reply is received it will have to seek another
society that fulfills its goals or acquire the new social skills and/or social
qualifications needed and then apply again for another - possibly the
same - role. There is, also, the possibility of a conditional reply in which
case the agent will have to enter another negotiation cycle - we are
assuming that nothing will have changed in the meantime as a result of
which the agent might have changed its opinion in relation to joining or
not the society.
For the remainder of this thesis, we will be assuming that the agent has
all the social qualifications needed and we will be focusing on verifying
its set of social skills against the protocol requirements. We will not
be looking at conditional replies either and focusing on providing the
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agent with a positive or negative response as to whether it is allowed
to enter the society or not.
1.2.2 An agent’s lifecycle in an artificial society
Once the agent’s request for joining the society is accepted, the agent
will need to be provided with descriptions of the protocols that it is going
to be involved in as a member of the society. Each of the protocols will
relate to a number of roles and sets of communicative acts that the agent
can use in these protocols, depending on what role it assumes in them.
During the time that the agent is part of the society, the set of protocols
needed to interact with other agents may not need to remain constant.
In an agent-oriented application of a business application domain, for
example, it is often convenient to have every user represented by an agent
so that the user accesses business applications and business processes via
the agent (similar to the way people access the web via a browser). In
this setting, if the user of the agent is promoted (thus, been involved
in more and, possibly, different protocols or in the same protocols but
with different roles), the user’s agent will need to accommodate the new
assignment as well. The protocol assignment part, therefore, is not static
but might require the agent, while in the society, to have to learn to cope
with more communicative acts. This is depicted in Figure 1.2. Moreover,
we need to ensure that the agent roles in the new set of protocols that
the agent receives does not contradict the ones it has at the moment,
i.e. there are no role conflicts.
Individual Agent Authority Agent
Assignment
of
Roles
Skills
Acquisition
may lead
to
Figure 1.2: Assignment of roles to an agent
In this work, we will not be considering the dynamic part of skill acqui-
sition and role allocation, but we are only concerned with the allocation
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of role(s) to the agent when it enters the society. Moreover, as we only
look at the static nature of role allocation, we do not include in our
analysis any role conflict issues.
1.2.3 Leaving a society
The status of the agent as a society member will need to be revised over
time. It might be the case that the agent has achieved its goal, in which
case it can leave the society (e.g. in the auction scenario because the
auction ended or the agent acquired the item it was bidding on from
another auction). On the other hand, the society might need to revise
its membership, as a result of the agent failing to comply with some of
the protocols or other constraints on membership (e.g. time constraints
due to limitations on resources availability).
The process in the form of an activity diagram is shown in Figure 1.3.
Individual  Agent Authority Agent
Society-Revise
Status
Terminate
Membership
with current status
Membership
Expired
Individual-Revise
Status
else
Member
Expelled
Goal
Achieved
Goal
Failed
New status
acquisition
else
Figure 1.3: An agent leaving a society
As we will not be looking at this phase, we will just assume that the
agent will leave the society once its goal has been achieved or the society
will expel the agent if there are any constraints that the agent violates.
Furthermore, we are not interested in the possibility of the agent break-
ing the rules of the protocol, as we only look at whether the agent can
converse with other agents participating in the protocol. We are not
interested in its actual behaviour once it joins the society, but on its po-
tential to generate conversations with the other member agents on the
basis of its communication skills.
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1.3 Issues
Section 1.2 presents the whole lifetime of an agent within an artificial
agent society. This thesis will focus on the first part, namely the admit-
tance of an agent into an artificial society. In using this representation
(artificial agent societies where member agents provide services through
protocols in which participant agents assume roles) a number of issues
arise.
(Issue 1) how do we formulate a game-based version representation of a pro-
tocol in terms of roles and how is access to the society regulated?
(Issue 2) Assuming the agent is granted access to the society, the next is-
sue is that of the knowledge it gets upon entrance. Sure enough,
we can provide all the details of the protocol but this will cre-
ate performance and, maybe, security problems. The issue to deal
with, then, becomes: can the agent be given a minimal protocol de-
scription that it can follow without worrying about the full protocol
complexity?
(Issue 3) Furthermore, one of the issues with protocols is that of protocol
decomposition [77], i.e., the breaking of complex ones into their
constituents. If the protocol is a well-designed one, then it should
be possible to decompose it into the constituent protocols (one for
each role participating in the protocol) and the resulting protocols
should be implementable, i.e., they should not contain any infor-
mation not known to the agent when it has to make decisions as
to how to proceed in the course of the protocol. In this case, the
question of whether the protocol is well-designed, i.e., is imple-
mentable by the participant agents or not is raised. The question
that we need to look at is: how can we verify that a protocol is
well-designed? If it is not, can it be repaired?
1.4 Aims & Objectives
1.4.1 Aims
The aims of this thesis are:
(Aim 1) (relating to (Issue 1)) Provide a framework based on the games
metaphor that:
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• represents protocols of an artificial society;
• links the representation of protocols to social notions (roles,
skills);
(Aim 2) (relating to (Issue 1)) provide a computational framework that can
assess the application of an agent wishing to join the society;
(Aim 3) (relating to (Issue 2) & (Issue 3)) provide a framework that can
decompose a protocol into smaller ones containing the minimal
information that the participant will need to know and assess if it
is well-designed;
(Aim 4) (relating to (Issue 2) & (Issue 3)) provide a framework for repairing
the protocol if it is not well-designed.
1.4.2 Objectives
The objectives of the project are:
(Objective 1) (relating to (Aim 1)) produce a framework that uses the games
metaphor as the main representation mechanism [104]. We chose
the games metaphor as users are familiar with the concept. More-
over, it is an intuitive metaphor as games and protocols are both
rule-governed.
(Objective 2) (relating to (Aim 1) & (Aim 2)) We aim at producing executable
specifications, which are event-based and structured; the protocols
as games representation meets these requirements as it is based
around the concept of events (moves made by the players). We
represent moves by considering the Event and Situation Calculi
frameworks to represent the evolution of the formulated protocols.
We are interested in the evolution of the protocol in cases where
focus is on the global state or on concurrent actions or property
changes over time and those two frameworks have proven to be
well suited for this purpose.
(Objective 3) (relating to (Aim 2)) evaluate the approach through the use of
protocols with different structures. One structure that might cause
problems is that of loops, as it might mean that we run the danger
of looping continuously and not reaching any result. We need to
filter out these moves and allow them to occur a certain number of
times. Another category that is of interest is in protocols where we
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have two instances of the same role - in this case, both instances
should receive the same behavioural description.
(Objective 4) (relating to (Aim 3) & (Aim 4)) use a technique that will allow us
to get a minimal version of the original protocol containing only
the rules pertinent to a specific role.
(Objective 5) (relating to (Aim 3) & (Aim 4)) use the aforementioned technique
in order to determine if the protocol is well-formed as well as repair
it so it has this property in the end.
1.5 Research Hypotheses
In the course of this research, we made the following assumptions:
(Hypothesis 1) We take a bird’s eye view of the society and look at it as a collection
of norms encapsulated in protocols and roles - nothing else (e.g.
reputation, trust) is of interest.
(Hypothesis 2) The strategies of the agents are, also, not taken into consideration
as they cannot be observed.
(Hypothesis 3) We look at societies whose admittance requirements will only de-
pend on the protocols. That is, admittance to the society is only
judged on the basis of the agent’s ability to participate in the rel-
evant societal protocols. We do not take into account the current
or future composition of the society (in terms of numbers of agents
playing specific roles) and how additional preferences regarding its
composition or any other aspect can affect agent’s admittance. For
example if an auction society has reached a pre-defined maximum
number of bidders, another one applying for a bidder’s place who
can perform well in the bidder’s protocol(s) will not be rejected
on the basis of a large number of bidders already present in the
society.
(Hypothesis 4) We only look at the message exchanges between societal agents
in the context of pre-defined protocols and roles. We also assume
that this exchange is free of any further constraints, e.g. due to
environmental models. If an exchange is allowed by a protocol
and the agent selects to utter that message, then the exchange
will happen.
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(Hypothesis 5) We are not interested in the architecture or communication lan-
guage of the individual agents. We assume that there is a shared
lingua and that agents themselves are responsible for ensuring that
they can understand the language spoken by other agents before
they make the application for entering the society.
(Hypothesis 6) We are not interested in the low-level primitives of agent com-
munication. We assume that messages will always arrive to their
recipients and any problems (e.g., network delays, concurrent com-
munication and so on) are outside the scope of this work.
(Hypothesis 7) When an agent is checked against the protocols that it will play
as a society member (if admitted to the society), the check is done
assuming that the other participants are ideal and collaborative.
This means that they can perform all moves prescribed by the pro-
tocol and they always collaborate. As mentioned in (Hypothesis
3), the current composition of the society is not taken into con-
sideration at all. This means that the new agent admitted might
posses skills that the agents currently in the society cannot match.
However, this approach has the following advantages:
(a) it can serve as a first pass. Assuming agents that can realise
all moves, we can discard applicants who do not meet our
expectations. This is much easier and effective than taking
into consideration the current composition of the society and
what moves each of its members can perform;
(b) it provides opportunities for expansion. As new agents are
added, the skills that cannot be put in use at the moment
might prove extremely useful later on. For example, an agent
that can take Visa payments, when no other agent in the
society can make a Visa payment now.
1.6 Description of the approach and archi-
tecture of the techniques used
This work aims at providing a framework for deciding if an agent is
competent to join a society offering services it is interested in and, if
accepted, provide it with the minimal enactable protocol with actions
only pertinent to its role. The approach followed to achieve this is:
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1 the agent applies for entry to the society providing his communi-
cation abilities (i.e., the messages it can utter/understand);
2 the Authority Agent of the society uses the game-based formula-
tion of the protocol (see Chapter 3 for the details) to decide if the
agent is competent to join the society or not;
3 provided it is considered to be competent, it will need to be pro-
vided with information on the role it is taking up. This will involve
creating a role specification from the protocol one. The technique
we use is based on an automata-theoretic technique called branch-
ing bisimulation equivalence(bbe ) Chapter 4 for the details).
4 the role specification is then checked for enactability.
• if it is found to be non-enactable, then the original protocol
is modified appropriately (check Section 4.3 for the details).
The process is shown in Figure 1.4.
membership to the
Agent applies for
Authority Agent judges
the agent’s competence
Agent Competenet?
No
Yes
role specifications
Authority Agent produces
Protocol
Enactable?
Yes
Provide agent
with the specification
Repair Protocol
No
society
Figure 1.4: Our approach
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1.7 Structure of the Thesis
This is the introductory chapter, where we provide the motivation for
the research and outline its aims and objectives, as well as state any
assumptions made and listing the relevant publications. The rest of the
thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 presents the background to our work. The concepts that
form the cornerstones of our work are presented briefly; namely the con-
cepts of agent societies, the original game-based protocol representation
framework and roles.
We, then, move on in Chapter 3 to describe the theoretical aspect of
our model. We describe how to model roles in games protocols and how
to compose them to compose the societal protocols. This is followed
by a definition of how a protocol can be represented in both Event and
Situation calculi formulations. Once the agent is accepted into the soci-
ety and should be given the protocols it has to enact, the question that
arises is whether it is competent to participate in the protocol or not.
We define the agent’s strategy and, on the basis of that, differentiate be-
tween different degrees of competence. Finally, the relationship between
the game-based approach that we use to describe the protocols and the
LTS one we are using for representing them is discussed.
Chapter 4 looks at the algorithms for meeting our objectives, namely
de-composing the protocol into roles, repairing it if needed and providing
the agent only with the minimal set of information required to enact
its role. We discuss three different approaches for repairing a protocol,
ranging from repairing every single problematic transition to a selected
subset of them.
Once the theoretical framework and the algorithms have been discussed,
in Chapter 5 we evaluate cyclic and acyclic protocols. We look at ex-
amples in both formulations - Event and Situation Calculi. We also
present an example of breaking down a protocol that contains two in-
stances of the same role, an auction with two bidders. If the protocol
is well-designed, then it should provide the same set of options for both
bidders as they enact the same role.
Chapter 6 reviews related work concerning competence (or conformance
or interoperability), extracting rules pertinent to a role from the descrip-
tion of the whole protocol and breaking down a protocol into component
roles. A brief account of each approach is given as well as a comparison
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with the game-based approach that we adopt in this work.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by presenting its main findings.
It also draws on directions for future research.
1.8 Previous Publications
The thesis contains materials from the following publications:
(Publication 1) Agents acquiring Resources through Social Positions [66]. This
publication describes the top-level framework for all stages of an
agent’s lifetime within a society. These include the application for
entrance, how it might evolve whilst in the society and the point
at which, voluntary or not, it leaves the society.
(Publication 2) An agent development framework based on social positions [65]. In
this publication, we discuss and link the main components of our
approach, namely roles and skills. Moreover, an attempt is made
to look at the problem of dynamically assigning new roles to the
agent. It also contains an initial attempt to define the concept
of social position as a placeholder for roles, which we have not
explored any further as it was not required to meet our aims.
(Publication 3) Competence Checking for the Global E-Service Society Using Games
[105]. In this publication, we present the game-based framework
for representing protocols. Furthermore, we describe the evolution
of a protocol in both time-independent (Situation Calculus) and
timed (Event Calculus) games.
(Publication 4) From Agent Game Protocols to Implementable Roles [59]. In this
publication, we present an algorithm for producing an individual
role specification from a protocol. We, also, address the problem of
protocols with structural problems (non-enactability) and propose
an algorithm for repairing them.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we look at the main concepts around which our work
is built and present the work already been carried out in these areas.
The presentation is done in a sequential order so that the next term
will depend on the previous one and will be motivated by that. More
specifically, we discuss the concepts of agent societies, game-based rep-
resentation of protocols, roles (and skills) and competence.
2.2 Agents
In recent years, there have been major advances in the way we perceive
and interact with computers. These advances were mainly due to the
progress made in the areas of distributed systems and networks as well
as the reductions in size and the increased penetration that computer
devices enjoy in our everyday life.
As a result, in contrast with the past, where the size of the devices as
well as the absence of open area networks made it impossible for the
user to interact with computing devices while on the move, it is now
perfectly possible to use small computing devices embedded in items
we use everyday (such as mobile phones or MP3 players) for performing
tasks that would otherwise be performed from our desktop. As an exam-
ple, many of us would use our mobile handset to connect to the Internet
and participate in auctions, book tickets, read and/or send emails, edit
office documents and so on.
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In conducting these applications, one option is to have the end user
fully involved in initiating and conducting them, i.e., if the user wants
to purchase a specific item in an auction, one option would be to look
at all the auction sites himself, evaluate and follow all the auctions
that this item features in. However, a more realistic and desirable way
forward, would be to allow the software running on the device make some
decisions and give it a degree of autonomy so the interaction required
from the user would be kept to a minimum.
This way repetitive tasks can be simplified and a less error-prone system
can be built. In the aforementioned auction example, it would be much
easier if the software running on the mobile phone or the PDA could
detect that a new auction came up with an item that interests the user
and joined it automatically.
In order for the software to work that way, it should exhibit a high degree
of autonomy and be able to reason about certain properties of the user.
Furthermore, it should be goal-oriented and focus on generating different
plans for achieving the user goal(s). Finally, it should be able to operate
in an open context (environment) and exchange information with other
software entities of the same kind.
This description fits naturally the description of a software agent. There
is no commonly agreed definition of an agent, however there is some
agreement over the characteristics that a software entity should exhibit
in order to be classified as an agent - these are as follows [19, 78]:
• encapsulates its own state - that is, every agent has its own view of
the world and that might be different to the view of other agents
in the system;
• the environment where the agent is situated is dynamic and open
- there are changes occurring that the agent must register (those
that are of interest to it);
• it should have the ability to reason on the basis of observations
registered from the environment;
• it should be able to communicate with other agents within the
same environment and execute actions based on data acquired
from the observation of the environment, the local state and the
internal reasoning that took place.
The definition above focuses on a number of characteristics that col-
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lectively define the weak notion of agency, i.e., the absolute minimum
characteristics that an application must possess in order to be classified
as an agent. These would be autonomy, social ability, reactivity and
pro-activity. Furthermore, agents can exhibit human-like characteris-
tics, such as benevolence, fairness and veracity, and these would define
the strong notion of agency.
2.3 MAS & Artificial Agent Societies
As an extension to the term agent, a collection of agents can be viewed
as a Multi-Agent System. A Multi-Agent system is a system made up of
software agents, where ([19]):
• not all problems can be solved with information that an agent of
the system possesses;
• there is no global system control;
• data is decentralised; and
• computation is asynchronous.
In the context of the environment described in Section 2.2, physical ev-
eryday devices are transformed into computing devices. On the other
hand, due to the technological advances and the availability of band-
width, they would able to migrate from one network/platform to the
other with ease. As a result, the question of how is access to these
resources going to be regulated arises.
Our view is that these network resources can be organised around the
concept of artificial agent societies [82, 90]. These are viewed in different
ways in the literature. Davidsson defines it as a collection of agents
interacting with each other under the presence of some norms and social
laws [26]. Moreover, a distinction can be made between agent societies
and agent communities in that the latter should represent agents in
closer proximity to those belonging in an agent society. In the same
context, an agent society is defined in [93] as a collection of agents
with similar interests working towards the achievement of a goal (the
focus been on the collaboration between the agents rather than their
proximity).
Formally, Artikis defines an open agent society as follows [5]:
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• a set of agents;
• a set of constraints on the society (a description of the societal
norms and rules that the agents have to obey);
• a communication language;
• a set of roles that the agents can play;
• a set of states of affairs that hold at each time at the society; and
• a set of agent owners.
Furthermore, Davidsson expands this definition in [28], to include the
following items:
• a set of agent designers;
• the environmental infrastructure in terms of communication and
computation;
• the environment owner (the organisation or institution that de-
fines who enters the society and what is the configuration of the
environment - roles to be assumed, communication language and
so on); and
• the environment designer.
The additional items in this definition are due to the fact that not all
system stakeholders are considered in [5] and any constraints due to
them will need to be acknowledged and explicitly stated. The societal
constraints element of the definition by Artikis would cover all the con-
straints but it is useful to look at constraints on a per stakeholder basis.
In [33], Doran defines the artificial society as a set of heterogeneous and
located inter-related agents. There is no assumption about the type of
agents, just the assumption on the society side that it is open, i.e., any
agent can join and leave freely. Society is formally defined as a network
graph where every node is a site and there are bidirectional links, called
channels, to join nodes (essentially sites will correspond to agents and
links will correspond to ways of communication). The agent members
of the society will be situated on a site and will have a unique identifier,
an owner, an internal unobservable selection strategy, might be mobile,
exchange information via the channels specified and can act on society
items.
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In [32], Dignum focuses more on the normative aspect of the specifica-
tion: an organizational-oriented view is taken upon the definition of an
artificial society. More specifically, the society is described by an or-
ganisational model and an individual (agent) model. The organisational
model is defined in deontic logic as a tuple OM = (R, CF, I, N), where:
• R is the set of role descriptions;
• CF is the communicative framework for the society (as agent will
be heterogeneous and speak different languages, this framework
will be used to provide common grounds for understanding be-
tween the agent members);
• I is a set of scripts to be realised in interaction scenes. Inter-
action scenes can represent states in a protocol execution, while
scripts will essentially represent an execution path for reaching
these states; and
• N is the set of social laws (or norms) - this is specified in terms
of contracts that, if broken, will result in the offending agent been
sanctioned.
In [48], the authors view society as a medium for agents to meet and
interact. They are characterised by their openness and the social norms
and laws that the society will need to have in place to enforce the order
in it.
The information from the approaches described above can be summarised
in Table 2.1:
Property Artikis Davidsson Doran Dignum
Set of Agents ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Set of Constraints ✓ ✓ 7 ✓
Communication Language ✓ ✓ 7 ✓
Set of Roles ✓ ✓ 7 ✓
Set of States ✓ ✓ 7 ✓
Set of Agent Owners ✓ ✓ ✓ 7
Set of Agent Designers 7 ✓ 7 7
Environmental Infrastructure 7 ✓ 7 ✓
Environment Owner 7 ✓ 7 7
Environment Designer 7 ✓ 7 7
Table 2.1: Comparison of artificial agent society definitions
In our approach, artificial agent societies are viewed as a collection of
agents having specific skills, i.e., communicative acts that they can per-
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form. These societies are normative societies and are organised around
the concepts of protocols and roles.
More specifically, a protocol will describe a pattern of interaction be-
tween two or more agents and will describe what actions they are allowed
to take and at what states of the protocol evolution. The description
of the protocol will be in terms of behavioral components, i.e., in terms
of what the agents can do when they engage with the protocol. The
behavioral recipes will be expressed in terms of roles - every role will
specify the expected behaviour of an individual in a given context [14].
As an example, we can consider the case of a user seeking to purchase
an item (e.g. a mobile phone) from an online auction. The user will pass
the information of the item he wants to purchase to his representative
agent, who will then take over and look for auction services from which
it can purchase that item.
This will involve evaluating a number of auction societies with regards
to whether the item it is interested in is available as well as whether
any other auction-related preferences are met (e.g. shipment has to be
made within two days of the auction end). It will then have to join these
societies and participate in the auction(s) for the item it is interested in.
In this context, if an agent needs to get access to the resources offered
by an agent society, i.e., the services that the agents offer, such as the
auction, payment and shipping agent societies, it will need to request and
gain access to that society. In other words, the question now becomes:
what would be the criteria that we can use to grant access to an agent
into an artificial agent society.
2.4 Entry to Society
In representing collection of agents as artificial agent societies governed
by normative rules expressed in the form of protocols and roles, we
need to make a decision concerning how the society will accept (or not)
new members. There are four possibilities regarding the openess of the
society to new members [27]:
• open societies, where agents can join and leave at any time without
any restrictions;
• closed societies, where membership is pre-defined and static; any
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agent is either a member and it is allowed access to the resources
offered by the society or not;
• semi-open societies where membership is granted on successful
judgement of a submitted application form; and
• semi-closed societies, where entrance to new members is not al-
lowed, but agents external to the society can nominate agents al-
ready in the society to act as their representatives.
In light of the type of systems we want to represent in our approach
(highly dynamic, adaptable, critical and fault-tolerant systems) the op-
tion of closed societies seems too restrictive for our purposes. On the
other hand, the option of completely open societies might lead to prob-
lems such as poor communication and/or communication deadlocks be-
tween member and non-member agents – the same applies to semi-closed
ones, as the agent will have to entirely rely on agents who are already
members of the society.
A more realistic approach seems to be the restriction of agent entry to
the society on the basis of satisfying certain conditions. As long as these
conditions are met, the agent can become a member of the society until
it accesses the resources to achieve its goals or it decides to leave the
society.
A choice has, thus, to be made regarding a number of factors that will
control the agent’s admittance (or not) to the society, namely:
• what will the admittance criteria be;
• who will conduct the check of whether the agent meets the criteria
or not; and
• how will the societal behavioral rules, i.e., protocols be repre-
sented.
We look at each one of them in the following Sections.
2.4.1 Admittance Criteria
The first item we need to decide is on the basis of what criteria would
the new agents be admitted into the society. As stated in Section 1.5,
we are interested in all societies who use protocols to judge the agent’s
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competence as part of their admittance criteria. We concentrate on that
part only – societies can have other criteria as well. As an example, in a
society with one auctioneer and a million bidders if a new bidder agent
applies for membership, the current number of agents who are bidders
in that society already makes no difference (as well as other properties
of the applicant agent, e.g. the good or bad reputation it carries from
other societies that it was a member of in the same role or in similar
roles).
The question, thus, of whether an agent should be admitted to a society
or not is transformed to a question of whether it should be able to
understand and use the societal rules, as the latter are expressed in the
relevant protocols.
2.4.2 Authority Agents (AA)
Every society that is semi-open and accepts members only by applica-
tion, will need to have a way of regulating access [27]. The role of this
component will be to assess the membership applications received and
reach a decision as to whether the application will be accepted or not.
In our societies, this task is performed by one (or more) Authority Agents
(AA) - their task is to know all societal rules and how they are related to
the society’s protocols, i.e., what roles participate in each protocol and
what are the conditions for making a move within each protocol. On
the basis of this knowledge, they need to decide if the applicant agent
will be granted or denied entry.
2.5 Game-based representation of proto-
cols
As the decision of the Authority Agent will be based on the actions
that the agent can perform in relation to the role it is applying for
and the protocols in which the role participates in, we need a suitable
representation of protocols.
In the literature, a number of choices exist with respect to modelling
protocols. These include different types of automata [16, 57, 64] such
as Finite State Automata (both deterministic and non-deterministic),
Bu¨chi automata and so on. The notion of automata is an attractive
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formalism as it is easy to understand and implement - the notation of
deterministic finite automata, specifically, has been widely used [31, 89].
Another approach is to model the protocols as games [106], emphasising
the similarities between the two approaches. The protocol participants
can be seen as players, the rules of the protocol as the rules of the game
and the participants decision on their next move they make could be
seen as part of their game strategy. Moreover, the starting point of the
protocol would be the starting point of the game and the final point(s)
would be when the game ends - depending on the final point reached, as
there might be many, one or the other participant would be declared the
winner. Finally, it can represent any of the protocols represented as an
FSA and can offer a higher level of granularity in the form of subgames.
In [68], a game description language is specified for playing online games
consisting of a Game Manager that will be connecting a number of
General Game Playing sessions; the players do not know the rules of
the game in advance, but they can understand the language in which
they are written. The development of the language was carried out as a
response to the large explosion of state space for a number of games (e.g.
chess) and the inability to differentiate - in a standard FSA - between
changes due to player moves or game dynamics. As an example when
two players are playing a game of Tic-Tac-Toe, we need to differentiate
between the case that the game terminated because one of the players
won or the network went down.
As a result, the Game Development Language (GDL) was introduced,
based on datalog⌝ [47]. This language describes the relations between
the players and the state of the game. The players of the game are
defined via the role relation, while the state of the game is described via
a series of relations - init to describe what is true at the beginning of the
game, control to describe the player who is in control, next to describe
the next player who is to make a move, legal that describes what are
the legal moves in a state and does to describe the moves that a player
makes (or has made). Finally, the goal rules will describe the goals of a
player and what he will be trying to achieve in the game.
On the other hand, the Game Manager is responsible for synchronising
the state between the players and receiving their moves. Every player
will be assigned a single role - every time that the player has to make a
move, the player will send the move to the Game Manager and it will be
the responsibility of the Game Manager to assess its validity and either
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apply the move if it is valid or randomly select a move and apply it if
the player submitted an invalid move or did not submit a move at all. It
will, also, be its responsibility to keep the clock for the game, i.e., if there
are any time constraints regarding the selection of moves by the players,
then Game Manager will enforce that. It can, also, provide some time
to the players for reading the rules before the start of the game. All the
communication in GDL happens through HTTP connections.
Our approach is based on the existing games framework described in
[103, 104, 106]. In this framework, for each game we need to specify the
following components:
• the state of the game;
• the moves that the players can make; and
• the rules of the game.
Moves will describe what actions are available, while the rules will de-
scribe what actions are legal. The moves are represented by Prolog
select/2 predicates in the form select(Player, Act). The state of
the game is represented by rule/3 predicates as follows: rule(State,
Property, Conditions) meaning that property Property holds in
state State if conditions Conditions hold. Any property that we want
to check against is considered to be a goal of the player and check for
multiple properties can be done recursively (by using a Prolog list con-
struct).
When a player makes a move, this will change the state of the game
by producing some effects; these are represented by effects/2 pred-
icates as follows: effects(State, Actions) defines the effects
of actions Actions on the current state State of the game. This is
further extended to the effectsRule/4 predicate, which is defined as
effectsRule(State, Action, Conditions, Actions). If the
game is in state State, if conditions Conditions of action Action are
met, then actions Actions are carried out. Action is the move that the
player(s) decided to make and we need to look at Conditions one at a
time, checking that they are met; for example, in a request-query pro-
tocol we need to check that a query has been made before the agent
produces a response. In other words, if Conditions of Action are ver-
ified in the current state of the game, Action is a valid move and its
effects will be described by Actions.
The game itself is defined as a sequence of steps as shown below:
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• check that the state we are currently in is not a terminating state;
• find the next valid move,
• apply its effects.
A distinction is made between moves that the game makes available to
the players (available), the moves that are allowed at a certain stage of
the game (legal) and the intersection of those (valid).
In order to play a game between two or more players, we have the option
of filtering the moves through an umpire. The umpire will check whether
the game is in a terminating state or not and - if not - check that a valid
move has been selected, display its effects and then call itself recursively
to check if the new state is a terminating state or not. If the game has
reached a terminating state, this will be offered as a solution – the game
can be terminated there, or the user might request more terminating
paths. The program is shown in Listing 2.1:
1 umpire(Umpire, State, Result, game(State,Result)):-
2 stop(Umpire,State,Result,terminating(State,Result)).
3 umpire(Umpire,State,Result,game(State,Result)):-
4 not terminating(State, _),
5 check(Umpire,Move,State,valid(State,Move)),
6 display(Umpire,State,Move,effects(State,Move)),
7 umpire(Umpire,State,Result,game(State,Result)).
Listing 2.1: umpire/4 predicate
The check/4 predicate in Listing 2.1 can be run in both a backward
mode - the player selects a move and the umpire checks if it is valid - or
in a forward mode - all valid moves are provided to the player and he
selects one.
As an example, we can look at the request-reply protocol in Figure 2.1.
select(responder,not−understood,initiator)
select(initiator,request,responder) select(responder,reply,initiator)
s1s0 s2
s3
Figure 2.1: A simple request-reply protocol
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It consists of two roles, initiator and responder, with the agent assuming
the role of initiator making a request for information to the agent assum-
ing the role of responder. The responder agent can, then, choose to reply
with the requested information or with a not-understood move. Both of
these moves take the protocol to a final state where it terminates.
The code in Listing 2.1 is saving the moves made so far by the game play-
ers in State and if the last move is a terminating move, State becomes
equal to Result which is the end result of the game. If the last move
selected is not a terminating move, then the state of the game is checked
for another valid move. Once selected, its effects are displayed and the
umpire predicate is called again to check whether it is a terminating one
or not; if not, the cycle continues.
The stop/4 predicate simply calls the terminating/2 predicate, which
contains information about the moves that bring the game to completion
along with any pre-conditions that will have to be met for a move to be
a terminating one. The same holds for the check/4 predicate; it merely
calls the valid/2 that looks at the current state of the game and decides
on the next valid move to be selected. Finally, the display/4 predicate
is calling the effects/2 one so that the effects of the last move selected
in the previous step will be reflected on the current state of the game.
The request-reply protocol that we are looking at has two terminating
moves, reply and not-understood. These can be selected provided that a
request move has been made by the initiator of the protocol beforehand.
Assuming a rule of the form
1 rule(requestreply(ID),terminating(reply(P1,P2,Query)),
2 [next(P1),previous(select(P2,request(P1,Query)))]).
Listing 2.2: Example of a protocol rule
if the second player selects reply, it is his turn to make a move and the
previous selected move has been a request by the first player then the
game terminates.
In the case of non-terminating moves, we need to specify their effect
on the state of the game. The effects of, for example, a request move
in the protocol of Figure 2.1 are shown in Listing 2.3. The player who
makes the move is not the next player any more, but becomes the last;
furthermore, the move is added as the last move selected.
1 effectsRule(qprotocol,select(P,Act),[Act=request],
2 [delete(previous(select(L,_))),add(previous(select(P,Act))),
3 delete(next(P)),add(next(L)),delete(last(L)),add(last(P))]).
Listing 2.3: effectsOne/4 predicate
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This approach also allows for games with subgames, i.e., games that
contain other games as independent components. There is no restriction
on the relationship between the game and its subgame components - i.e.,
we can represent subgames where once the agents enters the subgame,
it has to terminate it before going back to the main game as well as
subgames where the player can interleave and go back to the main game
without having terminated the subgame first.
Once engaged in the protocol (game), the players will need to get in-
formation about what are the moves they are entitled to make and in
which context. This is the task carried out by roles; setting a behavioural
context regarding the agents’ behaviour.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the basic concepts on which we will base
our approach as well as work already done on them. We will be using
the agent metaphor to link the low-level implementation details of web
services to the high-level description of service providers and service
issuers. Each agent will have a number of skills, that is a number of
messages they can utter (understand) in the course of a protocol. A test
should be run to verify that the skills they have can lead to successful
co-operation when the protocol runs. This calls for a formal framework
to represent protocols & roles, as well as providing a local view for the
roles which is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Formal Framework
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present the formal framework of our approach, de-
tailing how the protocols as games concept is formulated as an LTS; we
show how a protocol and a role within a protocol are defined. If the
definition of roles is given, then we can work out the protocol as the
parallel composition of the role definitions. Furthermore, we present the
representation - as well as the evolution - of protocols by integrating in
our representation of games (a) the Situation Calculus where the focus
is on changes of a global state and (b) the Event Calculus, if concur-
rency is a domain requirement and the focus is on local changes of state
properties. The choice of the frameworks is done on the basis of seeking
executable specifications ; thus, the representation of the state as Normal
Logic Programs that can produce executable specifications. Finally, we
explore the different degrees of competence for an agent on the basis of
its strategy S and use the Netbill protocol to illustrate them.
3.2 The Netbill Protocol
In this section, we will be illustrating the main concepts of our frame-
work by the use of a variation of the e-commerce protocol NetBill [25, 46].
This can be used by a society that aims at allowing merchants to sell
goods to customers and make use of payment gateways in order to collect
payment. An agent wishing to enter a society where Netbill is available
will have to apply for the role of customer, merchant or gateway depend-
ing on the goal it wishes to achieve when entering the society. In the
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original protocol, there are three roles - customer (c), merchant (m) and
gateway (g)- and eight overall steps for a customer to purchase goods
from a merchant and the merchant to process payment for the order
through NetBill’s gateway. These are depicted in Figure 3.1 and are as
follows:
m ssepo g
c rq m
s0 s7s6
c oa m m pq c
c oa m
m pq c
s8s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
c sepo m
m dgb c
m dg c
m dga c m dgk cg sr m
Figure 3.1: A variant of the NetBill protocol
• The customer requests a quote for some digital goods from a mer-
chant - see the transition (s0, (c, rq,{m}), s8), i.e., from state 0 to
state 8, labelled as (c, rq,{m}).
• The merchant provides a quote to the customer - (s8, (m,pq,{c}),
s7).
• The customer accepts the quote made by the merchant - (s7,(c, oa,{m}), s6).
• The merchant proceeds to deliver the ordered goods encrypted
with a key K - (s6,(m,dg,{c}), s1).
• The customer signs an Electronic Purchase Order (EPO) with the
merchant - (s1, (c, sepo,{m}), s2).
• The merchant signs in its turn the EPO and sends it to the NetBill
gateway - (s2, (m,ssepo,{g}), s3).
• The NetBill gateway internally checks the information on the EPO,
transfers the money and ends by sending the merchant a receipt -
(s3,(g, sr,{m}),s4).
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• Finally, the merchant sends the customer the key needed to de-
crypt the goods it purchased - (s4, (m,dgk,{c}), s5).
We made the following additions to the original NetBill protocol to cre-
ate one with branching structure so that we can illustrate problems when
the agent has to make a decision but does not have all the information
required:
• The merchant can now make a price quote directly - (s0, (m,pq,{c}),
s7); e.g., in the case of a promotional offer.
• The merchant could select to deliver the goods as its first move -
(s0, (m,dga,{c}), s1); e.g., when the customer has good credit and
solid reputation with that merchant. In this case, the encryption
method used in the delivery can be more relaxed than the normal
one as the process involves a trusted customer.
• The customer might accept the merchant’s quote directly - (s0,(c, oa,{m}), s6); e.g., when the merchant is trusted or this is a recurring
order.
• On reception of a quote request, the merchant can make the quote
and ship the goods directly without waiting for a formal acceptance
of the quote - (s8, (m,dgb,{c}), s1); e.g. when dealing with a
trusted customer or a recurring order. The delivery and encryption
method will have to be different again, as if it is a recurring order
it will mean that the customer is low on stock for this particular
item.
3.3 Definition of a protocol in a society
We present a representation of protocols based on Labelled Transition
Systems, following closely the game metaphor and the notation of [105],
where the protocol is described as a set of player roles that interact via
dialogue moves representing message passing.
A protocol interpreted as a game will need to provide structures for
specifying what happens when the game starts, as well as describing the
evolution of game. This is happening through the transition between
states, once certain actions are triggered. In this section, we look at the
LTS-based definition of the protocol and Sections 3.6 and 3.7 describe
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the frameworks used for specifying what applies initially to a game pro-
tocol and, also, how the game properties (next player to make a move,
properties that hold at a specific state) are been modelled.
A game protocol (PG) is defined as a tuple
<N , R, S , I , F , A, M , V , E >,
where the components are as follows:
1. N is the game protocol’s name;
2. R is the set of player roles, participating in the game protocol;
3. S is the set of game protocol states ;
4. I is the initial state of the game protocol, I ∈ S ;
5. F is the set of final states of the game protocol, with F ⊆ S .
6. A are the labels of the actions that are known to the game protocol,
that is, all possible messages which can be exchanged by any two
(or more) players at any time during the execution of the protocol.
7. game moves are described by the relation M = R × A × (2R ∖ ∅),
i.e., the available actions are associated with the role that can
perform them, as well as, the roles which will be the recipients of
that action, assuming that an action can be performed on multiple
recipients.
8. valid moves are defined for a role according to the state that the
protocol is in and narrow down the choices of the next message to
be sent by the role. They are defined by the relation V = S ×M .
9. effects of the valid moves are calculated by the relation E = V ×S ,
i.e., the transition relation of the LTS. This relation is used to
determine the next state of the LTS on the basis of the current
one and the move that has been selected by the agent.
For the NetBill protocol shown in Figure 3.1 we have the following formal
representation:
<N , R, S , I , F ,A, M , V , E >,
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where:
N = NetBill
R = {c,m, g}
S = {s0, s1, s2, s3, . . . , s8}
I = {s0}
F = {s5}
A = {rq, pq, oa, dg, sepo, ssepo, sr, dgk}
M = {(c, rq,{m}), . . . , (m,dgk,{c})}
V = {(s0, (c, rq,{m})), . . . , (s7, (m,dgk,{c}))}
E = {(s0, (c, rq,{m}), s8), . . . , (s4, (m,dgk,{c}), s5)}
3.4 Modelling Roles in Game Protocols
This section presents the formal framework for describing a role in the
context of a protocol and links it to the previous notion of a game pro-
tocol. In a role-oriented model, a game protocol is assumed to be a set
of roles, i.e., PR = {RR}; the protocol will be produced as a composition
of the constituent roles.
The role descriptors are effectively a projection of the relevant compo-
nents of the game protocol onto a specific role; a role, thus, is specified
as a tuple <N R, RR, SR, IR, FR, AR, MR, V R, ER >. The component
RR represents the set of roles that the role N R will be interacting with
during the course of the protocol, either as initiators or as recipients of
messages sent (received) by the role in consideration. Any message by
any other role would be considered irrelevant and illegal. The actions
known to the role are AR, i.e., moves that the role can perform or re-
ceive. Given that has role(R,2RR) are all the subsets of RR containing
N R, the known moves set MR = {{R}×AR × (2RR ∖∅)}∪{(RR ∖{R})×
AR ×has role(R,2RR)} specifies whether an action can be performed by
the role itself (and by which other roles it can be received) or whether it
can be performed by some other role and received by the role in question
(possibly among others).
We should note here that each role is represented by an LTS . In order to
work out the possible interactions between the roles, we need to compose
these LTS using parallel composition, i.e., any actions that are common
between the roles will have to be performed at the same time.
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3.5 From Roles back to Game Protocols
If the role descriptors for the roles participating in a protocol are avail-
able, then we can construct the protocol by taking the synchronous
composition of the role LTS. The steps for the composition and, thus,
the final protocol will be as follows:
• The roles of the protocol should be the union of all the rolesets
from the role definitions (R = ⋃r∈{RR} RRr).
• The state of the game can be defined at any moment to be the
composition of the state of all its roles (S =∏r∈{RR} SRr ).
• The initial state would be the state where all roles are in their
initial states (I =∏r∈{RR} s0r).
• The final state would be the state where all roles are in their final
states - therefore, any combination of role terminating states will
be a terminating state for the game protocol as well (F = {s ∶∀r ∈ {RR}.sr ∈ FRr }).
• The available moves for the game protocol would be the union of
available moves of all role moves and the same will hold for the
game actions (A = ⋃r∈{RR} ARr , M = ⋃r∈{RR} MRr ).
• The valid moves of the game will comprise of those moves where all
roles are in a state to make a valid move - transitions with the same
labels in their LTS’s will be synchronised (as this is a requirement
for parallel composition). This means that both roles should be
in a state where they can select to make the respective moves (
V = {(s,m) ∶ s ∈ S ,m ∈ M ∧ ∀r ∈ {RR}.m ∈ MRr ⇒ (sr,m) ∈ V Rr }).
• The effects of a move will be derived by looking at the effects of
each move on an individual role, when all other roles remain in
the same state. The new state of the protocol will be the result
of the composition of the new state of the role making the move
with the states of the other roles. The formal representation is :
E = {(s1,m, s2) ∶ (s1,m) ∈ V ∧ ∀r ∈ {RR}.((s1r ,m) ∈ V Rr ⇒ (s1r ,m, s2r) ∈ ERr ) ∨ ((s1r ,m) ∉ V Rr ⇒
s2r = s1r)}.
In the case of breaking a protocol into its constituent roles, the paral-
lel composition of the resulting role LTS will not always give us back
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the original protocol (or one that is branching bisimilar to it); see Sec-
tion 5.4.1 on Page 94 for a counter-example.
3.6 Game evolution in Situation Calculus
We are using the games metaphor [103, 104, 106] in order to describe the
interactions among participants in protocols of artificial agent societies
as interactions and moves made in the context of a game. The idea here
is that protocol enactment happens through a series of communicative
acts, which are viewed as moves made between players in the context
of a game. The game does not, necessarily, need to have a winner or
a loser in the traditional sense (in an order protocol, the supplier wins
by making a sale and the merchant wins by acquiring the item(s) it
wanted). Termination of the game signals that the protocol has reached
a state where no further moves can be made by any of the participants
of the protocol. The focus is on the interaction between the different
participants with the ultimate aim of being to apply the formalisation
to practical applications, as for example the Netbill protocol [25, 46].
The next Sections will present a brief overview of Situation Calculus as
well as describe the representation for the different components of the
game definition.
3.6.1 Situation Calculus
Originally the Situation Calculus has been presented as a first-order
logic formalism to represent change in dynamically changing worlds [67,
72, 85]. Its formalisation allows for actions that have an effect on the
current state of the world, as it is perceived by an agent.
The basic assumption of the Situation Calculus is that the world may be
modeled as a system of interacting finite automata or transition systems
[72]. Using the calculus we formalise a domain problem by providing a
model describing:
• how the state of this world will be described, including the initial
state;
• any actions that can be performed in the world;
• the preconditions and the effects of an action;
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• the state following after a certain action has been decided;
• how properties of the world that are not affected by actions remain
the same.
3.6.1.1 Formalisation of Situation Calculus
move(‘B‘, ‘A‘, ‘C‘)
D D
B
A C A
B
C
Figure 3.2: Blocks world example.
In Figure 3.2, on the left-hand side we see the initial situation where
blocks A and C are on the table D and block B is on block A. On the
right-hand side the picture shows the situation where we have moved
block B from A on the block C.
Using the Situation Calculus, we model the world as a sequence of situ-
ations. The initial state of the world is modeled by an initial situation
which is denoted by the constant symbol s0. In each situation we de-
scribe the facts that hold true in it. For example, to describe a blocks’
world as shown on the left in Figure 3.2 (initially block B is on top of
block A and after the move block B is on top of block C ), we need to
write:
holds(on(’B’, ’A’), s0).
holds(on(’A’, ’C’), s1).
Situations change as a result of actions. When an action A takes place
in a situation S, it brings about a new situation that is referred to by
the function do(A, S). Thus, to derive the new situation, we need to
apply an action to it through the do function. Note that a situation is
not equivalent to a state; a situation is a history of actions recorded by
the do function, while a state is what holds true at a specific situation.
For example, in the blocks’ world, the situation where the action move(’
B’, ’A’, ’C’) is performed, is defined as: do(move(’A’, ’B’, ’C’), s0).
In this situation the relations between blocks in the state of the world
have changed, as we discuss next.
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3.6.1.1.1 Fluents
A fluent is a predicate whose value might change from a situation to
another one, as the result of the effects of an action. In our blocks’ world
example, the on(’B’, ’A’) is a fluent that is true in the initial situation
and false in the situation that resulted from moving block ’B’ on top
of block ’C’. Typically, a set of fluents can be true in many different
situations, for example, there are many different configurations of the
blocks’ world where block B is on top of block C in different situations.
3.6.1.2 Preconditions of Actions and Effects
It is often the case that actions have preconditions. In Situation Calcu-
lus these are modeled by a special predicate called possible(S, A): this
denotes that in situation S it is possible to perform action A.
1 possible(S, move(From, Obj, To)) ←
2 block(Obj),
3 holds(clear(Obj), S),
4 holds(on(Obj, From), S),
5 holds(clear(To), S).
Listing 3.1: possible/2 example in Situation Calculus
This way of defining the preconditions of the actions allows us to define
generally an action’s effects. For example, in order to define what holds
after a move block action has taken place, we need to write what is
known in the Situation Calculus as an effects axiom, as follows:
holds(on(Obj, To), do(move(From, Obj, To), S) ←
possible(S, move(From, Obj, To)).
This defines the positive effects of the actions. We can also state what
properties an action terminates after it is performed. In this version of
situation calculus, we define this by writing what becomes abnormal in
the new situation. For example, when we move a block from one position
to another, we need to also write: abnormal(on(Obj, From), move(From, Obj,
To), S).
The above assertion states that it is abnormal to move the block in a
situation and the block to remain where it was in the new situation.
The abnormality predicate above must be understood in conjunction
with the frame axiom, which we describe next.
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3.6.1.3 The Frame axiom
One of the main issues that we need to take into consideration when
we describe how fluents change as a result of actions being carried out
in situations, is expressing what remains unchanged. For example, we
need to state generally that facts such as on(A, C) remain there until an
action changes them. We do this by describing a general frame axiom
as in Listing 3.2.
1 holds(do(A, S), F) ←
2 holds(S,F),
3 \+ abnormal(F, A, S).
Listing 3.2: Definition of The Frame Axiom
This states that a fluent F that holds in a situation S continues to hold
after an action A has been executed, as long as it is not abnormal that
it holds in the new situation. This frame action, using a holds predicate,
is much more general than the way successor-state axioms are presented
in full-first order logic formulation of the situation calculus [72].
3.6.1.4 Static Facts
To complete the formulation of a domain description using the Situation
Calculus, we assume the existence of facts that hold across situations, or
are not situation dependent. For example the assertions in Listing 3.3
allow us to describe the rigid facts for the blocks world of interest:
1 block(’A’).
2 block(’B’).
3 block(’C’).
4 table(’D’).
Listing 3.3: Static Facts
3.6.2 Evolution of a game
We represent the evolution of a game as the logic program shown in
Listing 3.4 [102, 105]:
The game is defined by a recursive predicate through a game Situation
structure, which we first need to check if it is a terminating state or
not. If it is, the game terminates with result equal to Result. If it is
not terminating and there is a valid move that can be made, that valid
move is selected, its effects are applied to produce a NewSituation, and,
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1 game(Situation, Result):-
2 terminating(Situation, Result).
3 game(Situation, Result):-
4 \+ terminating(Situation, _),
5 valid(Situation, Move),
6 effects(Situation, Move, NewSituation),
7 game(NewSituation, Result).
Listing 3.4: Game Evolution Representation
then, we continue exploring this NewSituation in order to reach the final
Result.
We, now, need to define how a game situation will be represented, how
initial and terminating states will be defined (what will hold at the
beginning of the game and what would indicate its termination), how
the selection of valid moves by the player will be made and how the
effects of these moves are assumed to produce a new situation. Once
all these concepts are fully defined, the Authority Agent will be able
to explore the interactions between the various players and decide on
whether to accept or not an agent’s application for joining the society.
3.6.3 Game Situations using the Situation Calculus
A game situation will be represented by terms of the form sit(Name, Id,
Narrative). A situation, thus, will consist of three elements:
• Name to represent the name (or type) of the protocol (e.g. auc-
tion);
• Id to represent the instance of the protocol that this situation
describes. This makes it possible to have many instances of the
same protocol running at the same time (e.g. auc1 ).
• Narrative to represent the moves made in the game so far - that
list of moves will define the state of the game. This is represented
as a Prolog list and an empty Narrative means that no move has
been made in the game.
As an example, a term of the form sit(order, s0, []) represents an order
protocol with an instance name of s0 and in which protocol no move has
been made so far; the narrative component of the description is empty
([]). A situation with a non-empty narrative will be shown shortly.
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3.6.4 Game Moves
A move Move made by player Player is represented by a term of the
form select(PlayerId, Action, Recipients); in cases where there is only one
role instance, PlayerId can be substituted by the role name as there is
no ambiguity regarding who made the move.
In the protocols we look at in this thesis, the move is specified only
by its name (e.g. bid). However, the representation could be enhanced
with moves that are parameterised, i.e., the specification of the move
will depend not only on the type of the move (expressed by its name),
but on a number of other parameters as well. As an example, rather
than simply stating that an agent places a bid for an auctioned item
we could add the value of the bid and the id of the item, e.g. se-
lect(bidder1,bid(watch1,12),auctioneer).
3.6.5 Game Situation
We now need to describe a game situation as a result of the moves made
by its players. In this context, we need to be able to reason about
properties that describe the game and see how they change when play-
ers choose their moves (in an auction protocol, these properties would
involve the current highest bid and the bidder who made it). In the
Situation Calculus version of the formal framework, we combine the
game formulation with our own interpretation of the situation calculus
[72] expressed as a normal logic program and describe the state of the
game with a series of holds predicates, as shown in Listing 3.5
1 holds(sit(Name, Id, []), F):-
2 initially(sit(Name, Id, []), F).
3 holds(sit(Name, Id, [M | Ms]), F):-
4 effect(F, M, sit(Name, Id, Ms)).
5 holds(sit(Name, Id, [M | Ms]), F):-
6 holds(sit(Name, Id, Ms), F),
7 \+ abnormal(F, M, sit(Name, Id, Ms)).
Listing 3.5: holds/2 predicate in Situation Calculus
The first rule in Listing 3.5 states that if we have not started the game yet
(the list representing the moves is an empty list), a property F will hold
if it holds in the initial situation, represented by initially/2 assertions.
The second rule states that a property F holds, if it is the result (effect)
of the last move made in the game. Note that we use a list to keep a
history of the moves and the leftmost element refers to the latest move
being made. Finally, the third clause states that a property F will hold
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if it held before the move was made and the move applied did not affect
its persistence.
We will be using the mail order protocol in Figure 3.3 to illustrate our
formalism. In this protocol we have two roles, merchant and supplier.
Initially, the merchant agent makes an order which can either be con-
firmed or refused by the supplier (the supplier can also reorder once an
order is placed). If the supplier agent refuses the order, the protocol
terminates. If it confirms it, the merchant has the option of either with-
drawing (protocol termination) or accepting it and then the supplier will
have to notify the merchant at which point the protocol terminates.
s6
m:order
s:reorder
s:refuse
s:confirm
m:withdraw
m:accept
s:notify
s0 s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
Figure 3.3: A Mail Order protocol
3.6.6 Initial and Terminating States
As mentioned in Section 3.6.2, we need to specify the initial and ter-
minating states of the protocol, i.e., we need to specify what properties
hold when the protocol starts and when it ends. The properties holding
at the beginning of the game will be recorded by the initially predi-
cate, while those describing a terminating state will be specified with
terminating clauses.
A typical example of properties holding initially are the properties re-
lated to the roles of the players. In the mail order protocol involving
a manufacturer and a supplier, Listing 3.6 indicates that player p1 is
the manufacturer and player p2 is the supplier; the role of predicate is
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used to define that the player specified as the first parameter has the
role specified in the second one.
1 initially(sit(mail_order,order,[]),role_of(p1, manufacturer)).
2 initially(sit(mail_order,order,[]),role_of(p2, supplier)).
Listing 3.6: Initial Situation of a mail order protocol
The protocol will terminate when the supplier selects to perform a notify,
withdraw or refuse move. In this case, the current state of the game
as expressed by the Situation argument of the terminating predicate
becomes a terminating path and is returned by the game predicate in
the variable Result (the running path is a terminating path so it is
returned). In other words, the current situation becomes the final result
of the game, as it is one of the (possibly) many ways that a sequence of
valid moves can be terminated.
In our games framework, we can write it as:
1 terminating(Situation, Situation):-
2 Situation = sit(mail_order, s0, N),
3 holds(Situation, last_move(select(Player, Act,_))),
4 holds(Situation, role_of(Player, manufacturer)),
5 member(Act, [refuse, withdraw, notify]).
3.6.7 Valid Moves
When describing an interaction protocol as a game, it is important to be
able to differentiate between valid and invalid moves - an auctioneer, for
example, will need to know which bids are valid so that the item under
auction can be adjudicated to the highest bidder. In our framework a
move will be valid if it meets two conditions - it should be:
• available - the protocol must be providing this move as a move
that is meaningful to be made within its context (e.g. accept in
the case of the manufacturer-supplier example);
• matching certain conditions depending on the state the game is in
- the fact that the protocol makes a move available does not mean
that the user can always select it. For example, the manufacturer
agent can select accept only if the supplier agent has selected con-
firm as the previous move in the protocol. In this case, accept
would be a valid move only if there has been a confirm move made
by the supplier before the merchant selects accept.
Listing 3.7 shows how to make the order move available to any player
of the mail order protocol.
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1 available(sit(mail_order, _, _),select(_, order, _)).
Listing 3.7: Available predicate in Situation Calculus
If we want to represent that it is valid for a supplier to select the notify
move, if the previous move was made by a merchant agent and it was
an accept move, we can write it as in Listing 3.8.
1 valid(sit(mail_order, s0, N), select(P1, notify, P2)):-
2 holds(sit(mail_order, s0, N),role_of(P1, supplier)),
3 holds(sit(mail_order, s0, N),last_move(select(P2, Act, P1))),
4 holds(sit(mail_order, s0, N),role_of(P2, manufacturer)),
5 Act = accept.
Listing 3.8: Valid Moves of a mail order protocol
3.6.8 Effects of Moves
Every time a valid move is performed in a communication protocol, the
effects of the move need to be applied to the current game situation so
that they can bring about the next one. In terms of updating the game
situation, all we need to do is extend the Narrative component of the
situation predicate to include the last move that the player chose. The
Narrative component is the component holding the list of moves made
by the players so far in the course of the protocol. This is represented
by an effects predicate, an example of which is shown in Listing 3.9. We
are representing the game moves as a list, so we need to prepend the
last move made to the head of that list.
effects(sit(mail_order,s0,Ms), M, sit(mail_order,s0,[M| Ms]).
Listing 3.9: Effects predicate in Situation Calculus
The update of the specific game properties is done implicitly via effect
and abnormal definitions. The effect predicate describes what is the
effect of a move made in the game on certain properties of interest.
For example, the effect of any move is that it changes the last move
property in the next situation. Listing 3.10 demonstrates that the effect
of selecting a move M is that the value of the last move predicate will
have to change to reflect that.
effect(last_move(M), M, sit(mail_order, s0, _)).
Listing 3.10: Effect predicate for the mail order protocol
We, also, need to provide abnormality conditions - i.e. conditions when
a property should not hold. The code in Listing 3.11 states that once a
new move has been selected, it is abnormal for the last move predicate
to have the value of the old move.
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abnormal(last_move(Mold), Mnew, sit(mail_order,s0,[ Mnew | Mold])).
Listing 3.11: Abnormal predicate in the mail order protocol
3.7 Timed games in Event Calculus
A number of protocols have a time element in their description. In
the auction protocol presented in Figure 3.4, we are using a compact
version with logic propositions binding player actions rather than listing
all different combinations to present a high-level view of the protocol. In
this context, b:bid1∪ bid2 . . . bidn is used to accommodate both the cases
where the first bidder bids or the second one or the nth one does. In this
protocol, we can have multiple bidders who will be sending messages to
the auctioneer in no particular order, and time constraints might be in
place for the bidders to place a bid; after this period of time passes, the
bid is not accepted.
[ p ≥ r ] a:adjudicate:bi
s0 s1 s2
s3 s5
a:openauction:bi
b: (bid1 or bid2 or ⋯ or bidn):a
[ p < r ] a:withdraw:bi
a:callforbids(p):bi
s4
b: (nobid1 and nobid2 and ⋯ and nobidn):a
Figure 3.4: An English Auction
In this protocol (an English auction protocol), the auctioneer opens the
auction with an openauction call, followed by a call for bids at a start
price p. If any of the bidders place a bid (by sending a bidi message to
the auctioneer), the auctioneer will issue another call for bids, this time
at the price of the new bid. This process will be repeated until none of
the bidders expresses an interest in bidding for the item been auctioned.
In that case, the auctioneer will have to compare the current price of the
item against the reserve price (a price that, if not met, the auctioneer
is not obliged to sell the item). If the current price is higher than the
reserve price, then the auctioneer adjudicates the item to the highest
bidder; otherwise, it is withdrawn.
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The following Sections provides a brief overview of the simple version of
Event Calculus and describe how the components of the game will need
to be changed in order to incorporate time constraints.
3.7.1 Event Calculus
In complex computer systems, such as those representing agent commu-
nities, protocols and agent actions need to be represented in a strict and
theoretical basis. This requirement demonstrates the need for a formal-
ism that will be used to represent the effects of the agent actions over
time, as well as any dependencies amongst them (an action might be the
starting point for a property or it might be terminating it). We will be
using the simple version of Event Calculus [60, 95–98] to define them.
3.7.1.1 The simple version of Event Calculus
Event Calculus allows quantifications over fluents, actions or events and
time points. A fluent can be anything that its value can change over time
- for example next(Player) in the case of a turn-taking game. Actions or
events (both terms can be used interchangeably) that happen at different
time points influence the truth value of fluents and allow us to reason
about them, provided we know what happened up to that point in time.
This, of course, makes the assumption that nothing else that influences
the truth value of these predicates happened in the time period under
consideration, otherwise our reasoning would be based on the wrong
value for the fluent. An example of an event is the selection of a move
by a player, denoted as select(P,M,R); this might affect the truth value
of some of the fluents we are interested in. In our case when a move is
selected, the value of the fluents next(Player) and last move(Move) are
affected.
The predicates of Event Calculus allow us to reason about what is true
initially, what happens at which time points, what are the effects of an
event on the value of the predicates and what predicates hold at what
times. The list of the predicates specifying what events initiate/termi-
nate the truth value of what fluents, as well as the fluents that hold true
initially, when an event happens, whether it holds true at time point T
and when a fluent is clipped - its value changes to false between time
points T1 and T2, is summarised in Table 3.1.
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initiates(E, F, T)
fluent F starts to hold after event E has hap-
pened at time T
terminates(E, F, T) fluent F stops holding after event E at time T
initially(F) fluent F starts from time 0
happens(E, T) event E happens at time T
holds at(F, T) fluent F holds at time T
clipped(T1 ,F ,T2 ) fluent F is terminated between time points T1and T2
Table 3.1: The predicates of the simple version of Event Calculus
3.7.1.2 The axioms of the Event Calculus
The three axioms in Listing 3.12 connect the different predicates of Event
Calculus.
The first one says that a fluent holds at time T, if it holds initially and
it has not been stopped until that time point, while the second that a
fluent holds at time T2 if an event A happened at time T1 - prior to T2
- that initiated it and it has not been stopped between the time points
T1 and T2. Finally, the third one states that a fluent is stopped between
the time points T1 and T2 if there is an action A that happens at time
T, somewhere in the time interval that we look at, that terminates the
fluent.
holdsat(F,T) ← initially(F) ∧ ¬ clipped(0, F, T)
holdsat(F,T2) ← happens(A,T1) ∧ initiates(A, F, T1) ∧T1 < T2 ∧ \+
clipped(T1, F, T2)
clipped(T1,F,T2) ← ∃ A, T [happens(A, T) ∧T1 < T < T2 ∧ terminates(A,F,T)]
Listing 3.12: Event Calculus Axioms
3.7.2 Representing games in the Event Calculus
Time constraints cannot be represented in the simple version of the Sit-
uation Calculus framework that we have used so far. Extended versions
[61, 62, 86, 87, 91, 110] to support reasoning with time in Situation Cal-
culus do exist but we prefer to use event calculus for this, as its ontology
provides a more natural way to represent time.
To represent timed games, we need to change the representation of sit-
uation to include a reference to the time component of the game. The
new representation is sit(Name, Id, Time, Narrative).
As before, Name is the name ( some times we can use the type if there
is only one protocol of each type running) of the protocol, Id is the
46
id of the game - to facilitate the running of multiple games in paral-
lel, and Time is the time point at which we are looking at the game’s
state. On the other hand, the narrative of what happened so far in
the game is now expressed in terms of episodes, a set of moves that
have happened at the same time point in the game (for example, mul-
tiple bidders bidding at the same time point). In their general form,
episodes are written as at([select(Player1, Act1,Recipients1), ..., select(
PlayerN,ActN,RecipientsN)], T). This means that at time point T a number
of moves have been selected (Act1 from Player1, Act2 from Player2, . . .,
ActN from PlayerN); player identifiers can substitute role identifiers if
there is one role instance for each role.
In this context, the episode at([], T) would mean that nothing happened
at time point T (no move specified).
As we will have to reason about a number of properties in the game,
we need to have a way of representing what properties hold and when.
This is discussed in Section 3.7.3.
3.7.3 Reasoning about properties in timed games
We are using the simple version [97] of Event Calculus [60], rather than
Situation Calculus - as the concept of time is inherent in the formula-
tion of Event Calculus, to reason about games with a time component.
Listing 3.13 shows the process for deciding whether a property holds or
not at a certain time point as well as when it stops holding (i.e., it is
clipped) between time points Ti and Tn when a event happens in this
time period that terminates it.
1 holds(sit(Name, Id, Tn, Narrativen), F):-
2 0 ≤ Tn,
3 initially(sit(Name, Id, Ti, Narrativei), F),
4 \+ clipped(F, sit(Name,Id,Ti,Narrativei),sit(Name, Id, Tn, Narrativen)).
5
6 holds(sit(Name, Id, Tn, Narrativen), F):-
7 happens(E, Ti, Narrativei, Narrativen),
8 Ti < Tn,
9 initiates(E, F, sit(Name, Id, Ti, Narrativei)),
10 \+ clipped(F,sit(Name,Id,Ti,Narrativei),sit(Name, Id, Tn, Narrativen)).
11
12 clipped(F, sit(Name, Id,Ti,Narrativei),sit(Name,Id, Tn, Narrativen)):-
13 happens(Estar,Tj,Narrativej,Narrativen),
14 Ti < Tj,
15 Tj < Tn,
16 terminates(Estar,F,sit(Name, Id, Tj, Narrativej)).
Listing 3.13: holds/2 predicate in Event Calculus
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One important difference between the normal Event Calculus formula-
tions and ours is that we do not assert knowledge facts into the knowl-
edge base, but hold them as a list in the game situation predicate. We
hold them as a list of episodes in the game situation and they describe
a sequence of situations in terms of selections made by the game players
previously in the game.
The first clause defines that a property F holds at a time point Tn if
the property holds initially and nothing has happened from the time of
the initial situation until Tn to change the persistence of the property.
The second clause states that a property F holds if an event happened
at a time point Ti that initiated F and F has not been clipped in any
episode between time points Ti and Tn. A property F is clipped if we
have some event happening at time point Tj, which lies between Ti and
Tn, that terminates F.
We, now, need to define the happens/4 predicate in line with our rep-
resentation of events as lists of episodes. This predicate takes four ar-
guments, the first been the event (or the group of events) that we want
to check for, the second one is the time we are checking for, while the
third and fourth ones are the situations of the game at different (or the
same) time points. The general idea is that an event happened if it
is part of the list showing the episode moves. As we might be looking
for single or multiple events, we have definitions that cover both cases.
Listing 3.14 shows the definition for single events, while Listing 3.15 for
multiple events.
1 happens(E, Tn, [at(Esn, Tn) | Situationn],[at(Esn, Tn) | Situationn]):-
2 member(E, Esn).
3
4 happens(E, Ti, [at(Esi, Ti) | Situationi], [at(Esn, Tn)| Situationn]):-
5 happens(E, Ti, [at(Esi, Ti) | Situationi],Situationn).
Listing 3.14: happens/4 definitions in Event Calculus for single events
In the case of single events, if we want to check that an event happened at
a specific time point, then the third and fourth elements of the happens/4
predicate will need to be the same - then, the event happened if it
is a member of the list of events that happened at this time point.
Alternatively, if we are checking for whether an event happened between
two time points, i and n, and we check if the event happened at time i,
then we are not interested in the list of episodes at time point n, so we
can discard it and call the happens/4 predicate with the rest of the list
as the fourth argument.
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1 happens(at(Esn, Tn), Tn,[at(Esn,Tn)|Situationn],[at(Esn,Tn)|Situationn]).
2
3 happens(at(Esi, Ti), Ti,[at(Esi,Ti)|Situationi],[at(Esn,Tn)|Situationn]):-
4 happens(at(Esi,Ti),Ti,[at(Esi,Ti)|Situationi],Situationn).
Listing 3.15: happens/4 definitions in Event Calculus for multiple events
In the case of multiple events, the logic is similar. An episode of multiple
events for the time point Tn happened by definition at time point Tn
(third and fourth arguments of happens will be the same). Alternatively,
if we are interested in checking whether a sequence of events happened
at a time point Ti and we are looking at the time period between Ti and
Tn , i.e., the third argument of happens would be the list of episodes for
time point i and the fourth the list of episodes for time point n we can
discard from the fourth argument the list of episodes for time point n).
3.7.4 Effects of actions in timed games
As a result of the changes in the representation of a situation, we need
to make changes to the rule describing the effects of an episode. The
update consists of adding the episode to the list containing the moves
made so far and then increment the clock of the game by one as shown
in Listing 3.16. Here, the assumption is made that any new episodes
will last for one game time unit, but obviously other time increments
can be used.
1 effects(sit(N, Id, T, Es), at(Ms, T),
2 sit(N, Id, NewT, [at(Ms, T) | Es])):-
3 T > 0,
4 NewT is T + 1.
Listing 3.16: Effects of a move in Event Calculus
3.8 Relationship between games and LTSs
As mentioned in Section 1.1, we want a representation of protocols that
is intuitive and easy to understand and used by both the designer and
the user of the protocol. The representation of protocols as games meets
both requirements as it provides a rich framework with a number of
possible extensions. In Section 3.3, we have described a game protocol
in terms of an LTS, while Section 2.5 provides a game-based decription
of protocols (based on [104]).
The question that arises is how the two descriptions are linked together.
As they describe the same set of interactions, there needs to exist a map-
ping and a transformation process that given the LTS description will
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output the game-based one and vice-versa. Some of them are straight-
forward as they are the same in both approaches (e.g. initial and final
states). Others need some more thought as the LTS framework is more
theoretic whereas the game-based one places the emphasis on the pro-
duction of executable specifications.
The relationship between our games framework and LTS is shown in
Table 3.2.
LTS
Representation
Game Representation
Initial State Initial Situation Description
Final State(s)
Those states (situations) described by the
terminating/2 predicate
States
Game Situations (essentially sequences of
moves)
Transition Function effects/3 predicate
Input Alphabet
Player moves (as described by select/3
statements).
Table 3.2: Relationship between game and LTS components
The states in the LTS can be represented by the moves that have been
made so far ( i.e., the situations in the LTS representation). The transi-
tion function of an LTS describes the effect that a move has when made
on a given state; in the LTS representation this is dealt with by the
effects predicate. Finally, the input alphabet for the LTS consists of
the moves the players make at certain states. The LTS representation
describes them in terms of select statements.
3.9 Formal definition of Competence
In Section 3.3, we defined how social interaction in a society is formulated
and understood; we can use the formulation to define what we mean that
an agent is competent to enter the society.
More specifically a game protocol, PG, is defined as a tuple < N ,R,S ,
I ,F ,V ,M ,V ,E >. Based on this definition, we will define the compe-
tence levels of an agent, g, whose skills are Skills(g), with respect to a
role, r, of a protocol, p.
As in section 3.4, the valid moves for the role that the agent is assuming
are defined by equation 3.1 and the actions of its role are defined by
equation 3.2.
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V r = {v = (si, (rn, αj,{rkm})) ∶ v ∈ V ∧ (r = rn ∨ r ∈ {rkm})} (3.1)
Ar = {αj ∶ ∃(si, (rn, αj,{rkm})) ∈ V r} (3.2)
(Comp.1:FC). Fully Competent (FC). The agent is fully competent when equa-
tion 3.3 holds.
Ar = Skills(g) (3.3)
(Comp.2:CuA). Competent under adversity (CuA). The agent needs to have a
strategy, Srg , that it can use to avoid reaching a state where it
must utter an action that does not belong in its skills or receive
an action that it does not understand. This strategy is effectively
a subset of V r – we allow the agent to know the protocol context
when deciding which action to perform. The agent must remove
from V r all the valid moves that it is allowed to do, which it can
either not perform or if it performs them it may reach a state
where it will be unable to execute the protocol. First we need to
define the set of valid moves that the role can enact itself, as in
equation 3.4.
This is effectively the set that the agent can restrict, since it con-
tains the actions that it can decide to perform or not.
V re = {v = (si, (rn, αj,{rkm})) ∶ v ∈ V ∧ r = rn} (3.4)
To define the required strategy we need first to define the set of
trace runs, T of the protocol, as in equation 3.5.
T = {t = (e0, e1, . . .) ∶ ei = (si, rn, αj,{rkm}, s′i) ∈ E ∧si+1 = s′i} (3.5)
The projection, TStr of traces to a set of valid moves, Str, is the set
of trace runs where traces whose effects’ valid moves don’t belong
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to Str have been removed, as in equation 3.6.
TStr = {t = (e0, e1, . . .) ∶ ei = (si, (rn, αj,{rkm}), s′i) ∈ E ∧ si+1 = s′i∧(si, (rn, αj,{rkm})) ∈ Str}
(3.6)
The projection of traces effectively introduces a projection of the
protocol states into the reachable states, SStr, under that strategy.
The strategy of an agent that is competent under adversity is given
by equation 3.7.
Strrg =
{ v = (si, (rn, αj,{rkm}))∶ v ∈ V re∧ ∀ s ∈ SStrrg∪(V ∖V re )
.(( r ≠ rn ∧ r ∉ {rkm})
∨( (∀ (s, (rn, αk,{rkm})) ∈ V
. ((r ≠ rn ∧ r ∈ {rkm})→ αk ∈ Skills(g))∧( (∃(s, (r,αk,{rkm})) ∈ Strrg∧αk ∈ Skills(g))
∨(∃ (s, (rn, αk,{rkm})) ∈ V
.r ≠ rn ∧ (r ∉ {rkm}∨αk ∈ Skills(g)))))))}
(3.7)
In equation 3.7, the enacted valid moves of the role are constrained
in such a manner that the set of reachable states has only states
with actions that: (i) do not involve the role (r ≠ rn ∧ r ∉ {rkm})),
or (ii) valid moves where if the agent is the recipient it must be
able to understand all of them, and either there is an action that
the agent can perform and has not been constrained (((r ≠ rn ∧
r ∈ {rkm}) → αk ∈ Skills(g))), (iii) or there is an action that it
can understand or that it is not involved in ((∃(s, (r,αk,{rkm})) ∈
Strrg∧αk ∈ Skills(g))∃(s, (rn, αk,{rkm}) ∈ V.r ≠ rn∧(r ∉ {rkm}∨αk ∈
Skills(g)))). So an agent must be able to understand all valid
moves that involve it as a recipient in the set of reachable states but
may choose to perform no valid move if there is another possible
valid move (to avoid deadlocks). The existence of a move that
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is not constrained by the strategy or of a move that cannot be
constrained by the strategy (in the bottom part), is there to ensure
that reachable states will have at least one action. While an agent’s
strategy may be the empty set, Strrg = ∅, which means that the
agent never performs any actions itself, only receives actions, we
do demand that the set of reachable states to contain some final
states, F ∩ SStrrg∪(V ∖V re ) ≠ ∅, so as to avoid the case where the
protocol cannot be executed at all.
The maximal strategy of an agent is the maximal set Strrg. It
should be noted that in the case of fully competent agents, we
have that max(SStr) = V re , since they do not need to constrain the
set of reachable states at all.
(Comp.3:CuC). Competent under cooperation (CuC). The agent in this case does
not have a strategy to constrain the set of reachable states to those
where it can perform an action or understand all messages received.
Instead, it needs the cooperation of the other protocol participants
to form a partial strategy, as shown in equation 3.8, that allows the
set of reachable states to be non-empty, i.e. F ∩ SpStrrg∪(V ∖V re ) ≠ ∅.
pStrrg =
{v = (si, (rn, αj,{rkm}))∶ v ∈ V re∧∀ s ∈ SpStrrg∪(V ∖V re )
.(( r ≠ rn ∧ r ∉ {rkm})
∨( (∃ (s, (rn, αk,{rkm})) ∈ V
. ((r ≠ rn ∧ r ∈ {rkm})→ αk ∈ Skills(g))∧( (∃(s, (r,αk,{rkm})) ∈ pStrrg∧αk ∈ Skills(g))
∨(∃ (s, (rn, αk,{rkm})) ∈ V
.r ≠ rn ∧ (r ∉ {rkm}∨αk ∈ Skills(g)))))))}
(3.8)
The only difference between equation 3.7 and equation 3.8 is that
now the agent need only be able to respond to some messages of
the other agents, not to all of them, that is, the ∀ symbol in the
sixth line has been replaced by an ∃ symbol. As long as the other
agents cooperate and do not send it messages it cannot understand,
the agent can participate in the protocol.
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Effectively, an agent in this category may never perform an action
itself, just like in the case of agents who are competent under
adversity. In addition, in this case an agent may never receive a
message from the other agents either, essentially participating in
the protocol only in name.
(Comp.4:I). Incompetent (I). In this case the agent has no strategy through
which it can participate in the protocol and still allow the set of
reachable states to contain some final states, that is, we have that
F ∩ SpStrrg∪(V ∖V re ) = ∅.
Essentially, an agent is incompetent (Comp.4:I) if it can find itself at a
state of the protocol where it is required to do an action it cannot. The
competency levels we have just defined, essentially consider different
cases for what a requirement may be.
Agent A Agent B Protocol Deadlocks
(Comp.1:FC) (Comp.1:FC) No
(Comp.1:FC) (Comp.2:CuA) No
(Comp.1:FC) (Comp.3:CuC) Possibly
(Comp.2:CuA) (Comp.2:CuA) No
(Comp.2:CuA) (Comp.3:CuC) Possibly
(Comp.3:CuC) (Comp.3:CuC) Possibly
(Comp.4:I) * Possibly
Table 3.3: Games where agents have different competency levels
It is interesting to consider now how an agent of competency type A
will behave with an agent of competency type B when participating in
the same protocol - will the protocol ever deadlock? Table 3.3 presents
the different cases we have. We can see that a protocol may deadlock
only if an agent is incompetent or competent under cooperation. The
latter is the case because the other agents (even those who are fully
competent (Comp.1:FC)) may not wish to cooperate with this agent.
Therefore, the authority agent needs to have a simple test to identify
agents that are either incompetent (Comp.4:I) or competent only under
cooperation (Comp.3:CuC). Checking whether an agent has (at least)
a partial strategy is easily performed by finding a terminating trace
run of the protocol where all the actions involving the agent in ques-
tion belong into its skills 1. Checking whether an agent is fully com-
1A terminating trace run that does not involve the agent at all is an obvious such
example.
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petent (Comp.1:FC) is even easier, since we only need to verify that
equation 3.3 is true.
3.10 Competence and Protocol Completion
The existence of a maximal strategy for an agent does not imply that
it will be used, even in cases where the agent is fully competent and its
maximal strategy is the full protocol. This is the case as what the agent
will actually do when the protocol runs depends on a set of personal
preferences that we do not have access to and, symmetrically, the fact
that the other agents have certain skills does not mean they will use
them as that would depend on a set of personal preferences that we did
not take into account. As a result, fully competent agents may choose
to use conflicting strategies. For example, we can look at the simple
greeting protocol in Figure 3.5. It involves two agents that do nothing
else than greeting each other. If agent A greets first, agent B follows
and vice versa.
b:greet:{a}
s0 s1
s2
s3
a:greet:{b} b:greet:{a}
a:greet:{b}
Figure 3.5: A Simple Greeting Protocol
This protocol has two possible traces, namely s0
a∶greet∶{b}ÐÐÐÐÐ→ s1 b∶greet∶{a}ÐÐÐÐÐ→ s3
and s0
b∶greet∶{a}ÐÐÐÐÐ→ s2 a∶greet∶{b}ÐÐÐÐÐ→ s3. Assuming that both agents have the
skill greet, they are both fully competent. The maximal strategy of agent
A following Equation 3.8 is V re = {(s0, (a ∶ greet ∶ {b}), s1), (s2, (a ∶ greet ∶{b}), s3)} and for agent B V re = {(s0, (b ∶ greet ∶ {a}), s2), (s1, (b ∶ greet ∶{a}), s3)}. For both agents the only move in the set V re are the greet
actions that they can perform and the only action that they are not the
sender but they can receive (as it is part of their skill set) is the greet
action that the other agent performs that follows their initial greeting.
As a result, their maximal strategy are the couple of greet moves made by
them. One would expect that the two agents will be able to fully utilise
the protocol, as they have the skills to do so. However, we have not taken
into account their own personal preferences. We use the case where each
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agent has a preference that says that it does not greet the other agent,
unless it receives a greeting from it first, i.e., greet(A) ← greet(B). If
that is the case, then none of the agents will do anything, as they will
be waiting for one another to act first.
More specifically, if V re is the maximal strategy of the agent and PA is
the set of preferences for the agent (expressed in the form of if-then-else
rules or any other notation) that influences the moves it will be making
in the protocol, then the part of the protocol that the agent will enact
will be V re ∩ PA, as the valid moves that the agent can enact will be
further constrained by its personal preferences.
For the greeting protocol in Figure 3.5 PA = {s0 b∶greet∶{a}ÐÐÐÐÐ→ s2 a∶greet∶{b}ÐÐÐÐÐ→ s3}
and PB = {s0 a∶greet∶{b}ÐÐÐÐÐ→ s1 b∶greet∶{a}ÐÐÐÐÐ→ s3}. Given their maximal strategy
V re and their preferences, we can see that the agents will never engage
in conversation, as they will both wait for each other to greet first.
3.11 Competence Checking as Planning
Our game-based specification so far allows us to check the evolution
of a protocol, by describing all valid game situations that agents can
be in, if they follow the social rules imposed by the protocol. As a
result, an authority agent can use it to check valid moves when they
are made on-line - acting as a referee - or oﬄine - acting as an auditor
for a certain sequence of moves representing a particular interaction.
However, the specification as it is currently provided does not allow an
authority agent to check for competence. For competence checking the
authority agent must have the competence profile (essentially the set
of actions that it can send/receive) of a specific candidate agent and a
representation of the competence profiles of existing agents within the
society it is an authority agent of. It can then use the rules of the
game, the competence profile of the agent at hand and the other agents,
to construct hypothetical situations that reach a terminating situation.
The construction of these hypothetical situations amounts essentially to
the authority agent planning for these situations using moves that belong
to agent profiles and are based on the rules of the protocol. Therefore,
we can augment this approach by considering competence checking as a
special case of planning under the constraint that rules of the game are
observed.
Listing 3.17 shows how the agents formulate their plans on the basis of
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the rules of the game.
1 plan(game(Situation, Result), Situation, Result):-
2 achieved(terminating(Situation, Result), Situation, Result).
3 plan(game(Situation, Result), Situation, Result):-
4 \+ terminating(Situation, _),
5 assume(valid(Situation, Move), Situation, Move),
6 apply(effects(Situation, Move, NewSituation), Situation, Move,
NewSituation),
7 plan(game(NewSituation, Result), NewSituation, Result).
Listing 3.17: Competence Checking by Planning
In order to plan for a game, we can stop when a terminating state has
been achieved. If that is not the case, a valid move needs to be selected,
its effects should be applied on the situation of the game to give us a
new game situation and that new situation will be used for running the
planning procedure again.
The definition for achieved/3 and apply/3 respectively is straightforward
as it involves simply calling the terminating/3 and effects/3 definitions,
as they have been defined for a specific protocol (e.g. see Sections 3.6.6
and 3.6.8 for the mail order protocol). The use of different names is
chosen simply to reflect the domain of planning that this variation is
used in. Listing 3.18 shows their implementation.
1 achieved(Terminating, Initial, Result):- call(Terminating).
2
3 apply(Effects, Situation, Move, NewSituation):- call(Effects).
Listing 3.18: Move effects and checking for terminating state
3.11.1 Competency Profiles
When planning for valid moves, however, we need to consider what the
players would do given their competency profiles. Such a profile contains
the skills and service abilities of the agents ( i.e., the services that the
agents offer, the messages that it can understand).
For a communication protocol a competency profile amounts to the com-
munication acts that the agent can utter and understand in the context
of that protocol. To describe a competency profile we use rules of the
form shown in Listing 3.19.
1 competent(Agent, do(Situation, Act)):- Conditions.
Listing 3.19: Generic form of Competency Rules
The Authority Agent of the society will need to keep competence pro-
files of every agent in the society. This way it should be able to assess
57
whether these agents would be able to fully exploit the protocol or just
part of it. As an example, for the two agents in the mail order protocol
in Figure 3.3, the competence rules in Listings 3.20 and 3.21 will hold.
Player p1 is able to select moves order and accept in a mail order sit-
uation while player p2 can select the acts called reorder, confirm and
notify - for all rules, there are no conditions limiting the agents from
performing them.
1 competent(p1, do(sit(mail_order, _, _), order)).
2 competent(p1, do(sit(mail_order, _, _), accept)).
Listing 3.20: Competence Profile for p1
1 competent(p2, do(sit(mail_order, _, _), reorder)).
2 competent(p2, do(sit(mail_order, _, _), confirm)).
3 competent(p2, do(sit(mail_order, _, _), notify)).
Listing 3.21: Competence Profile for p2
We assume that competence profiles will always generate ground in-
stances of actions.
3.11.2 Hypothesising Valid Moves
We can now specify the assume/3 predicate shown in Listing 3.22.
1 assume(Valid, Situation, select(Player1, Act, Player2)):-
2 competent(Player1, do(Situation, Act)),
3 call(Valid),
4 acceptable(Situation, select(Player1, Act, Player2)).
Listing 3.22: Definition of the assume/3 predicate
During the planning process a move is generated by the competence pro-
file of a player and then it is checked for validity. There is, though, one
more element that we need to check and possibly place a constraint on:
whether making this move will cause unwanted loops (in the mail order
protocol of Figure 3.3 such a loop will be caused if the manufacturer
selects order in state s0 and the supplier selects reorder in state s1);
this is described in Listing 3.23. This is the case as the program check-
ing for the competency of the agent might be trapped inside the loop
and not look at the other moves that the agent could possibly make.
Furthermore, these loops might cause undesired effects from a business
perspective, i.e., in the previous example the supplier is constantly ac-
cumulating goods since he is reordering all the time (as there is one role
instance for each role, we can also use the player identifiers as senders
and receivers instead of the role identifiers).
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1 [select(p1, order,p2), select(p2, reorder,p1)]
Listing 3.23: Loop Example in Situation Calculus
In order to deal with such loops, we first identify them in the protocol
and then we demand that the chosen move is acceptable. The acceptable
predicate will check the current situation of the game, i.e., the history of
moves made so far against the move selected by the valid predicate and
decide if it forms part of an unwanted loop. The definition of acceptable
is shown in Listing 3.24.
1 acceptable(sit(_,_,Narrative), Move):-
2 \+ cyclic(sit(_,_,[Move|Narrative])).
Listing 3.24: Acceptable Predicate
The cyclic predicate is, then, defined in Listing 3.25. It starts by in-
corporating the move selected to the current game situation and then
checks whether that situation creates any undesirable loops.
1 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves)):-
2 cyclic_pattern(CyclicPattern),
3 check_list( CyclicPattern , Moves).
Listing 3.25: Cyclic Predicate
We should note here that cyclic pattern/1 is a domain specific assertion
that the developer of the protocol has to provide. In the mail order
protocol described in Section 3.3, an example of a cyclic pattern would
be [select(p1, order,p2), select(p2, reorder,p1)] (again, player identifiers
correspond to role identifiers). That is, the merchant agent is order-
ing goods and the supplier agent is reordering them. The predicate
check list/2 checks whether the list of moves follows the pattern. The
definition of check list/2 is given in Appendix G.
3.12 Summary
In this chapter we presented the formal framework of our approach.
We, also, presented a representation based on games that can be used
to represent protocols in both a centralised way and as a distributed
collection of player roles. Furthermore, we discussed how this represen-
tation can be specified describing both games that have no concurrency
requirement using the framework of Situation Calculus as well as games
with such requirements with the use of Event Calculus. The two frame-
works are used for modelling the state of the game. Finally, we gave a
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formal definition of the concept of competence and commented on how
competence influences protocol completion.
The next step would be to produce the algorithms that given a protocol
representation of the kind described in this chapter will generate its
role components as well as detect any problems (states where the agent
players would have to make a choice as to what to do next, but will not
have the necessary information). In these cases, we will need algorithms
that describe how to go about remedying these situations. Furthermore,
we need to ensure that in protocols where multiple instances of one role
are present - for example in an auction with multiple bidders, all role
instances will have access to all the moves prescribed by the protocol for
the bidder role. This is the subject of the next chapter.
60
Chapter 4
Decomposing the protocol
into roles
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present two algorithms for manipulating protocols.
The first one decomposes a protocol into separate role-specific descrip-
tions, ensuring that agents are provided with all the information they
require for performing their role and only that. The second algorithm
attempts to repair protocols that cannot be decomposed into roles. Fi-
nally we show how these algorithms can be extended for protocols where
a role may have multiple instances participating.
4.2 The Need for Decomposing Protocols
This section looks at the inverse problem of that in Section 3.5, i.e.,
how to produce the individual role descriptions for a protocol that is
given in its full LTS form. In order to achieve this, we need to compute
role descriptions like those in Section 3.4, starting from the protocol
descriptions of Section 3.3.
This is the case as once the agent is accepted into the society, there is a
need for providing it with the protocols it will be using (as determined
by the role(s) it applied for). One solution would be to give it the full
protocol, so that it has complete knowledge of what is happening. This
is, however, inappropriate for a number of reasons, namely:
• security - there might be sensitive information in the protocol
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that should not be revealed to all agents. As an example, we can
think of a protocol that involves online payment; the merchant
should not see the number of the customer’s credit card, but an-
other role (gateway) needs to see it and process that information.
• information overload - the agent might not need all the infor-
mation in the protocol as it is of no relevance to its role. If the
agent is overloaded with information, or if it is required to pro-
cess much more information than it needs to, then the process of
running the protocol becomes more error-prone and comes at the
cost of a high overhead. In addition, if the system in consideration
is distributed, then the cost of everyone receiving all messages is
even higher.
As a result, the optimal solution would be for every agent to receive
only the messages related to the role(s) it plays in the protocol. As our
basic representation of a protocol is that of an LTS, essentially we want a
smaller LTS that will contain only the relevant information for the agent
in hand. By relevant, we mean that we need to keep enough information
for the agent to be able to enact its role and nothing more, nothing that
it will provide it with more information than what is strictly needed.
In other words, we want a smaller and equivalent LTS to the original
protocol that will contain only the moves that are relevant for a specific
role; a minimal protocol with regards to the role’s knowledge. States and
actions that the role knows about should be kept intact and we should
look at whether any actions that do not have the role as a sender or a
recipient affect its knowledge on deciding on the next action to perform.
This new protocol will have to be equivalent to the original one in terms
of the traces that it can produce if we only take into account the role’s
knowledge and everything else is considered a silent (τ) action. As we
are using an LTS description of the protocols, the notion of bisimulation
can be used to that effect - Section 4.2.1 provides a brief overview of the
notion.
We discussed the relationship between Event Calculus and Situation
Calculus with the LTS representation of the protocol in Section 3.8.
Both frameworks can be used to model the state of the game. As a
result, we can represent the evolution of a game as an LTS by labelling
each state with the sequence of moves the player has made in order to
reach that state. This, however, would be difficult as - e.g. in the case
of loops, there could be an infinite number of possible evolutions that
62
lead to the same state. On the other hand bisimulation runs on LTSs, is
well-researched, optimised algorithms have been developed, the process
is fully automated and well-developed and tested toolsets, e.g. CADP
and µCRL2, exist.
4.2.1 Bisimulation
Bisimulation [73, 113] is a way of minimising labelled transition systems
on abstract (silent) actions (state minimisation technique) while at the
same time preserving the properties of the original model. It, also,
has the property of been computed automatically without any manual
involvement [40].
We can define bisimulation as follows [92]: A binary relation R on the
states of a Labelled Transition System is bisimulation if whenever s1R s2:
for all s′1with s1 µÐ→ s′1, there is s′2 such that s2 µÐ→ s′2 and s′1Rs′2
(∀s′1.s1 µÐ→ s′1⇒ ∃s′2∶ s2 µÐ→ s′2, s′1Rs′2);
the converse, on the transitions emanating from s2
(∀s′2.s2 µÐ→ s′2⇒ ∃s′1∶ s1 µÐ→ s′1, s′2Rs′1).
(4.1)
Bisimulation can also be defined along the same lines on Mealy automata
which are similar to LTSs but have no initial and/or final states [92]. An-
other definition of bisimulation can be obtained using relations, fixpoints
and game theory [74, 84]. In this case the interest is on the concept of
fixed point operators where bisimulation is defined as the greatest fixed
point of a relation involving the actions that can be observed depending
on the type of bisimulation that we are looking at.
For the purposes of bisimulation, we consider that the state of a system
at any point in time is given by the actions that can be executed at that
time point, as well as the actions that can follow that choice. If we,
therefore, want to call two systems bisimilar it should be true that for
every evolution of one of them through a sequence of actions, the same
evolution should be possible for the second one using the same actions
[75] and vice-versa.
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We are especially interested in transition systems where some transitions
are not observable by an external observer of the system. In a system
describing a business transaction, the merchant has to talk to the bank
in order to get the transaction authorised but that is not observable by
the customer. As a result, we want to check whether the two systems
are equivalent or not on the basis of the actions that we can observe -
this is done by defining a family of actions that we can observe on the
LTSs and checking if they match the criterion in Equation 4.1.
In producing a new transition system that will have the same behaviour
as the original one, it is important to decide on how we are going to deal
with silent actions. Depending on the chosen way, we can distinguish
between a number of different bisimulation types, which we analyse next.
4.2.2 τ⋆α Bisimulation
In this notion of bisimulation [111], any sequence of silent actions (τ)
preceeding an observable action (α) can be replaced by the observable
action, i.e., τ⋆α ≃ α.
In the context of LTS, we can distinguish between two types of actions:
visible (observable) actions and invisible (silent) actions that are internal
and, as such, not observable. Those actions are substituted with τ
and, according to [73], one or multiple instances of them cannot be
distinguished by observing the system. As a result of this, any visible
action preceded by any number of silent actions will be equivalent to
one instance of the visible action. More formally, the τ⋆α equivalence
is denoted as ≈τα and is the equivalent of the bisimulation relation (see
Section 4.2.1) for the {τ⋆α ∣ α ∈ A} set of actions.
This is a convenient way of defining equivalence (τ⋆α = α, all silent
actions omitted), however it does not preserve always the structure of
the transition system we are looking at.
In order to overcome that, branching bisimulation was introduced; this
is discussed next.
4.2.3 Branching Bisimulation
In branching bisimulation we not only worry about the silent actions, but
also in preserving the branching structure of the LTS. In other words,
although there are τ actions, these cannot be removed always as the
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structure of the LTS will need to be preserved.
Two LTSs P and Q are branching bisimilar if there is a symmetric
relation R between their states such that [111]:
• the initial states are related by R;
• If r and s are related by R and r αÐ→ r′, then either α = τ or there
exists a path s ⇒ s1 αÐ→ s2 ⇒ s′ such that r and s1, r′ and s2 as
well as r′ and s′ are related by R.
4.2.4 From Protocols To Individual Roles - The Al-
gorithm
The next decision to be made is the type of bisimulation to be used. We
assume that any action not involving the role as either a sender or one of
the recipients is represented as a silent τ (tau) action. The simplest form
is the τ⋆α one [111], in which every silent action preceding a non-silent
action is ignored.
A −> B: a
C −> B: b
C −> B: c
A −> B: d
A −> B: e
3
0 1 2
4
(a) Full Protocol
A −> B: a
A −> B: d
A −> B: e
τ
0 1 2
4
3
τ
(b) Protocol with τ
A −> B: e
A −> B: a
A −> B: d
0 1 2
(c) τ⋆α Bisimulation
A −> B: a
A −> B: d
A −> B: e
τ
0 1 2
4
3
τ
(d) Branching Bisimulation
Figure 4.1: Non-implementable protocol due to incomplete knowledge
In Figure 4.1a, we have a protocol with three roles, namely A, B and
C. Role A can perform actions a, d and e, all messages going to role B.
Role C can perform actions b and c, with both messages again going to
role B. If the only knowledge that roles are allowed to have is the actions
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they have performed and received and we replace non-observable actions
for role A with τ , then the resulting role LTS is shown in Figure 4.1b.
As we can see there, role A will need to decide what message to send to
role B (d or e), but this decision will need to be based on what message
C sent to B (b or c) and that is knowledge that role A does not have.
This is true for two reasons. First, role A cannot know whether role C
has already acted so that it can follow it with its last action. Second,
role A cannot know what action role C has performed in order to follow
it with the correct response. Instead, we need a bisimulation relation
that will detect this problem and will not remove a silent action if it
may cause lack of knowledge to perform further actions in the course of
the protocol, e.g. in the case of branching in the previous protocol.
For this, we use branching bisimulation [111]. In Figure 4.1c, we see
the result of τ⋆α bisimulation been employed. The silent actions are
removed and it looks like role A will have to make a choice between
sending messages d and e to role B. This choice, however, is not entirely
its own; it depends on a previous exchange of messages for which A
has no knowledge about - therefore, the silent actions should remain in
the protocol. Applying branching bisimulation gives the result shown
Figure 4.1d.
At the top level, our approach is as follows (followed for every role in
the protocol):
(A) the global protocol is transformed into a role specific one, where
any action for which the agent in question is neither the sender
nor one of the receivers of the message is replaced with the silent
τ (tau) action;
(B) we compute the branching bisimilar LTS;
(C) if no τ transitions, we have a minimal role specific behaviour spec-
ification.
Section 4.3 presents different algorithms for repairing protocols. They
differ in the number of silent transitions that are repaired as well as on
the criteria that we use to decide on which transitions to repair.
Given a game protocol P, the process we need to follow to derive the
component roles is described by the derive role procedure shown in List-
ing 4.1. The protocol we obtain in the first pass might contain silent
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(τ) actions, in which case repair is needed. We do not commit to any
particular repair algorithm, as any of the ones in Section 4.3 can be
used.
1 // r - role name, g - game protocol
2 derive_role(r, g) {
3 ng = copy(g);
4 // relabel irrelevant transitions to tau
5 foreach (tr in ng.transitions) {
6 if (r ∉ {tr.sender} ∪ tr.receivers)
7 tr.label = tau;
8 }
9 // try to repair the protocol
10 do {
11 old_ng = copy(ng);
12 ng_r = branching_bisimulation(ng);
13 foreach (tr in ng_r.transitions) {
14 if (tau == tr.label) ∧ is_problematic(tr))
15 ng = repair(ng, tr.initialState, r);
16 break;
17 }
18 } while ( ng != old_ng );
19 return compute_role_attributes(r, ng_r, g);
20 }
Listing 4.1: Deriving a role from a protocol
The algorithm starts by looking at each transaction in the game protocol
and checks to see if the role in question is either the sender or amongst
the recipients of a move. If that is not the case, then the role transition
label , i.e., move, becomes τ to indicate that the user is not participating
in this message exchange. Branching bisimulation is then applied to
the resulting protocol and that produces a new game protocol ng r.
The algorithm will, then, go through all transitions in the new game
protocol and check if the label of the transition is τ or not. If it is, and
the silent action is a problematic one (this depends on the algorithm
from Section 4.3 that we choose to implement), it will call the repair
algorithm (see Section 4.3 for the details) for that specific label (one
repair might solve more than one problematic transitions). Once the
transition is repaired, it moves on to check the next transition. We do
not want to commit to any particular interpretation of repair in this
case, so we are just stating that repair is needed. The loop will run until
the protocol we start the loop with is the same as the protocol after the
loop has run, i.e., either there are no silent transitions or if there are
they do not cause lack of knowledge for the role. The attributes of the
role are then returned.
The algorithm for computing the specification attributes of a role after
resolving any lack of knowledge problems in the original protocol is de-
scribed in Listing 4.2. The resulting LTS will have a higher number of
transitions (as it is unlikely that no silent transitions needed repair) and
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possibly the set of the roles that the agent communicates with will get
augmented by new roles as a result of the repair process. The number
of states would, most likely, be lower as a number of the original LTS
states would have been merged into the same equivalence class.
1 // r - role name, rg - role graph, g - game protocol
2 compute_role_attributes(r, rg, g) {
3 roleset=states=actions=moves=valid=effects=∅;
4 foreach (tr in rg.transitions) {
5 m = tr.move; a = m.action;
6 sndr = m.sender; rcvrs = m.receivers;
7 s = tr.startState; f = tr.finalState;
8 roleset = roleset ∪ {sndr} ∪ rcvrs;
9 actions = actions ∪ {a};
10 moves = moves ∪ {m};
11 valid = valid ∪ {(s, m)};
12 effects = effects ∪ {(s, m, f)};
13 }
14 foreach (s in rg.states)
15 states = states ∪ {s};
16 initial = equivalence_class(g.initialState, rg);
17 foreach (s in g.FinalStates)
18 finals += equivalence_class(s, rg);
19 return ( <r, roleset, states, initial, finals,
20 actions, moves, valid, effects> );
21 }
Listing 4.2: Computing the attributes for a role
It starts by setting all role attributes (roleset, states, actions, moves,
valid moves and effects) to the empty set (∅). In order to compute the
role attributes, there are two pieces of information that we need to look
at - one is the role protocol transitions from which we can gather infor-
mation about the roleset, actions, moves, valid and effects components
and the second one is the set of states and final states from which we can
gather information about the initial and final states of the role protocol.
For each transition in the role protocol, we can read the move of the
transition (in the form (Sender, Action, Recipients)) as well as the start
state and the final state of it. From the move we can extract the sender,
action and recipients of the action. The sender and receivers will need
to be added to the roleset of the role, as they represent roles that engage
in communication with it. Similarly, the action part of the transition is
added to the available actions component of the role, as it is an action
that the role can choose to execute. The move as a whole will be added
to the set of available moves for the role, while the initial state and the
move components as a pair will be added to the valid moves set of the
role. Finally, the whole transition will be added to the effects set.
The last two components that need to be specified are the initial state
and the final state(s) of the role LTS. As the resulting LTS was produced
using bisimulation, the states of the original role LTS are equivalence
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classes of the states of the protocol LTS so the initial state of the role LTS
is the one that contains the initial state of the protocol LTS. Similarly,
all states of the role LTS that contain a state designated as final in the
protocol specification are designated as final states for the role as well.
4.3 Repairing non-enactable game proto-
cols
If, after running branching bisimulation on the role’s LTS, there are still
silent (τ) moves, then that role’s description may not be implementable
due to lack of knowledge - the agent may arrive at a state where it
will have to make a choice for which it will need to take into account
information that it cannot observe.
In that case, if we want to produce a protocol that can be decomposed
into roles, we will have to add the missing knowledge to the role in ques-
tion. The following Sections describe possible approaches for repairing
the silent moves.
4.3.1 Updating all silent moves
One approach is to find the equivalent states in the original protocol
of the problematic states in the bisimulated one and add the role as a
recipient to any messages originating from these states in the protocol.
The algorithm is described in the Listing 4.3.
1 // Legend: Game Protocol variables start with GP,
2 // Role Protocol variables start with RP
3 repair(GP, RP_badState, GP_role) {
4 GP_class= equivalence_class(RP_badstate, GP);
5 // Add role to the receipients of the moves of these states
6 foreach (GP_state in GP_class)
7 foreach (GP_tran from GP_state.transitions)
8 GP_tran.move.receivers = GP_tran_move.receivers ∪ GP_role;
9 }
Listing 4.3: Updating all silent transitions
This algorithm repairs the protocol by adding the extra information
that was missing and was causing the occurrence of the τ move, i.e.,
adds the role in question to the recipients of the communication act. At
the beginning, we calculate all states from the original protocol that are
in the equivalence class of the originating state of the transition with the
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silent move in the bisimulated protocol. Once these are found, for every
transition that starts from these states in the original protocol, the set
of receivers is updated with the inclusion of the role whose LTS we are
calculating. This, of course, is a rudimentary approach that results in
large protocols as a number of transitions that need no updating do get
updated.
4.3.2 Updating frontier silent moves
Another approach would be to repair a few transitions of the original
protocol, those that start from any state in the original protocol that
belongs to the same equivalence class as the original state of the silent
action in the bisimulated protocol and finish in any of the states belong-
ing to the same equivalence class as the end state of the same transition.
C1 C2
τ
s6
s8
s1 s2
s4
s7
s5
s3
τ
τ
τ
τ
τ
τ
Figure 4.2: Branching Bisimulation Equivalence Classes
In Figure 4.2 after running branching bisimulation we have states s1
and s2 linked with a τ transition. However, as branching bisimulation
is an equivalence relation placing states into equivalence classes, each
of these two states would belong to an equivalence class of states from
the original LTS. In this case, we have two equivalence classes C1 ={s3, s4, s5} (represented by s1) and C2 = {s6, s7, s8} (represented by s2).
By looking at the transitions, we can see that the transitions from states
belonging to class C1 to states belonging to class C2 are all τ transitions
that need to be repaired. The benefit, however, in comparison with the
approach described in Section 4.3.1 is that we do not repair any silent
transitions internal to the class , i.e., the transitions from s3 to s4, s4 to
s5 and s5 to s3.
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The algorithm that performs the repair is described in Listing 4.4:
1 //Legend: Game Protocol variables start with GP,
2 // Role Protocol variables start with RP
3 repair(GP, RP_Transition, GP_role) {
4 RP_initial_state = RP_Transition.initial_state;
5 RP_end_state = RP_Transition.final_state;
6 GP_equiv_initial_states = equivalence_class(initial_state,
7 GP);
8 GP_equiv_end_states = equivalence_class(RP_end_state,GP);
9 //Add role in the recipients of the moves
10 //of those transitions that start in
11 //GP_equiv_initial_states, end in GP_equiv_end_states
12 //and is a silent transition in the original protocol
13 foreach (GP_tran from GP_state.transitions) {
14 GP_initial_state = GP_tran.initial_state;
15 GP_final_state = GP_tran.final_state;
16 GP_m = GP_tran.move;
17 GP_recipients = GP_tran.recipients;
18 if (GP_initial_state ∈ GP_equiv_initial_states ∧
19 GP_final_state ∈ GP_equiv_end_states ∧
20 GP_role ∉ GP_recipients)
21 GP_tran.move.recipients = GP_tran.move.recipients ∪
22 GP_role;
23 }
24 }
Listing 4.4: Updating silent actions by looking at equivalence groups
4.3.3 Updating selected silent moves
Our approaches to protocol repair so far, have considered silent actions
as something that needs to be removed from the role’s final LTS- their
presence would imply lack of knowledge and failure in implementation.
However, this is not always true. A silent action in a role’s protocol needs
to be repaired only if it is causing problems in the role’s action selection
process. Assuming a branch where the first move in both leaves is τ , the
following combinations exist for the follow-ups:
• the two actions following the silent ones are both receive actions
for the role - in that case, we do not need to repair the transition
as the role has no decision to make and just waits to receive a
message;
• the two actions following the silent ones are both send actions for
the role and they are different in terms of either the move or the
recipients of the move (or both); in this case repair is needed so
that the role will have the required information to decide on which
move to pursue;
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• one of the following moves is a send, while the second one is a
receive; we need to repair the protocol in this case too, as the role
in question will need the extra information to decide whether it
will wait to receive the prescribed message or go ahead and send
a message.
If such moves are found in a role’s LTS, then they need to be repaired.
This presents the overhead of having to examine a much larger section of
the protocol every time we come across a silent move, but gives smaller
final protocol sizes.
The algorithm for repairing a protocol in this way is shown in Listing 4.5
(this time we have to include the role LTS as well, as it is been used to
check for the moves that need to be repaired),
1 //Legend: Game Protocol variables start with GP,
2 // Role Protocol variables start with RP
3 repair(GP, RP_Transition, GP_role, RP) {
4 RP_initial_state = RP_Transition.initial_state;
5 RP_end_state = RP_Transition.final_state;
6 // check if the transition needs to be repaired
7 RP_outgoing_transitions = find_outgoing(RP_initial_state);
8 forall ( t ∈ RP_outgoing_transitions,k ∈ RP_outgoing_transitions, k ≠ t)
{
9 if ( t.Move == "tau" ∧ k.Move == "tau"){
10 final_state_t = t.FinalState;
11 final_state_k = k.FinalState;
12 outgoing_transitions_newt = find_outgoing(final_state_t);
13 outgoing_transitions_newk = find_outgoing(final_state_k);
14 forall (r ∈ outgoing_transitions_newt ∧ s ∈
outgoing_transitions_newk){
15 Move1 = r.Move; Move2 = s.Move;
16 sender1 = r.Sender; sender2 = s.Sender;
17 Recipients1 = r.Recipients; Recipients2 = s.Recipients;
18 if ((sender1 == sender2 == GP_Role) ∧ ((Move1 ≠Move2) ∨ (
Recipient1 ≠ Recipient2)) ∨
19 (Sender1 == GP_Role ∧Sender2 ≠ GP Role∧GP Role ∈ Recipient2)){
20 // repair process
21 initial_equiv =equivalence_class(RP_initial_state,GP);
22 end_equiv = equivalence_class(RP_end_state,GP);
23 forall (v ∈ GP.Transitions) {
24 initial_state = v.InitialState;
25 final_state = v.FinalState;
26 if (initial_state ∈ initialequiv ∧
27 final_state ∈ endequiv)
28 v.Recipients = v.Recipients ∪ GP_Role;
29 }
30 }
31 }
32 }
33 }
Listing 4.5: Updating selected silent transitions for role R
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4.4 Protocols with multiple instances of
the same role
In the protocols we have considered so far, there was only one instance
of each role. However, in some cases more than one instance of some
roles are required for the protocol to make sense or to be complete. In
an auction protocol if there is only one participant assuming the role of
bidder, some messages will not be uttered as they are only applicable
when there are multiple bidders. In this case, we need to produce a
version of the protocol with more than one participants playing the role
of bidder to ensure the exchange of all possible messages.
Furthermore, as all LTSs describe the behaviour of the same role, we
would expect them to be equivalent. The idea, thus, is that if we de-
compose the protocol instance and compare the LTS generated for each
of the multiple instances of the same role, these LTSs will have to de-
scribe the “same” behaviour, i.e., be bisimilar.
4.4.1 Verification
Once the protocol is in the format specified in Section 3.3 on page 31, we
can apply bisimulation to decide if the LTSs produced by bisimulation
are the “same” (really, bisimilar as state number(s) might have been
changed by the bisimulation tool) or not. Also, we need to use branching
bisimulation as the auction protocol does have a number of branches
and we need to maintain that structure. If we use τ⋆α instead, branches
in the protocol would be eliminated as any sequence of silent actions
would be condensed with the next known action to the role. If the
LTSs for the two bidder role instances prove to be the “same”, then the
auction protocol prescribes the same moves for both of them. If not,
it might be the fault of the protocol or it could be that the auction
house differentiates between different bidders (e.g. on the basis of their
participation order) and this is reflected in the protocol.
The algorithm for checking whether LTSs from multiple role instances
exhibit the same behaviour or not is described in Listing 4.6.
The first step would be to identify the number of role instances partici-
pating in the protocol; in the case of the auction protocol this number is
equal to two. Before running branching bisimulation, we need to create
the role specific LTSs for the individual role instances where any action
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1 check_role_automata(GP,R) {
2 // GP is the Game Protocol
3 // R is the role in GP with multiple instances
4 n = number_of_role_instances(R);
5 for (i = 1 . . . n)
6 {
7 automatoni = create_role_automaton(GP, Ri);
8 }
9 run_branching_bisimulation(automaton1, . . . , automatonn);
10 if (branching_bisimilar(automaton1, . . . , automatonn))
11 {
12 return true;
13 }
14 else
15 {
16 return false;
17 }
18 }
Listing 4.6: Verifying multiple LTSs of the same role instance
not having the role instance as a sender or one of the recipients will be
renamed to a silent (τ) action.
This will provide us with a role LTS for each role instance. Once
we create all LTSs, we check to see if they are branching bisimilar
to confirm that they are exhibiting the same behaviour. If they are
check role automata returns true. Otherwise, it returns false and we
need to check whether the business rules justify this difference in be-
haviour or whether the LTSs need to be repaired using one of the ap-
proaches in Section 4.3 on page 69.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have discussed how to decompose a protocol into
role LTSs and how to check, using the concept of bisimulation, if these
role LTSs are implementable or the protocol needs to be repaired. We
have presented three different repair techniques, each time decreasing
the amount of extra information that we provide to a role in order for
an agent to be able to implement it. Finally, we have presented an
approach that deals with protocols where there are multiple instances
of one (or more) role(s) during its execution. This is used to check if all
LTSs for the same role instance describe the same behaviour, i.e., are
bisimilar.
The next chapter provides examples of this approach in both frameworks
(Event and Situation Calculi) described in Chapter 3. We, also, provide
an example of an auction with two bidders and how the bidder LTSs for
the two role instances can be checked for bisimilarity.
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Chapter 5
Case Studies
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we demonstrate our approach by the use of examples.
We show how the competence of an agent can be assessed using both
the Event and Situation Calculi approaches, both for acyclic and cyclic
protocols. We, then, show how a protocol can be decomposed into its
constituent roles and how the decomposition of a protocol with multiple
role instances can be checked for correctness with the use of bisimulation.
5.2 Setting the Scene - an acyclic protocol
5.2.1 The protocol
We will be using the mail order protocol that was partially described
in Section 3.6.6 to demonstrate an acyclic protocol. In this protocol, a
merchant is interacting with a supplier for the purchase of goods. The
merchant makes an order, that the supplier can refuse, in which case
the protocol terminates. On the other hand, if the supplier confirms the
order and supplies an invoice, then the merchant can withdraw in which
case the protocol terminates again. If the merchant accepts the offer,
then the supplier agent notifies the merchant agent of the order details.
The protocol, in the form of an automaton, is shown in Figure 5.1.
In Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3, we describe how to formalise this game in
terms of initial and terminating situations, valid moves, effects of moves
and how to write the game predicate that will be checking the progress of
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Figure 5.1: A mail order protocol
the game and decide whether it reached a terminating point or not. The
formalisation will be in both frameworks (Event and Situation Calculi).
5.2.2 Protocol Rules in Situation Calculus
5.2.2.1 Game Situations
As described in Section 3.6, a game situation is represented by the
predicate sit(Name, Id, Moves). In the example, we are describing a
mail order protocol so the situation narratives will be of the form:
1 sit(mail_order, buy1, Moves).
Listing 5.1: Situation Narratives
5.2.2.2 Initial and terminating situations
The initial situation describes what holds initially in the game, i.e., in-
formation about the roles that participants play as well as any additional
information regarding facts that are true when the game starts.
In the mail order protocol example, the initial situation will describe
the roles of the players as in Listing 5.2. We assume that the name of
the merchant is john and the name of the supplier is paul and use the
predicate role of(X, Y) to assign roles to agents (agent X has role Y ). In
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an initial situation, no moves have been made so the Moves component
is an empty list.
1 initially(sit(mail_order,buy1,[]),role_of(john, merchant)).
2 initially(sit(mail_order,buy1,[]),role_of(paul, supplier)).
Listing 5.2: What holds initially in the protocol (Situation Calculus)
For the mail order protocol to terminate, there are three options:
• the supplier refuses to provide the items requested;
• the supplier notifies the merchant that he accepts the order;
• the merchant withdraws his order.
Listing 5.3 specifies these terminating conditions using the predicate
last move(X) that indicates whether the last move selected by a par-
ticipant in the protocol is X. The first rule covers the cases where the
supplier terminates the protocol with a refuse or a notify move and cor-
responds to the first two conditions, while the second rule covers the case
that the merchant terminates the protocol with a withdraw message.
1 terminating(Situation, Situation):-
2 holds(Situation,last_move(select(P1,Act,P2))),
3 member(Act, [refuse,notify]),
4 holds(Situation,role_of(P1,supplier)),
5 holds(Situation,role_of(P2,merchant)).
6
7 terminating(Situation, Situation):-
8 holds(Situation,last_move(select(P1,Act,P2))),
9 holds(Situation, role_of(P1, merchant)),
10 holds(Situation,role_of(P2,supplier),
11 Act = withdraw.
Listing 5.3: Terminating conditions for the protocol in SC
5.2.2.3 Valid Moves
Valid moves are the moves that can be selected by a player in a certain
state of the game. The conditions on the state will be expressed as a
sequence of holds/2 predicates and valid moves in every state will be a
subset of available moves, i.e., the moves that the game protocol makes
available to its players.
In the mail order protocol of Figure 5.1, the available moves are shown in
Listing 5.4. Any player can select any move, as there are no constraints
upon their selection. The players can select them at any time with the
only constraint being that they have to be participating in a mail order
protocol.
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1 available(sit(mail_order,buy1,Moves),select(_,order,_)).
2 available(sit(mail_order,buy1,Moves),select(_,refuse,_)).
3 available(sit(mail_order,buy1,Moves),select(_,confirm,_)).
4 available(sit(mail_order,buy1,Moves),select(_,withdraw,_)).
5 available(sit(mail_order,buy1,Moves),select(_,accept,_)).
6 available(sit(mail_order,buy1,Moves),select(_,notify,_)).
Listing 5.4: Available Moves in Situation Calculus
The second filter for the validity of a move is to decide whether it is legal
or not, i.e., determine if it can be selected in a specific situation. The
example we are looking at is a shallow protocol [35], in that the next
move only depends on the type of the previous move and not on the
contents of the message (e.g. the supplier can select the confirm move
irrespective of what the customer ordered). As a result, the criteria we
will be using to determine validity are the roles of the player (by using
the role of/2 predicate) and the last move that has been selected by the
other participant(s) (by using the last move/2 predicate).
The rules applicable to this protocol are as in Listing 5.5. For example,
the first rule specifies that it is legal for a player to select the order
move if its role is that of merchant and no last move has been selected
previously in the game.
1 valid(sit(mail_order,buy1,N), select(P1, order,P2)):-
2 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
3 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),role_of(P2,supplier)),
4 \+ holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),last_move(_)).
5
6 valid(sit(mail_order,buy1,N), select(P1,confirm,P2)):-
7 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),role_of(P1,supplier)),
8 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),role_of(P2,merchant)),
9 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),last_move(select(P2,order,P1))).
10
11 valid(sit(mail_order,buy1,N), select(P1, refuse,P2)):-
12 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),role_of(P1,supplier)),
13 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),role_of(P2,merchant)),
14 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),last_move(select(P2,order,P1))).
15
16 valid(sit(mail_order,buy1,N), select(P1, withdraw,P2)):-
17 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
18 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),role_of(P2,supplier)),
19 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),last_move(select(P2,confirm,P1))).
20
21 valid(sit(mail_order,buy1,N), select(P1, accept,P2)):-
22 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
23 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),role_of(P2,supplier)),
24 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),last_move(select(P2,confirm,P1))).
25
26 valid(sit(mail_order,buy1,N), select(P1, notify,P2)):-
27 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),role_of(P1,supplier)),
28 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),role_of(P2,merchant)),
29 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,N),last_move(select(P2,accept,P1))).
Listing 5.5: Valid Moves in Situation Calculus
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5.2.2.4 Effects of Moves
As the players select moves, the state of the game - as saved in the
situation/3 predicate changes. These changes are captured by effects,
effect and abnormal rules. The effect rules can be summarised as follows:
• when a player makes a move, this is prepended to the last argument
of the situation predicate; thus, the list of moves grows by one
element, the last move (effects);
• when a player makes a move in the protocol, this automatically
becomes the last move (effect).
The first item can be captured by the rule in Listing 5.6; if john makes
an order move with paul as the recipient in the initial situation, then
this move is added to the list of moves (in fact, it is the first move made
in the protocol). In Listing 5.7 when john makes the same move in the
initial situation, the effect of that move for the last move predicate is
that its value will have to change to reflect that this is the last move
made in the game.
1 effects(sit(mail_order, buy1, []), select(john,order,paul),
2 sit(mail_order, buy1, [select(john,order,paul)])).
Listing 5.6: Move effects in situations
1 effect(last_move(select(john,order,paul)),select(john,order,paul),
2 sit(mail_order,buy1,[])).
Listing 5.7: Local Move Effects
Finally, we need to define abnormality conditions, i.e., conditions where
a property holds when it should not hold. In our case, it would be
abnormal for the last move property to have the value of the old move,
when a new one is selected. This is shown in Listing 5.8.
1 abnormal(last_move(select(john,order,paul)), select(paul,confirm,john),
sit(mail_order, buy1, [select(john,order,paul)])):-
2 \+ OldMove = NewMove.
Listing 5.8: Abnormal situations in Situation Calculus
5.2.2.5 An example run
By executing the rules specified in the previous sections, we obtain the
possible outcomes shown in Listing 5.9.
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R = sit(mail_order, buy1,
[select(john, withdraw, paul),select(paul,confirm, john),
select(john, order, paul)]) ;
R = sit(mail_order, buy1,
[select(paul, notify, john),select(john, accept,paul),
select(paul, confirm, john),select(john, order, paul)]) ;
R = sit(mail_order, buy1,
[select(paul, refuse, john),select(john, order,paul)]) ;
false.
Listing 5.9: Game Results in Situation Calculus
This list represents all the runs that an agent can realise on the basis
of the competencies it supplied the Authority Agent with at the appli-
cation process. These will have to be compared against the competence
requirements of the society to decide the agent will be allowed entry or
not. Essentially we assemble all the runs that the agent can realise, e.g.
by using the findall/3 predicate and then compare the result with
the runs that the AA of the society is requiring the agent to realise.
5.2.3 Protocol Rules in Event Calculus
The alternative formulation in which we can specify the protocol rules
is that of Event Calculus, as discussed in Section 3.7.1. As before, we
will be describing the different components of the protocol viewed as a
game. In this example, we could have selected either formulation but
in the case that we had to take time into account when developing the
game rules, an Event Calculus formulation would be more appropriate
as it is a more natural way of representing time.
5.2.3.1 Game Situations
The description of a situation in Event Calculus is very similar to the
one in Situation Calculus, but with an added time component. The
time component is needed as in some protocols (e.g. an auction pro-
tocol), moves have to be selected within a pre-defined period of time
or time is an important component of the game (e.g. the auction runs
for a pre-defined amount of time). The general form of a situation in
Event Calculus is sit(Name, Id, Time, Narrative). In the mail order pro-
tocol example, at time point 2, the predicate describing the situation
could be:
sit(mail_order, buy1, 2, [at([select(paul,confirm,john)],1),at([select(
john, order,paul)],0)]).
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This situation predicate describes a mail order protocol with an Id of
buy protocol that is at time point 2. The moves that have been made
so far are an order move from the merchant agent (john) and a confirm
move by the supplier (paul).
5.2.3.2 Initial and Terminating Conditions
We need to define what holds true at the beginning of the protocol as
well as what would terminate it. For the mail order protocol, what holds
initially is information regarding the roles that the protocol participants
play. These would be expressed by the statements in Listing 5.10.
1 initially(sit(mail_order,buy1,0,[]),role_of(john,merchant)).
2 initially(sit(mail_order,buy1,0,[]),role_of(paul,supplier)).
Listing 5.10: Initial episodes in Event Calculus
The protocol can terminate by two actions of the supplier (notify and
refuse) and one of the merchant (withdraw). In Event Calculus this is
described as in Listing 5.11.
1 terminating(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N)):-
2 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),last_moves([select(P1,X,P2)])),
3 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N), role_of(P1,supplier)),
4 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N), role_of(P2,merchant)),
5 member(X, [notify,refuse]).
6
7 terminating(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N)):-
8 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),last_moves([select(P1,X,P2)])),
9 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N), role_of(P1,merchant)),
10 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N), role_of(P2,supplier)),
11 member(X, [withdraw]).
Listing 5.11: Terminating conditions in Event Calculus
5.2.3.3 Valid Moves
As in Section 5.2.2.3, we describe what the agent can do in the current
state of the game in the form of valid moves. They are expressed as
mostly a sequence of holds constraints and, at every state, they form a
subset of the moves that the protocol makes available to the players.
Listing 5.12 describes the moves that the mail order protocol makes
available to its players. These moves can be selected by any player at
any time over the course of the protocol.
For a move to be selected, it needs not only to be available but the player
should be able to select it on the basis of the current state of the game
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1 available(sit(mail_order,buy1,_,_),select(_,order,_)).
2 available(sit(mail_order,buy1,_,_),select(_,confirm,_)).
3 available(sit(mail_order,buy1,_,_),select(_,refuse,_)).
4 available(sit(mail_order,buy1,_,_),select(_,withdraw,_)).
5 available(sit(mail_order,buy1,_,_),select(_,accept,_)).
6 available(sit(mail_order,buy1,_,_),select(_,notify,_)).
Listing 5.12: Available moves in Event Calculus
and its role, e.g. the supplier agent can select refuse only if the merchant
agent has selected order immediately before. In contrast with Situation
Calculus , we are now using lists to store the moves players make as
a number of them might choose to move at the same time point. For
example, an auctioneer makes a call for bids and all bidders will have
to reply by the next time point; their collective moves will be stored
in a list. For the mail order protocol we are considering, the rules are
specified in Listing 5.13.
1 valid(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N), select(P1, order,P2)):-
2 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
3 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N), role_of(P2,supplier)),
4 \+ holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),last_moves(_)).
5
6 valid(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N), select(P1,confirm,P2)):-
7 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),role_of(P1,supplier)),
8 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N), role_of(P2,merchant)),
9 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,order,P1)])).
10
11 valid(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N), select(P1, refuse,P2)):-
12 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),role_of(P1,supplier)),
13 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),role_of(P2,merchant)),
14 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,order,P1)])).
15
16 valid(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N), select(P1, withdraw,P2)):-
17 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
18 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),role_of(P2,supplier)),
19 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,confirm,P1)])).
20
21 valid(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N), select(P1, accept,P2)):-
22 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
23 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),role_of(P2,supplier)),
24 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,confirm,P1)])).
25
26 valid(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N), select(P1, notify,P2)):-
27 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),role_of(P1,supplier)),
28 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),role_of(P2,merchant)),
29 holds(sit(mail_order,buy1,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,accept,P1)])).
Listing 5.13: Valid Moves in the Event Calculus Representation
5.2.3.4 Effects of the Moves
When a player selects to make a move, the state of the game will need
to change and this will need to be recorded. We are using the effects/4
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predicate (Listing 5.14) to define how:
• the time of the game increases by one after each move;
• the list of moves that have already been selected in the game is
updated;
• the value of the last moves predicate (as well as any other pred-
icates recording other parts of the game state - e.g. the running
price of the auction, if required) is updated.
The code is as follows - the second line indicates that the supplier chose
to perform move confirm at time point one after the merchant agent has
selected to make an order move:
1 effects(sit(mail_order, buy1, 0, []),
2 at([select(john,order,paul)], 1),
3 sit(mail_order,buy1,1,[[select(john,order,paul)] |[]])).
Listing 5.14: Effects of a move (or moves) in a game episode
5.2.3.5 An example run
By executing the rules specified in the previous section, we obtain the
outcomes in Listing 5.15.
R = sit(mail_order, buy1, 2,
[at([select(paul,refuse,john)],1),at([select(john,order,paul)],0)]);
R = sit(mail_order, buy1, 3,
[at([select(john,withdraw,paul)],2),at([select(paul,confirm,john)],1),
at([select(john, order, paul)],0)]) ;
R = sit(mail_order, buy1, 4,
[at([select(paul,notify,john)],3),at([select(john,accept,paul)],2),
at([select(paul,confirm,john)],1),at([select(john,order,paul)],0)]);
false.
Listing 5.15: Game Results in Event Calculus
This has, again, to be checked against the competence requirements set
by the Authority Agent so that the approval (or rejection) of the agent’s
application can be decided.
5.3 Setting the scene - a cyclic protocol
The protocol in Section 5.2 is a simple acyclic one. However, this is
not always the case and our formalism should allow to consider complex
protocols that contain cycles. As an example, we will be looking at
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an electronic negotiation protocol in Figure 5.2 adapted from [35]. This
protocol has a number of cases of moves that can form part of an infinite
loop - for example (this is not a comprehensive list, as other cases of loops
exist):
• the customer selects challenge and the merchant selects justify ;
• the customer selects certify and the merchant selects not-understood ;
• the customer selects inform and the merchant selects not-understood ;
• the customer selects certify, the merchant selects not-understood,
the customer selects inform and the merchant selects not-understood ;
• the customer selects inform, the merchant selects not-understood,
the customer selects certify and the merchant selects not-understood.
A:justify
A:retract
A:authenticate
A:not-understoodA:not-understood
B:inform B:certify
B:refuse
A:request
B:accept
A:justifyB:challenge
A:rejectA:reject
A:justify
Figure 5.2: An electronic negotiation protocol
The occurrence of any of these cycles could possibly result in an infinite
loop and the protocol will never terminate but will keep looping between
84
these states. As we are assuming that the agent selection strategy is
private, we have no way of knowing whether it will accommodate exiting
from the loop itself or not, so we have to make allowance for it in the
processing of protocol moves. In the next Sections, we describe how we
deal with this kind of situation in both Event Calculus and Situation
Calculus by discussing the cyclic/1 predicate; the rest of the formalism
is exactly the same.
5.3.1 Specifying cycles in Situation Calculus
In order to check for cycles, we need to check the representation of the
state of the game for the occurrence of these moves. In other words, as
the state of the game is represented by a list, it is sufficient to check if
the specified moves exist in that list in the same sequence. This is done
by the cyclic/1 predicate, defined in Listing 5.16.
1 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves)):-
2 cyclic_pattern(CyclicPattern),
3 check_list( CyclicPattern , Moves).
Listing 5.16: Identifying cyclic moves in Event Calculus
Intuitively, a move causes a cyclic problem, if a certain pattern is matched
against the moves already made and the newly selected move. In the
protocol of Figure 5.2, such a pattern could be two occurrences of the se-
quence select(paul,challenge,john), select(john,justify,paul). This would
be specified as a cyclic pattern and every new move selected by the
agents assuming the roles of supplier and merchant in the protocol will
have to be checked against that pattern. If adding the new move will
result in a loop, the agent’s choice will be rejected and it will have to
make another one. We should note here that the validity of the move is
not affected and an agent using the protocol is allowed to use that move
as many times as it chooses to do so.
We are imposing this limitation only on the grounds of been able to
check the agent’s ability to terminate the protocol and as there is no
control over the agent’s selection strategy the only option is to intro-
duce a new layer of filtering for the moves it selects. Furthermore, by
using that version of cyclic, we can easily adapt it to cater for cases
where we want to apply patterns like periodic occurrences of the cyclic
moves (e.g. cases like (LoopMoves, ,LoopMoves,. . . )). The specification
of problematic moves for the protocol in Figure 5.2 via the specifica-
tion of cyclic patterns in Situation Calculus is shown in Listing 5.17. If
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Move is selected, then all cyclic patterns are examined against the list
of current moves enhanced with Move.
1 cyclic(sit(mail_order,_,Moves), Move):-
2 Move = select(B,challenge,A),
3 sublist([select(B,justify,A),select(A,challenge,B),
4 select(B,justify,A),select(A,challenge,B)],Moves).
5 cyclic(sit(mail_order,_,Moves), Move):-
6 Move = select(B,authenticate,A),
7 sublist([select(A,challenge,B),select(B,justify,A),
8 select(A,challenge,B),select(B,justify,A)], Moves).
9
10 cyclic(sit(mail_order,_,Moves), Move):-
11 Move = select(B,challenge,A),
12 sublist([select(B,justify,A),select(A,certify,B),
13 select(A,certify,B)], Moves).
14
15 cyclic(sit(mail_order,_,Moves), Move):-
16 Move = select(A,challenge,B),
17 sublist([select(B,justify,A),select(A,inform,B),
18 select(B,notunderstood,A),select(A,certify,B)],Moves).
19 cyclic(sit(mail_order,_,Moves), Move):-
20 Move = select(A,challenge,B),
21 sublist([select(B,justify,A),select(A,certify,B),
22 select(B,notunderstood,A),select(A,inform,B)],Moves).
23
24 cyclic(sit(mail_order,_,Moves), Move):-
25 Move = select(A,challenge,B),
26 sublist([select(B, justify, A), select(A,certify,B),
27 select(B, notunderstood, A), select(A, certify, B),
28 select(B, notunderstood, A),elect(A,inform,B)],Moves).
29 cyclic(sit(mail_order,_,Moves), Move):-
30 Move = select(A,certify,B),
31 sublist([select(B,notunderstood,A),select(A,certify,B),
32 select(B,notunderstood,A),select(A,certify,B)],Moves).
33 cyclic(sit(mail_order,_,Moves), Move):-
34 Move = select(A,inform,B),
35 sublist([select(B,notunderstood,A),select(A,inform,B),
36 select(B,notunderstood,A),select(A,inform,B)],Moves).
37
38 cyclic(sit(mail_order,_,Moves), Move):-
39 Move = select(A,challenge,B),
40 sublist([select(B,justify,A),select(A,inform,B),
41 select(B,authenticate,A)],Moves).
42 cyclic(sit(mail_order,_,Moves), Move):-
43 Move = select(A,challenge,B),
44 sublist([select(B,justify,A),select(A,certify,B),
45 select(B,authenticate,A)],Moves).
46
47 cyclic(sit(mail_order,_,Moves), Move):-
48 Move = select(A,certify,B),
49 sublist([select(B,notunderstood,A),select(A,inform,B),
50 select(B,notunderstood,A)],Moves).
51 cyclic(sit(mail_order,_,Moves), Move):-
52 Move = select(A,inform,B),
53 sublist([select(B,notunderstood,A),select(A,inform,B),
54 select(B,notunderstood,A)],Moves).
Listing 5.17: cyclic pattern examples
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5.3.1.1 An example run
After running the code for the electronic negotiation protocol, we get
the following results for the possible paths of the protocol that can be
realised on the basis of the competence information supplied by the par-
ticipant agents. The results shown in Listing 5.18 are not comprehensive,
but the first few paths that we get from running the code. They will
have to be matched against the societal competence requirements.
-> [ select(paul,accept,john), select(john,request,paul)]
-> [ select(paul,refuse,john), select(john,request,paul)]
-> [ select(paul,accept,john), select(john,justify,paul),
select(paul,challenge,john), select(john,request,paul)]
-> [ select(paul,refuse,john), select(john,justify,paul),
select(paul,challenge,john), select(john,request,paul)]
-> [ select(paul,accept,john), select(john,justify,paul),
select(paul,challenge,john), select(john,justify,paul),
select(paul,challenge,john), select(john,request,paul)]
-> [ select(paul,refuse,john), select(john,justify,paul),
select(paul,challenge,john), select(john,justify,paul),
select(paul,challenge,john), select(john,request,paul)]
-> [ select(john,retract,paul), select(paul,challenge,john),
select(john,justify,paul), select(paul,challenge,john),
select(john,request,paul)]
-> [ select(paul,accept,john), select(john,justify,paul),
select(paul,certify,john), select(john,authenticate,paul),
select(paul,challenge,john), select(john,justify,paul),
select(paul,challenge,john), select(john,request,paul)]
Listing 5.18: Electronic negotiation protocol specified in SC
5.3.2 Cyclic Rules in Event Calculus
We use cyclic/2 to check for cycles in the Event Calculus formulation
as well. In the case of Event Calculus , as a number of moves can be
made by multiple agents at the same time, the definition of cyclic (as
part of the definition of the acceptable 2 predicate) is moved inside the
assume/3 predicate as in Listing 5.19.
1 assume(Valid, sit(N,Id,T,Ns), E, at(Es,T)):-
2 findall(E, Valid, All),
3 member(Es, All),
4 acceptable(sit(N,Id,T,Ns),at(Es,T)).
Listing 5.19: Assuming a move in Event Calculus
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In Listing 5.19, we find all moves that are valid (for all players) and
check to see if the move we are selecting is a sublist of them (so that we
can capture all different combinations of the moves that can be made
from one or more players). The next step is to check if the aggregate
move selected is acceptable or not (where acceptable is equivalent to the
move not introducing a cycle).
The definition of the cyclic predicate is shown in Listing 5.20:
1 cyclic(sit(_,_,_,Ns),at(Es,T)):-
2 cyclic_pattern(CyclicPattern),
3 sublist(CyclicPattern, Ns).
Listing 5.20: Definition of a cyclic move
Listing 5.21 shows examples of the specification of cyclic moves in Event
Calculus .
1 cyclic_pattern([at(select(B,justify,A),_),at(select(A,challenge,B),_),
2 at(select(B,justify,A),_),at(select(A,challenge,B),_)]).
3
4 cyclic_pattern([at(select(B,challenge,A),_),at(select(B,justify,A),_),
5 at(select(A,challenge,B),_),at(select(B,justify,A),_)]).
6
7 cyclic_pattern([at(select(B,justify,A),_),at(select(A,certify,B),_),
8 at(select(A,certify,B),_)]).
9
10 cyclic_pattern([at(select(B,justify,A),_),at(select(A,certify,B),_),
11 at(select(B,notunderstood,A),_),at(select(A,certify,B),_),
12 at(select(B,authenticate,A),_),at(select(A,challenge,B),_),
13 at(select(B,justify,A),_)]).
14
15 cyclic_pattern([at(select(B, justify,A),_),at(select(A,inform,B),_),
16 at(select(B,notunderstood,A),_),at(select(A,inform,B),_),
17 at(select(B,authenticate,A),_),at(select(A,challenge,B),_),
18 at(select(B,justify,A),_)].
19
20 cyclic_pattern([at(select(B,justify,A),_),at(select(A,inform,B),_),
21 at(select(B,notunderstood,A),_),at(select(A,certify,B),_)]).
22
23 cyclic_pattern([at(select(B,justify,A),_),at(select(A,certify,B),_),
24 at(select(B,notunderstood,A),_),at(select(A,inform,B),_)]).
25 . . .
Listing 5.21: Example of cyclic patterns
We are making use of the same rules as in the case of Situation Calculus,
but with the difference that in the case of having two or more players
making a move at the same time, our moves for each time point will
have to be represented as lists (in this example, there is a single move
at every time point, but this does not have to be the case in general).
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5.3.2.1 An example run
Running the program in Event Calculusproduces the following results -
Listing 5.22 is a small sample to demonstrate the outcome to be checked
against the competence requirements:
-> [at(select(paul,accept,john),1),
at(select(john,request,paul),0)]
-> [at(select(paul,refuse, john),1),
at(select(john,request,paul),0)]
-> [at(select(paul,accept,john),3),at(select(john,justify,paul),2),
at(select(paul,challenge,john),1),at(select(john,request,paul),0)]
-> [at(select(paul,refuse,john),3),at(select(john,justify,paul),2),
at(select(paul,challenge,john),1),at(select(john,request,paul),0)]
-> [at(select(john,retract,paul),4),at(select(paul,challenge,john),3),
at(select(john,justify,paul),2),at(select(paul,challenge,john),1),
at(select(john,request,paul),0)]
-> [at(select(paul,retract,john),4),at(select(paul,challenge,john),3),
at(select(john,justify,paul),2),at(select(paul,challenge,john),1),
at(select(john,request,paul),0)]
Listing 5.22: Results for the electronic negotiation protocol in EC
5.4 Entering the society - Role Assignment
Once an agent is judged to be competent to join a society by been able
to realise at least the essential protocols (defined by the AA), it needs to
know the protocol(s) it will be engaging in. In this Section, we provide
an example of the algorithm for decomposing a protocol into constituent
roles. In this case study, we consider a gateway agent who wants to enter
a society of merchant and customer agents in order to handle payments
on the merchant agent’s behalf for purchases made by customer agents.
This society is making use of a variant of the NetBill protocol, described
in Figure 3.1 on page 30, in order to process orders and payment. This
is the standard NetBill protocol [25, 46], with a number of variations
(for a full description of the protocol, see Section 3.2). Although this is
a high-level description, NetBill is a protocol widely used in the area of
e-commerce applications and transactions.
The formal representation of the protocol is:
<N ,R, S , I , F ,A, M , V , E >,
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where:
N = NetBill-v1
R = {c,m, g}
S = {0,1,2,3, . . . ,8}
F = {5}
A = {rq, pq, oa, dg, sepo, ssepo, sr, dgk, dga, dgb}
M = {(c, rq,{m}), . . . , (c, oa,{m})}
V = {(0, (m,dga,{c})), . . . , (0, (c, rq,{m}))}
E = {(0, (m,dga,{c}),1), . . . , (0, (c, rq,{m}),8)}
The NetBill protocol is described by the protocol predicate in List-
ing 5.23. We will use the gateway role for illustrating the derivation
process as it is the role that enjoys the most benefits from the process.
1 protocol(netbill1,
2 [c,m,g],
3 [0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8],
4 0,
5 5,
6 [rq,pq,oa,dg,sepo,ssepo,sr,dgk,dga,dgb],
7 [(c,rq,m), (m,pq,c), (c,oa,m), (m,dg,c), (c,sepo,m),
8 (m,ssepo,g), (g,sr,m), (m,dgk,c), (m,pq,c), (m,dg,c),
9 (c,oa,m)],
10 [(0, (m,dga,c)), (1,(c,sepo,m)),(2,(m,ssepo,g)),
11 (3, (g,sr,m)),(4,(m,dgk,c)), (6, (m,dg,c)),(8,(m,dgb,c)),
12 (8, (m,pq,c)), (7,(c,oa,m)), (0, (c,oa,m)), (0,(m,pq,c)),
13 (0, (c,rq,m))],
14 [(0, (m,dga,c),1),(1,(c,sepo,m)),2),(2,(m,ssepo,g),3),
15 (3,(g,sr,m),4),(4,(m,dgk,c),5),(6, (m,dg,c),1),
16 (8,(m,dgb,c), 1),(8,(m,pq,c), 7),(7,(c,oa,m), 6),
17 (0, (c,oa,m), 6),(0,(m,pq,c), 7), (0, (c,rq,m), 8)]).
Listing 5.23: Representation of the NetBill protocol
The next step is to calculate the role-specific LTS from the protocol.
After processing the transitions, we obtain the result in Listing 5.24.
Every transition where the gateway agent g is not a sender or a recipient
of the message involved in the original protocol is replaced with a silent
action (denoted by tau). The top line of the representation denotes the
initial state of the LTS (0 ), the number of transitions in it (12 ) and the
number of states (9 ). Each of the other lines describe a transition of the
LTS in the form of (InitialState, Move, FinalState), e.g. the third line
describes a transition from state 2 to state 3 via the move (m, ssepo,
g). Most of the moves are tau, as the involvement of the gateway agent
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is minimal.
1 des(0,12,9)
2 (0,"tau",1)
3 (1,"tau",2)
4 (2,"(m, ssepo, g)",3)
5 (3,"(g, sr, m)",4)
6 (4,"tau",5)
7 (6,"tau",1)
8 (8,"tau",1)
9 (8,"tau",7)
10 (7,"tau",6)
11 (0,"tau",6)
12 (0,"tau",7)
13 (0,"tau",8)
Listing 5.24: Role-specific representation for the gateway in the NetBill
protocol
We can, now, run the branching bisimulation reduction on this LTS.
As this role is only involved towards the end stages of the protocol,
most of its transitions are silent. Branching bisimulation will tell us
if the silent transitions in the LTS can be removed without any loss
of knowledge on the role’s side. Indeed, in this case, the result of the
bisimulation algorithm as shown in Listing 5.25 allows us to reduce the
initial protocol (consisting of nine states and twelve transitions) to one
of three states, two transitions and no silent transitions.
1 des(0,2,3)
2 (0,(m, ssepo, g),1)
3 (1,(g, sr, m),2)
Listing 5.25: The role-specific representation for gateway after the bbe
reduction
As a by-product of the process we also obtain the mapping between
the states in the original LTS and those in the new one as shown in
Listing 5.26. Every line of this representation is a pair of the form
(OldStateNumber, NewStateNumber). For example states 0, 1, 2, 6, 7
and 8 are all merged into state 0 - these are the states with the silent
transitions that were merged into a single state.
1 (0,0)
2 (1,0)
3 (2,0)
4 (3,1)
5 (4,2)
6 (5,2)
7 (6,0)
8 (7,0)
9 (8,0)
Listing 5.26: Equivalence between LTS states
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The agent assuming the role of the payment gateway service is not in-
volved in the message-passing when the protocol is in these states and
does not need to know about them when assuming its role.
The results obtained for all roles in the original Netbill protocol are
shown in Figure 5.3 (the bisimulation is performed by using the ltsmin
tool of the µCRL2 toolset [15]). For the merchant agent, there is no
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Figure 5.3: Branching bisimulation results for NetBill roles
change and it is receiving the full protocol. This is to be expected as the
merchant is involved in all protocol communications and is communi-
cating both with the gateway and the customer agent. As a result, since
there is no communication that does not involve the merchant agent
(either as the sender of the message or as one of its recipients), the pro-
tocol that it is receiving is the full one. The protocol for the customer
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agent is not that much smaller from the original protocol, but it does not
include the conversations involving the gateway agent. This is informa-
tion that the customer should not have access to. It is at the merchant
agent’s discretion how to handle payment and which gateway (or any
other way) to choose in order to receive payment for the order. Also,
if the customer agent knew about these interactions there might be the
danger that it would try and alter the amount due for the purchase or
any other order related information. The real benefit, however, lies with
the gateway agent. An agent representing the gateway service needs not
know the negotiations that have already happened between the mer-
chant and the customer agent. Furthermore, it only needs to interact
with the merchant agent and it does not need to talk to the customer
agent at all. As a result, the protocol for the gateway agent after the
branching bisimulation reduction is made up only of three states while
the original one has nine. To complete the role specification of the gate-
way according to the definitions in Section 3.4, we need to compute the
remaining components, i.e., roleset, initial and final states etc.This is
shown in Table 5.1.
Role name = g
RR = {m }
SR = {0, 1, 2}
IR = 0
FR = {2}
AR = {ssepo, sr }
MR = {(m,ssepo,{g}), (g, sr,{m}) }
V R = {(0, (m,ssepo,{g})), (1,(g, sr,{m}))}
ER = {(0, (m,ssepo,{g}), 1), (1, (g, sr,{m}),2)}
Table 5.1: Gateway Role Specification
The gateway agent is only interacting with the merchant agent, so this
is the only value added to the roleset of the gateway agent. The initial
state of the new LTS is the state that is bisimilar to the initial state of
the full protocol (that is state 0) and the final state is state 2, which
is the bisimilar state of the final state of the original protocol for the
gateway role (that is state 5 and, as we can see from Listing 5.26, its
equivalent state is state 2). The moves for the role are the moves that
have the gateway agent as either the sender or among the recipients of
the message and these are (m,ssepo,{g}) and (g, sr,{m}). The actions
in these moves are the available actions for the role from the original
protocol (in this case ssepo and sr). The valid actions (as well as the
effects relationship) for the role in question are obtained by looking at
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the valid moves in the original LTS, matching the states to the new
states in the bisimilar LTS and rewrite the moves and effects rules. As
an example, the initial state of the gateway LTS is the class of states in
which the initial state (0) of the original LTS belongs - this is the class
of states represented by 0.
5.4.1 From Roles back to Protocols
In this Section, we consider whether the parallel composition of the role
LTSs we get after running branching bisimulation and performing any
necessary repairs on the protocol will give us the original protocol. This
is not true; we get neither the original protocol nor one that is branching
bisimilar to it. As an example, consider the protocol in Figure 5.4; for
brevity, we only show the message names. The protocol begins by role R1
sending itself one of the messages d or e. After that, and depending on
what was the first message that R1 sent itself, it sends role R2 message
a or b and the protocol terminates.
b
d
e
a
Figure 5.4: From role LTS to the whole protocol - counterexample
The LTS for the two roles where silent actions for the roles are replaced
with τ are shown in Figure 5.6.
R2
d
e
a
b
a
b
τ
τ
R1
Figure 5.5: Role LTS for roles R1 and R2
Branching bisimulation will make no changes to the LTS for role R1 as
no silent actions exist. It will, also, make no changes to the LTS for role
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R2 as the τ actions will be kept in the LTS to preserve the branching
structure.
Because of the τ actions in the second LTS, we need to repair the proto-
col. If the repair algorithm in Section 4.3.3 is used, no repair is performed
because both silent actions are followed by receive moves for the role.
R2 does not need to know what message R1 sent itself, it just waits to
receive the next message.
We, now, need to compose the LTSs for the two roles and check the
result against the original protocol (or the LTS for role R1 as they are
the same). The parallel composition of the two LTSs will produce the
result shown in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: Parallel Composition of the LTSs for roles R1 and R2
The ltscompare tool of the µCRL2 suite reports that the two LTSs
are not branching bisimilar.
5.5 Games with multiple instances of the
same role
All the protocols we looked at so far were requiring a single instance of
each participant role. There are, however, cases when multiple instances
of the same role might be required. We will use the English auction pro-
tocol of Section 5.5.1 on page 96 with one seller, one auctioneer and two
bidders to demonstrate this. The seller provides the auctioneer with the
items to be auctioned and the auctioneer conducts the auction. There
are two bidders competing for the items and the description of the pro-
tocol, in the form of an FSP specification, can be found in Section 5.5.1
on page 96 - we use this as it is an easy and compact way to give a
high-level specification of the protocol without overwhelming the user
with the full list.
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The following Sections describe first the FSP specification of an English
auction protocol with two role instances of bidders, how we can convert
the protocol from the FSP specification into an LTS one on which we
can run bisimulation, as well as the steps involved in the algorithm for
checking that the two LTSs describing the behaviour of the two bidders
are branching bisimilar.
5.5.1 The English auction protocol
The model is described by a specification written in FSP [6]. Without
loss of generality the model considers that there are only two bidders,
but it can easily be extended to cover for more bidders. The full FSP
specification for the Bidder agent as well as the composition of the Bid-
der agents processes are given in Listing 5.27.
1 const N = 2
2
3 Bidder = (register -> BidderRegister
4 | inform -> Bidder
5 | end -> Bidder),
6 BidderRegister= (accept_registration -> BidderBid
7 | reject_registration -> Bidder
8 | end -> Bidder),
9 | BidderBid = (bid -> WaitBid
10 | cancel_bid -> Bidder
11 | inform -> BidderBid
12 end -> Bidder) ,
13 WaitBid = (accept_bid -> Wait
14 | reject_bid -> BidderBid
15 | inform -> BidderBid
16 | end -> Bidder),
17 Wait = (inform -> BidderBid
18 | end -> Bidder).
19
20 ||BidderI(I=1) =
21 Bidder/{ bid[I]/bid,
22 reject_bid[I]/reject_bid,
23 accept_bid[I]/accept_bid,
24 inform[I]/inform,
25 cancel_bid[I]/cancel_bid,
26 register[I]/register,
27 accept_registration[I]/accept_registration,
28 reject_registration[I]/reject_registration}.
29
30 ||Bidders = (forall [i:1..N]
31 BidderI(i))/{{win[b:1..N],no_win[1..N],no_win}/end}.
Listing 5.27: FSP code for the two bidder auction - Bidder
The constant N is used to identify the number of bidders participating
at the auction. We set this to two for convenience, but can easily be
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changed to accommodate any number of buyers. At the initial state,
the bidder can choose between register, inform and end messages. An
inform or end message will take the agent back to the beginning of the
process, while a register message will cause transition to the BidderReg-
ister process.
At this state, the registration can be accepted via an accept registration
message that takes the agent to the BidderBid state. If the registration
is rejected (via a reject registration message) or the bidder quits (via
an end message), then the bidder agent goes back to the initial state.
In the BidderBid state, the bidder can place a bid (bid), cancel a bid
(cancel bid), be informed about a bid (inform) or quit the auction (end).
If the bid is cancelled or the bidder quits the auction, then the agent goes
back to the first state in the process. On the other hand, placing a bid
will take the agent to the WaitBid state. In this state, the bidder agent
can have the bid accepted (accept bid), rejected (reject bid), receive an
inform message (inform) or quit the auction (end). A reject bid or
inform message will take the agent back to the BidderBid state, while
an end message will cause transition to the initial state of the process.
If the bid is accepted (accept bid), the system transitions to the Wait
state. In this state, the agent can either receive an inform message that
takes it back to the BidderBid state from which it can place more bids,
or an end message which takes the agent back to the initial state.
The specification we have looked at so far, describes the behaviour of a
single bidder agent. In our model we are representing two agents; there-
fore we need to create the parallel composition of two bidder processes.
This is done by action interleaving, where any non-shared, i.e. not with
the same name, actions of the two processes can be interleaved arbitrar-
ily but shared, i.e. with the same name, actions of the two processes
must be executed at the same time. Furthermore, we will need to be
able to determine where the move came from, i.e., which agent placed
the bid. This is done by combining the bidder agent with an index i
and is defined as renaming the bidder actions to include the index i. As
an example, the bid message will be renamed to bid[1] if the first bidder
placed the bid. Then, we compose all bidder processes. In doing so, we
need to rename the messages that are common between the Auctioneer
and Bidder agents as well as cater for all possible ways of ending an
auction (e.g. the bid message will come up as bid[1] and bid[2] because
of the composition; these are renamed to bid to achieve synchronisation
with the Auctioneer process). As a result, we create the Bidders pro-
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cess by composing all individual Bidder processes and renaming all end
messages to win and no win ones with an index to indicate the agent
that has won (or not) the auction. The no win message with no indices
covers the case where there is no winner at the auction.
The seller (Listing 5.28) and auctioneer (Listing 5.29) agents have a
common action, init, that they perform. This takes the seller to the
state WaitInit where it can receive accept init messages. On receipt of
this message, the seller goes to the WaitEnd state, in which it receives
the end message when the auction comes to an end. Finally, if the
init message is rejected, i.e., a reject init message is received, then the
process terminates.
1 Seller = (init -> WaitInit),
2 WaitInit = (accept_init -> WaitEnd
3 | reject_init -> STOP),
4 WaitEnd = (end -> STOP).
Listing 5.28: FSP code for the two bidder auction - Seller
The auctioneer agent can accept an init message that starts off the
process. It takes the agent to the AnswerInit state where it can choose
between the accept init and reject init messages.
1 Auctioneer = (init -> AnswerInit),
2 AnswerInit = (accept_init -> AuctioneerBid[0][0][0]
3 | reject_init -> Auctioneer),
4 AuctioneerBid[chb:0..N][i1:0..1][i2:0..1] = (
5 | when i1 == 1 bid[1] -> AnswerBid[1][chb][i1][i2]
6 | when i1 == 0 register[1] -> AnswerReg[1][chb][i1][i2]
7 | when i2 == 1 bid[2] -> AnswerBid[2][chb][i1][i2]
8 | when i2 == 0 register[2] -> AnswerReg[2][chb][i1][i2]
9 stop -> AuctioneerAgreement[chb]),
10 AnswerReg[b:1..N][chb:0..N][i1:0..1][i2:0..1] =
11 (when b == 1 accept_registration[1] ->AuctioneerBid[chb][1][i2]
12 | when b == 2 accept_registration[2] ->AuctioneerBid[chb][i1][1]
13 | reject_registration[b] -> AuctioneerBid[chb][i1][i2]),
14 AnswerBid[b:1..N][chb:0..N][i1:0..1][i2:0..1] =
15 (accept_bid[b] -> InformBidders[b][i1][i2]
16 | reject_bid[b] -> AuctioneerBid[chb][i1][i2]),
17 InformBidders[b:1..N][i1:0..1][i2:0..1]=
18 InformBidders[b][1][i1][i2],
19 InformBidders[b:1..N][i:1..N][i1:0..1][i2:0..1]=
20 if (i==1 && i!=b && i1==1) then (inform[1] ->
21 InformBidders[b][2][i1][i2])
22 else if (i==1 && (i==b || i1==0)) then
23 InformBidders[b][2][i1][i2]
24 else if (i==2 && i!=b && i2==1) then
25 (inform[2] ->AuctioneerBid[b][i1][i2])
26 else AuctioneerBid[b][i1][i2],
27 AuctioneerAgreement[0] = (no_win -> Auctioneer),
28 AuctioneerAgreement[chb:1..N] =
29 (win[chb] -> Auctioneer
30 | no_win[chb] -> Auctioneer).
Listing 5.29: FSP code for the two bidder auction - Auctioneer
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In the case that the reject init is chosen, the agent goes back to the
beginning, as the initiation of the auction is denied (e.g. because the
seller agent does not want to sell the goods any more).
On the other hand, if the accept init message is chosen, the process
moves to the AuctioneerBid[i][j][k] state. The state description uses
three indices, i for holding the winning bidder and j and k to hold
information about whether the buyer agents are registered or not (a
value of one means they are registred). This is the state where the
auctioneer agent can receive registration (register[i]), bidding (bid[i])
and stop messages. Both register[i] and bid[i] messages need to have an
index, as we need to differentiate between the two bidders and be able to
check who has registered/bid and who has not. A register message will
cause transition to the AnswerReg[i][j][k][l] state with four indices. The
first index stores the index of the bidder who has requested registration,
the second one holds the index of the current winning bidder and the
last two take the values zero (if the respective agent is not registered)
or one (if it is). A bid message causes the auctioneer process to progress
to the AnswerBid[i][j][k][l], where the semantics of the indices are the
same as for the AnswerReg state.
The auctioneer, once in the AnswerReg state, can respond with an ac-
cept registration or reject registration message (both of them need an
index to identify the agent who has applied for registration). If the
application for registration is successful from the first (second) bidder
agent, the second (third) index of the AnswerReg state will change to
one. If the auctioneer declines the application, there is no change in
the indices. The same rules hold for the AnswerBid state (instead of
accept registration and reject registration messages, there would be ac-
cept bid and reject bid messages). If the bid is rejected, then nothing
needs to be done and the auctioneer will go back to the AuctioneerBid
state, where it can receive bid messages.
If the bid is accepted, the bidders participating in the auction will need
to be informed of this development. However, it is only the registered
bidders different than the one who made the bid that will receive an
inform message. The InformBidders initially has three indices - the first
one about the bidder who is the winning bidder (the bidder who just
placed the bid) and the second and third ones are one or zero depending
on whether the agent is registered or not.
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In order to inform all bidders, we need to keep track of the bidder who
was informed last. This calls for an additional index to be added to the
InformBidders process holding the id of the bidder to be informed about
the new bid. As an example, InformBidders[2][1][1][1] means that the
winning bidder is the second one, the first bidder is the next one to
be informed of the bid and both bidders are registered bidders. In our
example if the second index is one and the first bidder is not the one
who make the bid (first index different than one) and the first bidder is
registered (third index is one) then the inform[1] message is sent. The
process, then, stays in the InformBidders state, but the second index
changes to two. If the second agent is the one who made the bid or it
is not registered, the process sends no inform message and moves on to
the next bidder. When the last bidder is informed, the auctioneer moves
again to the AuctioneerBid state where the agent can accept new bids.
In the event that the auctioneer agent receives a stop message, it moves
to the AuctioneerAgreement state. This state takes only one index that
describes the winning bidder. A value of zero would indicate that there
is no winner and the process goes back to the initial state so that another
auction can begin. If there is a winning bidder, then a win or nowin
message is sent to the bidders and the auctioneer agent goes back to
the initial state for the next auction. The FSP specification for the
auctioneer is specified in Listing 5.29.
To obtain the full protocol we need to compose together the processes
of all role instances. In doing so, the end message in the Seller agent
specification will need to be renamed in accordance with the renaming
in Listing 5.27. This is so that the seller will receive the information
about who won (not won) the auction as well as the no win message
in the case that there was no winner. The FSP specification for the
composition of the full system is given in Listing 5.30.
1 ||System = (Auctioneer ||
2 Seller/{{win[b:1..N],no_win[1..N],no_win}/end} || Buyers).
Listing 5.30: FSP code for the two bidder auction - System
So far, we have built the system in FSP for describing the auction with
two bidders, an auctioneer and a seller. Our aim, however, is to use
this model to decide if the protocol provides all instances of the same
role (in this case bidder) with the same behaviour. We need to check
this, as the specification might specify different rules for different role
instances. As an example, if an instance represents a “trusted” bidder,
its registration requested is automatically accepted, otherwise the auc-
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tioneer might need to run some tests before accepting it. In order to
achieve that, we need a formalism similar to that of describing messages
in Section 3.2, i.e., in the form (Sender, Move, Recipients).
In our case the different components of a move are separated by , e.g.
the renaming of bid[1] to b1 bid1 a will imply that b1 sent the message
bid1 to a. If the last component has the value of all, this indicates that
all agents receive the message, i.e., the auctioneer (a), the seller (s) and
all bidder agents (b1,b2 ).
The FSP code for the renaming is provided in Listing 5.31, e.g. the
first line will rename transition labels of bid[1] to b1 bid1 a. The non-
bidder actions have no index associated with them as there is a single
agent participant for each of the roles of auctioneer and seller. Some
of these actions (the ones concerning the outcome of the auction) are
broadcasted to all agent participants. These are the ones that have all
as the value of the Recipients field.
1 || Auction = System /{
2 b1_bid1_a/bid[1],
3 b2_bid2_a/bid[2],
4 a_rejectbid1_b1/reject_bid[1],
5 a_rejectbid2_b2/reject_bid[2],
6 a_acceptbid1_b1/accept_bid[1],
7 a_acceptbid2_b2/accept_bid[2],
8 a_inform1_b1/inform[1],
9 a_inform2_b2/inform[2],
10 b1_cancelbid1_a/cancel_bid[1],
11 b2_cancelbid2_a/cancel_bid[2],
12 b1_register1_a/register[1],
13 b2_register2_a/register[2],
14 a_acceptregistration1_b1/accept_registration[1],
15 a_acceptregistration2_b2/accept_registration[2],
16 a_rejectregistration1_b1/reject_registration[1],
17 a_rejectregistration2_b2/reject_registration[2],
18 a_win1_all/win[1],
19 a_win2_all/win[2],
20 a_nowin1_all/no_win[1],
21 a_nowin2_all/no_win[2],
22 a_nowin_all/no_win,
23 a_acceptinit_all/accept_init,
24 s_init_a/init,
25 a_rejectinit_s/reject_init,
26 a_stop_a/stop
27 }.
Listing 5.31: FSP code for the two bidder auction - Auction
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5.5.2 Verifying the correctness of the description
As already mentioned, we are trying to determine if the LTSs describing
the two bidders are describing the same behaviour by checking if they
are bisimilar. In this case the protocol is not given in the form of an
LTS but in FSP so we need to convert it before applying the algorithm.
The process followed for converting from FSP format to LTS cannot be
fully automated, as there is information we need that will have to come
from outside the protocol and sometimes might be uncertain. As an
example, we do not know in advance how many instances of each role
we need in order to capture all messages. This might be achieved by a
trial and error approach (trying to increase the number of role instances
and seeing if the new trace contains any additional messages).
5.5.3 Preparation
This is an example of the verification algorithm specified in Section 4.4.1.
The protocol specification given is not in our framework but in FSP, so
we need to convert it once we get the full protocol. As the protocol is
given in terms of individual FSP processes, we need to compose them
to get the full protocol. However, as multiple role instances from the
same role are involved, we need to index their actions so we know which
role instance is performing which move. As a result, the composition of
bidder processes for the two role instances in Listing 5.27 includes an
index (i) that carries this information. Furthermore, the moves specified
in the FSP format will need to be changed to reflect the specification
of moves in our framework ((Sender, Act, Recipients)). Finally, the
transitions we will get from the LTSA tool will need to be converted
into a format the tool that performs the bisimulation (µCRL2) uses,
i.e., in the form of (InitialStateNumber, Move, FinalStateNumber).
The steps we need to take therefore for bringing the model to a format
on which bisimulation can be applied are - this would correspond to step
one from Listing 4.6:
(A) index the actions of each process with multiple role instances (e.g.
the Bidder process in FSP is specified as the composition of two
Bidder(i) processes);
(B) compose all role processes to obtain the full protocol;
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(C) change the name of moves so that they comply with our framework
(e.g. bid[1] becomes b1 bid1 a);
(D) convert the representation of the transitions from the FSP format
to that of our framework (e.g. Q1 = (a rejectinit s → Q2 should
become (1,(a,rejectinit,s),2);
(E) as we will be checking the LTSs for branching bisimulation, the
transition names should be the same in both LTSs, otherwise the
check will fail. Role or move elements of transitions can be re-
named as long as they do not appear in the same role’s LTS with
multiple indexes (as is the case of win1 and win2 that appear in
both bidder LTSs).
5.5.4 Converting the protocol specification
The first step is to produce the game LTS from the FSP specification
(part (i), line 7 from Listing 4.6). From the Transitions menu of the
LTSA tool, we can get the transitions of the LTS as specified in FSP. A
small sample of them is shown in Listing 5.32.
1 Process:
2 Auction
3 States:
4 70
5 Transitions:
6 Auction = Q0,
7 Q0 = (s_init_a -> Q1),
8 Q1 = (a_rejectinit_s -> Q2
9 |a_acceptinit_s -> Q3),
10 Q2 = STOP,
11 Q3 = (a_stop_a -> Q4
12 |b2_register2_a -> Q5
13 |b1_register1_a -> Q69),
14 Q4 = (a_nowin_all -> Q2),
15 . . .
Listing 5.32: Output of LTSA for the auction model with two bidders
The next step is to convert this information into a format that can
be read by the branching bisimulation tool ( i.e. (InitialStateNumber,
Move, FinalStateNumber)). This is done by reading the transitions
line by line and making the necessary conversions. As an example, the
state Q0 should become 0 and s init a should become (s,init,a). Any
move that has all as the designated recipient should have it expanded to
[s,b1,b2]. This is the case as these messages have the auctioneer agent
a as the sender, so they need to be sent out to the other agents. The
first line is stating that this LTS has 162 transitions, 70 states and that
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the initial state is 0. The results, again a small sample, are shown in
Listing 5.33.
1 des(0,162,70)
2 (0,(s,init,a),1)
3 (1,(a,rejectinit,s),2)
4 (1,(a,acceptinit,s),3)
5 (3,(a,stop,a),4)
6 (3,(b2,register2,a),5)
7 (3,(b1,register1,a),69)
8 . . .
Listing 5.33: Conversion of the output of LTSA to aut
In parallel, we need to create the protocol representation as specified in
Section 5.4 on page 89. This is handled by the same code that converts
the output of the LTSA Transitions menu into the role LTS. The result
is shown in Listing 5.34.
1 protocol(auction2,
2 [s,a,b2,b1],
3 [0,1,2,3,4,5,40,6,7,16,29,30,8,9,10,11,15,12,13,14,17,18,19,20,21,
4 22,28,23,24,25,27,26,31,32,35,37,39,33,34,36,38,41,42,44,47,43,
5 45,46,. . .],
6 0,
7 2,
8 [init,rejectinit,acceptinit,stop,register2,register1,nowin,
9 . . .],
10 [(s,init,a),(a,rejectinit,s),(a,acceptinit,[s,b1,b2]),(a,stop,a),
11 . . .],
12 [(0,(s,init,a)),(1,(a,rejectinit,s)),(1,(a,acceptinit,[s,b1,b2])),
13 . . .],
14 [(0,(s,init,a),1),(1,(a,rejectinit,s),2),. . .]).
Listing 5.34: Protocol representation for the auction protocol
We, now, need to prepare the role-specific representations for the two
bidder role instances (still part (i) of Listing 4.6). This is done by
looking at the effects component of the protocol definition and reading
and processing each element. If the role for which we are producing the
LTS is not the sender or amongst the recipients of the message, then the
move component is substituted by tau.
The representations for the two role instances,small samples, are shown
in Listings 5.35 and 5.36.
1 des(0,162,70)
2 (0,tau,1)
3 (1,tau,2)
4 (1,tau,3)
5 (3,tau,4)
6 (3,tau,5)
7 (3,(b1,register1,a),69)
8 . . .
Listing 5.35: Role-specific LTS for the first bidder
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1 des(0,162,70)
2 (0,tau,1)
3 (1,tau,2)
4 (1,tau,3)
5 (3,tau,4)
6 (3,(b2,register2,a),5)
7 (3,tau,69)
8 . . .
Listing 5.36: Role-specific LTS for the second bidder
Before we move on to the second step, checking the LTSs for bisimilarity,
we need to make sure all transitions have the same names, as the check
will fail if they are different (not only the structure has to be the same,
but the action names have to match). As an example, a transition called
(b1, bid1, a) in the first bidder’s LTS and one called (b2, bid2, a) in the
second bidder’s LTS denote exactly the same thing; the bidder is placing
a bid for the auctioned item, but the bisimulation check will fail because
of the difference in the names. All actions with an index need to be
renamed before we run the check for bisimulation, i.e., b1 will become
b, bid1 will become bid and so on (this applies to messages going to
multiple recipients; b1 and b2 will be replaced by b). However, there
are messages (win1,nowin1,win2,nowin2 ) that need to be treated in a
different way than simply renaming them to win, nowin. This is because
their meaning is special and depends on whose bidder LTS we are looking
at. As an example, win1 appearing in the first bidder’s LTS will mean
that it won the auction, whereas when appearing in the second bidder’s
LTS it will mean that the other bidder won the auction. For this reason,
we rename them as follows: win1, nowin1 becomes winme, nowinme in
the first bidder’s LTS and winyou, nowinyou in the second bidder’s LTS,
while win2, nowin2 becomes winyou, nowinyou in the first bidder’s LTS
and winme, nowinme in the second bidder’s LTS (so winme means that
the bidder whose LTS we are looking at won the auction).
After applying the name changes in Listings 5.35 and 5.36 we get the
LTSs for the first and second bidder role instance shown in Listings 5.37
and 5.38 respectively.
1 des(0,162,70)
2 (0,tau,1)
3 (1,tau,2)
4 (1,tau,3)
5 (3,tau,4)
6 (3,tau,5)
7 (3,(b,register,a),69)
8 . . .
Listing 5.37: Role-specific representation for the first bidder
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1 des(0,162,70)
2 (0,tau,1)
3 (1,tau,2)
4 (1,tau,3)
5 (3,tau,4)
6 (3,(b,register,a),5)
7 (3,tau,69)
8 . . .
Listing 5.38: Role-specific representation for the second bidder
5.5.5 Checking the protocol role instances for bisim-
ilarity
We can, now, run step two (line 9) of Listing 4.6, branching bisimulation.
The ltscompare tool from the µCRL2 tool reports that indeed the two
LTSs are branching bisimilar (step 3, line 10 of Listing 4.6) and the
check role automata algorithm returns true.
This means that the two bidders exhibit the same behaviour. If this
was not the case, the business protocol should explicitly specify it. As
an example, consider the case that two bidder place the same bid and
that is the final bid of the auction. The auction house might have a rule
specifying that the bidder who is registered with them wins the item.
This should have been explicitly specified in the protocol specification.
The representation for the first bidder instance is shown in Listing 5.39.
It now contains sixty-one transitions and twenty-six states rather than
the starting a hundred and sixty-two and seventy respectively. Any silent
actions that were not repaired remain in the bidder’s file as τ actions and
indicate that further repair might be needed on the auction protocol.
1 des (0,61,26)
2 (1,"(b,bid,a)",14)
3 (4,"(a,acceptregistration,b)",1)
4 (14,"(a,rejectbid,b)",1)
5 (3,"(a,inform,b)",1)
6 (2,"(a,inform,b)",1)
7 (17,"tau",2)
8 . . .
Listing 5.39: Final LTS for the first bidder
As the representation contains tau actions, we need to repair the role
specification to make it implementable. As we already know that the
LTSs are bisimilar we only need to repair one of the two; we choose
to do it for the first bidder. The repair is done using the approach in
Section 4.3.3 on page 71.
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After repairing the role LTS for the first bidder, we get the representation
shown in Listing 5.40 where some moves have been extended to include
the bidder agent among their recipients so as to provide it with extra
knowledge about the current state of the protocol.
1 des(0, 162, 70)
2 (53,"(a,rejectbid1,[b1, b2])",52)
3 (68,"(a,acceptregistration1,[b1, b2])",52)
4 (52,"(b1,bid1,[a, b2])",53)
5 (21,"(b1,cancelbid1,[a, b2])",6)
6 (68,"(a,rejectregistration1,[b1, b2])",6)
7 (6,"(b1,register1,[a, b2])",68)
8 . . .
Listing 5.40: Protocol representation after the repair of silent transitions
For example the result of move register1 from the first bidder is now
sent to the second bidder as well or the fact that the first bidder placed
a bid is now communicated to the second bidder apart from just the
auctioneer.
Following that, we need to check if further repairs of the protocol are
required. Thus, we create the new role-specific LTS for the first bidder
from the updated protocol by replacing any action it is not involved in
by a silent τ action, run branching bisimulation on the resulting protocol
LTS and check if it still contains silent actions. The generated data for
the protocol after the addition of recipients to certain moves because of
the repair algorithm is displayed in Listing 5.41 and is the file for the
first bidder generated, this time, from the updated protocol.
1 des(0, 162, 70)
2 (53,"(a,rejectbid1,[b1, b2])",52)
3 (68,"(a,acceptregistration1,[b1, b2])",52)
4 (52,"(b1,bid1,[a, b2])",53)
5 (21,"(b1,cancelbid1,[a, b2])",6)
6 (68,"(a,rejectregistration1,[b1, b2])",6)
7 (6,"(b1,register1,[a, b2])",68)
8 . . .
Listing 5.41: The first bidder after making repair changes
The LTS produced after running branching bisimulation on the repaired
LTS of Listing 5.41 is shown in Listing 5.42.
1 des(0,61,26)
2 (1,(b1, bid1, a),14)
3 (4,(a, acceptregistration1, b1),1)
4 (14,(a, rejectbid1, b1),1)
5 (3,(a, inform1, b1),1)
6 (2,(a, inform1, b1),1)
7 (17,tau,2)
8 . . .
Listing 5.42: First bidder after repairs and bbe
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As we see from the first bidder’s LTS, there are still some remaining silent
actions; however, they do not influence the decision-making process of
the first bidder. If it goes from state 10 to state 3, then it can only
receive a message from the auctioneer about another bidder placing a
bid so there is no conflict.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we provided examples for the framework representation
and algorithms described in Chapters 3 and 4. We looked at how pro-
tocols can be described as games in both Situation Calculus and Event
Calculus notation, as well as demonstrated how cyclic patterns can be
established so that we can filter them out of protocol runs. These pro-
cesses can be used to prove (or refute) competence of an agent with
regards to a specific protocol. We also showed how to provide an agent
with the minimal necessary information for it to play its role in a pro-
tocol as well as decide on the correctness of a protocol description if
it involves multiple instances of the same role. We accommodate this
by creating the role-specific LTSs for the different instances, renaming
the role and action names so that we have equal grounds for comparing
them and demanding that they are branching bisimilar, as they ex-
hibit the same behaviour. If that is not the case, then the protocol is
not correct in that different instances of the same role do not exhibit the
same behaviour. The next chapter will be comparing and contrasting
our approach to other approaches to agent competence as well as protocol
decomposition for providing the agent with the role-specific information
it should receive.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we review other approaches on competence checking and
protocol decomposition and compare them with our approach that was
covered in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. We focus on these two concepts as they
are the main contributions of the work and briefly look at different ways
for describing agent interaction either in the form of games or not. The
approaches are grouped by the main contributors. In order to make the
presentation in this chapter self-contained, we summarise the necessary
features of the approaches to aid the comparison with our work.
6.2 Competence Checking
In the area of competence checking, dealing with whether an agent can
enact a given protocol or not, there seems to be a general consent that
if an agent is found to be competent (able to enact it), then it should
be found to be interoperable as well (if enacting the protocol, it should
be able to reach the terminating states without causing deadlocks) [4,
7, 10, 24]on the grounds of the other agents acting exactly as prescribed
by the protocol. If two agents can engage in conversation that can
possibly lead to a terminating state, they should be able to actually
reach that state when they take on their roles in the context of the
protocol specified. This, in general, is achieved by looking at the agent’s
private strategy (essentially, the way it selects its next move), as well
as the protocol. The protocol is, then, transformed to take into account
actions from the private strategy of the agent likely to prevent the agents
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from terminating the protocol, which are discarded. Any extra actions
that are not going to cause any deadlocks are incorporated into the
protocol by creating trap states, i.e., states from which the agent can
only transition to the same state. The final protocol that is given to
the agents is the modified one so the agents are made interoperable by
design.
6.2.1 Singh et al.
In [24], Singh et al. address the issue of competence as well as that of
conformance. The idea is to examine whether the agent in consideration
can produce some (or all) of the computations predicted by the protocol.
The representation of the protocol is that of a transition system from
which paths are defined as a series of transitions that take an agent from
an initial state to a final one and a run as only the sequence of states in
the aforementioned transition. Furthermore, the t-span of a transition
system T, [T ], is defined as the set of all paths in the transition system,
i.e., all sequences of paths that take the agent from an initial state to a
final one.
They also address the issue of how to deal with cases where the agent
does not follow the rules of the protocol strictly, but is allowed some
deviations from it as long as the main goals of the protocol are not
affected; e.g. in a purchase protocol, if the customer requests an invoice
before making payment and the original protocol does not prescribe
this behaviour. Rather than disallowing this action on the basis that it
is not supported by the protocol, they choose to allow it as the basic
commitment that the customer pays and then the merchant ships the
goods is not affected. On the other hand, if the customer requested the
goods to be shipped before payment is made, it would have been a major
violation of the pay-before-ship commitment and not allowed.
As the authors allow for deviations from the original protocol, a decision
has to be made as to what constitutes a minor (major) violation. The
idea is that we want to allow for deviations in which the current and the
resulting states of the protocol remain unchanged on the grounds of a
similarity function - in this case, the state similarity one, which, as an
example, can be based on the notion of commitments [71]. Formally, we
say that si ≈f sj if the same set of commitments holds in both states;
if the non-anticipated move does not cause any change in what both
agents are supposed to deliver, then it is deemed to be a minor violation
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and, thus, allowed.
Furthermore, a temporal relation is defined as follows: s ≻τ s′ if s occurs
before s′ in the run τ . In this context, we would say that run τj subsumes
run τi (τj ≫f τi) if for every state si in τi there is a state sj in τj such
that sj ≈ si and for all si′ in τi if it is true that si ≻τi si′ then there is sj ′
in τj such that sj ≻τj sj ′ and sj ′ ≈f si′. In other words, a run subsumes
another one if we can relate them through a state-similarity function
and we can rank the similar states in the same order using the temporal
relation ≻ as in the original run.
The other important element is the concept of closure for a protocol
which is defined as [[P]]f = {τ ∣∀τ ′ ∈ [P]∶ τ >>f τ ′}, i.e., all the runs that
subsume the runs provided by the set of original runs for the protocol so
that we can extend the initial protocol rules. The span of the agent α
([α]) will be the paths in the protocol transition system that the agent
can realise.
Following that, we define the terms conformance and coverage of an
agent α with respect to a protocol P and a state-similarity function f :
• the agent is conformant with the protocol if [a] ⊆ [[P]]f , i.e., the
agent cannot produce interactions that break the commitments
holding in similar states.
• the agent is covering the protocol if for every run in the protocol
span (τ ∈ [P]), there is another run τ ′ in the agent’s span (τ ′ ∈ [α])
that subsumes it (t′ >>f t), i.e., the agent can subsume all proto-
col runs, at least matching them or adding extra states without
modifying the commitments).
Following from these definitions, all we have to do to make sure that
two agents will be interoperable is work out the parallel composition of
their individual specifications and rule out, by the use of trap states, the
paths that can cause problems - these are:
• deadlock paths, i.e., paths when both agents have to execute a
receive action but the send actions for both messages have not
been taken;
• blocking paths, i.e., paths when some receive actions have to be
performed by the agent, but the send action for that message has
not been performed;
111
• out-of-order paths, i.e., the agent receives the messages in a dif-
ferent order than the one they were sent.
As there is no control over how the interactions will be co-ordinated,
no restriction is placed on them (e.g. forcing rendezvous style or any
other).
In order to develop interoperable agents, we need to take their individ-
ual transition systems and rule out any problematic combinations, i.e.,
deadlock, blocking and out-of-order paths.
In another paper [112], it is claimed that a big class of protocols - espe-
cially those used in electronic commerce applications, can be looked at
from the viewpoint of commitments and operations (creation, manipu-
lation, delegation) on them.
They claim that in order to check compliance one cannot adopt a local
view, due to the heterogeneity of the agents that comprise the system,
but has to look at it externally as an observer (as not knowing the inter-
nal workings of the member agents will make only observable behaviour
meaningful). In order to observe the moves of the agents, a central point
of reference is needed (in the case of a distributed system no local view
would be reliable). Thus, a global clock is used with its starting value
set to
Ð→
0 △ ⟨0, . . . ,0⟩.
It considers local models, which are nothing more than a collection of
messages sent and received by the agent (the timestamp will reference
the time for each agent that the message was sent or received).
In this model, every state is identified with a message and at every state
a set of messages holds, i.e., Q = {m∶m is a message} ∪ {Ð→0 }, i.e., all
the messages that have been sent in the protocol so far as states are
identified with messages, as well as
Ð→
0 , which is the starting point.
6.2.1.1 Comparison
In [24] the notion of conformance used could correspond to our notions
of either Competent under Adversity or Competent under Co-operation
assuming that the agent does not do any action that breaks the protocol.
This is the case as in all degrees of competence, we require that the agent
selects valid moves. Regarding the properties of the agent, assuming it
selects only valid moves, if the agent is conformant then it would be
at least Competent under Co-operation; the agent span is a subset of
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the protocol span and the agent can not realise all protocol actions. If
the agent is covering the protocol (again on the assumption that it is
always selecting valid moves), then it is Fully Competent as it can match
all protocol runs.
This approach has a number of limitations, namely (these constraints
are mainly imposed due to the approach for checking interoperability):
• it accepts only one action per transition;
• an agent is not allowed to play twice ;
• we cannot have two different transitions that take you to the same
state;
• actions can only occur once in every path.
In our approach, we can represent concurrent actions with the use of
Event Calculus.
In [112] our concept of competence in this approach relates to that of
compliance to protocol rules, as long as the agent does not select a move
that is not specified by the protocol (regardless of whether any base-
level commitment is broken or not). They are, also, making assumptions
about the agents’ behaviour, i.e., agents are benevolent and they do not
forge message timestamps. Our approach makes no such assumptions.
The use of the global clock for ensuring a central point of reference is
similar to our approach where the Authority Agent of the society has
full knowledge of the protocol and does the checking on the basis of the
information submitted by individual agents. However, although they
present a technique for flagging violations based on commitments, they
offer no classification of the agents in terms of compliance levels. Some
suggestions are adopted, but no formal classification is made.
The way they represent states is equivalent to the way we represent them
in Situation Calculus (set of all actions happened so far in the game)
and Event Calculus(set of properties that can be verified by looking at
the actions so far carried out in the game). It is a run-time approach in
contrast with ours, which checks competence at design time. This means
that they check the agent’s competence when the protocol is actually
running, without having any knowledge of the agent strategies or any
other information regarding their skills.
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6.2.2 Baldoni et al.
Baldoni et al. in [7] recognise the similarities between web services and
multi-agent systems in that they both comprise of heterogeneous, pro-
active and independent components operating in open, dynamic and
unpredictable environments with no form of central control. Therefore
rules are required in order to govern the interactions between the in-
volved parties - these would be protocols in the case of agent societies
and choreographies in the case of web services.
Moreover, due to the heterogeneity of the components as well as the
dynamic nature of the environment in which they interact we cannot
rely on internal constructs such as beliefs and intentions to do the ver-
ification. Instead, we will have to use the observable behaviour of the
parties involved.
As the membership of the MAS or web services will be changing con-
stantly, we need to reason about which applicant will be allowed entry
and whose application should be rejected. This reasoning can be per-
formed either a priori or at runtime and will be associated with whether
the agent’s behaviour is in line with the behaviour specified by the pro-
tocols for the role(s) it is interested in taking on in the new societal
settings.
The authors expect the agents (web services) to fully respect the rules
of the protocol (choreography) and not deviate from the specified inter-
actions. They are, also, expecting two agents who have independently
be proven conformant to the protocol to be interoperable as well - if we
can prove that they can follow the protocol, then we expect them to do
so if asked to participate in it.
They restrict their attention to protocols that can be represented by
Finite State Automata; in fact it is required that both the specification
of the protocol as well as its implementation (policy) is specified by a
Finite State Automaton. These protocols can easily be described by our
approach as we are using the same representation. This is a property
that many protocols from the area of Multi-Agent Systems satisfy so
it is a general approach in this respect. Furthermore, the expression of
the agent’s policy rules in a logic-based declarative language makes the
transformation to a Finite State Automaton even easier.
The basic concept is to look at the problem as a problem of relating two
languages: that of the protocol Pspec and that of the agent’s policy Paglang
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(where lang is the language in which the policy is specified and ag is the
identifier of the agent).
The protocol specification defines a set of legal conversations - as a
result, a conversation is legal if it belongs in the language defined by
the protocol specification language. In our approach, this conversation
will be a sequence of valid moves. Thus, the agents will be labelled
conformant if they can produce a legal conversation with respect to an
extended automaton that is derived from Paglang and Pspec.
The protocol specification defines a set of legal conversations - as a
result, a conversation is legal if it belongs in the language defined by
the protocol specification language. Thus, the agents will be labelled
conformant if they can produce a legal conversation.
The proposed algorithm aims at fulfilling the following expectations:
• the policy should be able to deal with any possible incoming mes-
sage that the protocol foresees and do nothing if the policy foresees
a message that is not supposed to be received at that point accord-
ing to the protocol;
• the agent’s policy should not utter a message that is not expected
at this stage according to the protocol;
• the agent’s policy allows it to utter at least one of the messages
foreseen by the protocol (it is not necessary to cater for all legal
messages, but at least one should be catered for);
The solution proposed is to start with the automaton that accepts the
intersection of the two languages (agent and protocol) and then extend
it so that it includes all conversations we want to allow. This is done
via an IO automaton [70]. The automaton is defined as follows: Eq
is the set that consists of messages that cause a transition from state
p to state q; formally Eq = {m ∣ δ(p,m) = q}for p,q ∈ Q, where Q is
the set of the automaton states. Then, the automaton from which the
states p and q are drawn will be an IO-automaton for agent ag iff for
every q ∈ Q,Eq consists of only incoming or only outgoing messages with
regards to agent ag.
Starting with the automaton that accepts the intersection of the lan-
guages accepted by the agent and the protocol specification, it is suffi-
cient to apply the following transformations:
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• a state q that has only incoming messages coming into it and leads
to a final state for the agent’s policy but does not for the protocol
specification, is made a trap state (the transition function always
stays in the same state) and is added to the final states of the
automaton. This would cover the case in which the agent’s policy
allows, at a certain state, a message that is not prescribed by
the protocol. Assuming that the other protocol participants are
following the rules, any paths originating from that state can be
safely ignored;
• a state that has only incoming messages coming into it and leads
to a final state for the protocol specification but not for the agent’s
policy, is made a trap state (for every state, the resulting state is
the same) and there is no change for the set of final states. This
covers the case in which, at a certain state, the protocol allows for
a message to be received that the agent can not receive. If the
agent receives this message, all paths originating from that state
will be rejected by Mconf ;
• a state that has only outgoing messages coming out and leads to
a final state for the agent’s policy but not for the protocol spec-
ification is made a trap state (all transitions are self-transitions)
and there is no change to the set of final states. This rule handles
the case where the agent can utter a message that is not allowed
according to the specification of the protocol. As a result, all
conversations originating from that state will not be accepted by
Mconf ;
• a state that has only outgoing messages coming out and leads to
a final state for the protocol specification but not for the agent’s
policy is made a trap state (all transitions lead to the same state)
and is added to the set of final states. This is the case where the
protocol allows for a message to be uttered at a certain state, but
the agent policy does not. All conversations up to this state should
be accepted by Mconf , but it will have to be turned into a final
state as the conversation can not progress any further.
Before checking for conformance and interoperability, we need to intro-
duce the concept of a complete automaton. An automaton is complete
if for all the common states in the agent’s policy and the protocol spec-
ification there is at least one message that will lead to an alive state
(state leading to a final state). If that message (from the agent policy)
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is substituted in the specification policy it is still possible to reach an
alive state in the specification automaton.
In terms of conformance an agent is labelled conformant to a protocol
specification if the automaton, whose construction is described above, is
complete, i.e., a message will always be uttered, when one is expected)
and it should accept the union of the two languages (the agent’s L(P aglang)
and the protocol’s specification L(Pspec)).
Their approach works using the same concept as Singh in that they want
to turn the states resulting from moves that can prevent the agents from
terminating the protocol into trap states (states that are not final and
the agent can only transition to the same state). However, what they are
really interested in is to show that conformant agents will also be
interoperable. According to the authors, for every common conversa-
tion (viewed as a path in the Finite State Automaton) t′, there is another
one t′′ such that the resulting conversation t = t′t′′ (effectively the path
that results from joining the two initial paths) is in the intersection of
the two agent policy languages.
This approach entails interoperability by design without imposing re-
strictions on the conversations allowed, i.e., agents need not alternate
or an action can be used more than once in a dialog, unlike the ap-
proach in Section 6.2.1. On the other hand, it links interoperability
with conformance, while the approach in Section 6.2.3 does not (in fact,
they discuss conformance without making any reference to the concept
of interoperability).
In [10], the authors look at conformance verification of logic-based agents
whose policies are specified in a Prolog-like language (in this case Dy-
LOG) and distinguish between three degrees of conformance as shown
below. The problem of verifying conformance is treated (for the first
two degrees) as a inclusion problem between the set of conversations
that can be generated from the agent’s specification in DyLOG given
an initial state of beliefs for the agent (Σ0) (for the first case) or the set
of conversations independent of the initial state of agent beliefs and the
language generated by the AUML specification of the protocol (second
case). In the third degree we want the agent’s conformance to be proved
independent of the speech acts semantics and their implementation (e.g.
an inform message might mean that once an agent knows about a fact,
it informs the others immediately or it does that only if its belief base
contains the proposition that the other agent does not know about that
117
fact; we would like to be able to prove conformance no matter what the
semantics of the inform message are for the agent).
In this context, the following degrees of conformance are defined (higher
versions imply the lower level ones):
a. an agent is conformant if any conversation generated by the policy
language of the agent on the basis of an initial state of beliefs Σ0
(equivalent to the initial state in our approach) is in the set of
languages generated by the grammar that the AUML specification
of the protocol is transformed in.
b. an agent is strongly conformant if any conversation generated by
the policy specification of the agent independent of its belief base
is also generated by the language generated by the grammar of
the AUML specification of the protocol (definition a. is obviously
satisfied, so a strongly conformant agent is also conformant).
c. an agent is protocol conformant if the language generated by the
agent policy specification is a subset of the language generated
by the AUML protocol specification (regardless of how the inform
message, for example, is realised). Again, due to the definition
of protocol conformance implies strong conformance and confor-
mance.
The problem of verifying conformance is treated (for the first two de-
grees) as an inclusion problem. In the case of conformance, it will be
between the set of conversations generated from the agent’s DyLOG
specification and the protocol’s AUML specification, given Σ0. In the
second one we check the protocol specifications against the agent con-
versations independent of the initial state of the agent beliefs Σ0. In the
protocol conformance case, the agent’s conformance has to be proved
independent of the speech acts semantics and their implementation (e.g.
an inform message might mean that once an agent knows about a fact,
it informs the others immediately or it does that only if its knowledge
tells it that the other agent does not know about this fact).
Finally, in [11], the authors talk about open systems that can be realised
by new components been dynamically added to the system. Before that,
however, we need to perform some sort of reasoning regarding the be-
haviour of the new component once inserted into the system. Finally,
they make the analogy between agents and Multi-Agent Systems on one
hand and web services and choreographies on the other. Agents and web
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services form the local view of the interaction, they are the component
units. Multi-Agent Systems and choreographies are about the global
viewpoint, specifying how the building blocks of the interactions should
behave. A variety of representations exist for each viewpoint and the key
question that both have to answer is the following: given a choreography
(MAS) can a web service (agent) join the system? The decision will
be based on whether the agent (or the web service) can participate in
conversations with the other member agents or services; if it is capable
of doing that, then membership is granted.
The authors also consider bisimulation [111] as a means for testing con-
formance of an agent wishing to interact with other agents on the basis
of a choreography and the agent’s policy. In [8], they conclude that this
cannot be treated as a test of whether the conversations generated by the
policy are a subset of what the choreography allows (as it could be the
case that the agent is able to handle more messages than the choreogra-
phy prescribes) or a test of whether the automata of the role as specified
by the choreography and the agent’s policy are bisimilar (as the pres-
ence of extra messages or messages with different names will generate a
negative result). On the basis of these observations, they require that
the bisimulation restriction is replaced with another simulation relation
(conformant simulation) that treats incoming and outgoing messages in
different ways. This captures the intuition that the policy should be
able to handle all incoming messages according to the choreography and
utter at least one of the messages that the choreography expects the role
to utter in any given situation over the course of the protocol. Thus, it
will correspond to a Competent under Adversity agent in our approach.
The conformant simulation relation is defined as follows: Assuming two
FSA’s A1 and A2, we say that A1 is a conformant simulation of A2 and
write it as A1 < A2, iff there is a binary relation R between A1 and A2
such that (we consider the case that A1 is the agent’s private policy and
A2 is the specification of the role in the protocol that we compare the
policy against):
a. A1.s0RA2.s0, i.e., the two initial states of the automata should be
linked by the relationship R);
b. for every outgoing message m! ∈ A1.L and for every state si ∈ A1.S,
for every sj ∈ A2.S such that siRsj and (si,m!, si+1) ∈ A1.T , then
there is a state sj+1 ∈ A2.S such that (sj,m!, sj+1) ∈ A2.T and
si+1Rsj+1. This means that for every outgoing message predicted
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by the agent’s policy that is related to the role specification viaR there is a corresponding state in the policy’s automaton that is
also related to the initial state of the transition. The same tran-
sition exists in the role automaton and the end states are related
through R - this ensures that the outgoing messages which are also
prescribed by the role specification would be legal;
c. for every incoming message m? ∈ A2.L and for every state sj ∈
A2.S, for every si ∈ A1.S such that siRsj and (sj,m?, sj+1) ∈ A2.T ,
then there is a state si+1 ∈ A1.S such that (si,m?, si+1) ∈ A1.T and
si+1Rsj+1. This means that for every incoming message that the
role specification accounts for and for all states from the agent’s
policy automaton that are linked to the initial state of the in-
coming message in the role specification, the final states of the
corresponding transitions should also be linked via the relation R.
6.2.2.1 Comparison
In [7] the authors are concerned with conformance interpreted as Com-
petent under Co-operation. The agents are expected to fully respect
the rules of the protocol and not deviate from the specified interactions.
This is achieved by comparing the agent’s policy language and the proto-
col specification against a specially constructed specification that takes
both the protocol and the policy into account. They require that the
agent’s policy should be able to deal with all incoming messages and
plan a response for at least one of them.
They make the following assumptions:
• protocols with concurrent operations are not supported - this is
because the approach relies on finite state automata that do not
accommodate concurrency;
• the conversation will be between two agents.
The completeness of the automaton (for every state with outgoing mes-
sages there is at least one message that leads to a path with a termi-
nating state) they produce from the protocol specification language and
the agent policy’s language guarantees the property of competence. At
least the agent is Competent under Co-operation due to the process of
constructing the protocol automaton). This is the case as no matter
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what state the agents are in, a path taking them to a terminating state
can always be reached. In this case, we only know that the agent is
at least Competent under Co-operation as the other participant might
select a move for which the agent in consideration has no response.
In [10], we have the following associations between the degrees of con-
formance specified by the authors and the ones in our approach:
• a conformant agent would be equivalent to an Competent under
Adversity agent in our approach, as all generated conversations
(on the basis of the agent’s selection process) will be in the set of
conversations that the protocol allows;
• a strongly conformant agent can be either Competent under Adver-
sity as now there is no assumption on Σ0 or even fully competent
according to whether it can realise all actions or part of them;
• a protocol conformant agent implies a fully competent agent if the
agent policy can generate the full protocol specification or a Com-
petent under Adversity if that is not the case.
Furthermore, in this approach, the Initial Beliefs set Σ0 can be linked to
the initial state of the game. However, the higher degrees of conformance
that relate to the agent’s internal policies, cannot be represented in our
approach.
In [11], the addition of an agent (web service) to the system (choreog-
raphy) will only take place on the basis of respecting the rules of the
society - this is the same idea behind our motivation in [105]. Further-
more, a notion similar to the notion of agent skills is used in [9] where a
web service is considered to be a component available over the web that
has several interaction capabilities that it makes available through its
interface. Finally, the notion of conformance that they use is equivalent
to the notion of competence we are using.
6.2.3 Endriss et al.
Endriss and colleagues in [36–38] are looking at the problem of confor-
mance from the viewpoint of Multi-Agent Systems. They look at agent
communication protocols as specifying rules of encounter and been de-
signed independently of the agent policies. If we want to truly verify
that an agent follows a protocol, we would need to have access to the
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internal mental states of the agent, which is not possible. This means
that we need to use the agent’s observable behaviour in order to do the
verification.
The protocols that the authors look at are protocols that can be rep-
resented by deterministic finite state automata where the next state
depends solely on the previous one (shallowness), mainly to avoid con-
currency. The representation of the moves in general is of the form
act(Utterer,Receiver,DialogueID,Subject,Time).
Further to shallowness, the following constraints apply to the protocols:
1. at least one rule has the special performative START that signals
the beginning of the interaction and START can never occur on
the right-hand side of a rule. This means that we cannot start
nested executions of the protocol and the protocol specification
does not cover sub-protocols;
2. any move - other than STOP that signals the end of the dialogue
- that occurs on the right-hand side also occurs on the left-hand
side of another rule. This means that there are no dead states; no
matter what state we are in, we can always make a move;
3. it is not possible to perform two different moves in the same dia-
logue at the same time; formally tell(X,Y,S1, T,D)∧tell(X,Y,S2,
T,D) ∧ S1 ≠ S2⇒⊥. This means that no concurrency is allowed;
4. for every rule in the interaction other than START and STOP, if
on the left-hand side X is the utterer and Y is the receiver on the
right-hand side Y should be the utterer and X the receiver. This
means that all messages are used;
5. all dialogue moves on the left-hand side, i.e., the triggers of the
dialogue moves, should be distinct from one another (so that non-
deterministic automata are excluded).
In terms of conformance levels, a distinction is made between:
• weak conformance; the agent should never utter any dialogue move
that is not expected for the state of the dialogue it is in. The
protocol, however, might not allow the agent to not make a move
and prescribe that the agent will always have to choose a move to
make;
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• exhaustive conformance; the agent should be weakly conformant
and it should utter at least one legal move that is expected for the
state of the dialogue it is in.
• robust conformance; the agent is exhaustively conformant and if
the other agent utters any move that is not expected in the state of
the dialogue it is in, it should react by uttering a special dialogue
move (e.g. not-understood).
They, also, identify the decomposition of a protocol into role skeletons,
i.e., the agent’s view of the protocol, although the discussion is by ex-
ample.
The authors do not deal with the issue of interoperability as it would
involve agents revealing their private strategy.
6.2.3.1 Comparison
In [36–38] the authors look at shallow protocols, i.e., protocols in which
the next state depends only on the previous one. We make no such
assumption and our approach can accommodate any type of protocol as
long as it is represented by an LTS.
Furthermore, they impose a set of rules that allows no concurrency and
discards non-deterministic automata. We make no such assumptions;
concurrent moves are accommodated by the use of Event Calculus for
the representation of the game state and non-deterministic automata
can be represented as a sequence of different valid moves.
Regarding conformance levels, the following equivalence exists between
their approach and ours:
• weak conformance would correspond to Competent under Adver-
sity or Competent under Co-operation in our approach, as long as
the agent does not make a move that is not valid. In the case that
it chooses not to do anything (or make an invalid move) there is
no comparison with our competence levels.
• exhaustive conformance would correspond to Competent under Ad-
versity or Fully Competent as it will always make a valid move.
• robust conformance would correspond to either a Competent under
Adversity or Fully Competent agent depending on whether it can
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make all protocol prescribed moves or not. This applies as long as
the not-understood reply to invalid moves is part of the protocol
(otherwise there is no comparison).
6.2.4 Alberti et al.
Alberti and colleagues in [3] observe the similarities between Multi-
Agent Systems and Service Oriented Computing in that they both re-
quire the co-operation of autonomous and independent components (same
observation as the one made by Baldoni). These components are de-
veloped independently of one another and they have to work together
according to rules specified in the protocol (in the case of Multi-Agent
Systems) or the choreography (in the case of web services composition).
In order for this approach to work, we need to ensure that, if com-
bined, the agents (web services) will be able to work together and
produce meaningful output. This is achieved by checking the inter-
action capabilities of the agents/web services with reference to the pro-
tocol/choreography that they want to join. The authors make use of a
formal language for defining multi-agent protocols specified in [2, 4] and
the proof-procedure g-SCIFF [1] to deal with protocol properties.
In this context, the Abductive Logic Webservice Specification (AιLoWS)
framework represents the specifications of both the choreography and the
web service as abductive logic programs [50] with happened events (H)
and expectations (E) as the abducibles. The idea is that if the speci-
fications of the web service and the choreography are put together, we
should be able to work out the set of all possible interactions between the
web service and the choreography (HAP⋆) on the basis of the following
assumptions:
• any message that the web service is expected to send, it will actu-
ally send it;
• any message that the choreography expects to be sent from other
web services (not the one we are checking for conformance), will
actually be sent as well.
On the basis of that set, we can distinguish between two types of con-
formance:
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1. feeble conformance - in this case the events in the set HAP⋆ will
be such that put together with the expectations and the knowledge
base of both the choreography and the web service will model the
goal and the integrity constraints of the two components. Further-
more, the happened events along with the expectations will model
every expectation that the web service has as well as any expec-
tation that the choreography has. This method of conformance
ensures that all messages from the web service will be expected by
the choreography, but does not cover the ones that the choreogra-
phy is not prescribing.
2. strong conformance - for that, the interaction will have to be feeble
conformant, but this time all the events should be expected by
both the web service and the choreography.
This work is inspired by the work of Baldoni in that they look at the
problem of conformance as a problem of comparing two formal specifi-
cations; finite state automata in the case of Baldoni and abductive logic
programs in the case of AιLoWS.
6.2.4.1 Comparison
The model of Alberti et al. in [3] reflects the social context of our model
in terms of the requirement for adding a web service to a choreography.
It will need to meet the expectations, i.e., be able to understand and
utter a set of messages pertinent to the role it wants to occupy in the
choreography.
They describe two types of conformance, which correspond to our ap-
proach as follows:
• feeble conformance could correspond to a Fully Competent, Com-
petent under Adversity or Competent under Co-operation agent, as
we know nothing about whether the agent can realise all messages
or whether at any point it depends on the other web services to
send it a specific message, so that the choreography can progress.
This applies in the case that no invalid moves are made, as this
would render the comparison impossible.
• strong conformance could correspond, again, to a Fully Competent,
Competent under Adversity or Competent under Co-operation, as
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we do not have enough information to classify it in one of the cate-
gories. In this case no invalid moves are allowed by the definition.
6.2.5 Giordano et al.
Another popular approach for representing protocols is that of temporal
logic [34, 42, 45]. Giordano et al. are using this representation to reason
about agent’s interoperability [43], i.e., they maintain that if a number of
agents A1, A2,⋯,Ak are proved interoperable then they should be able to
produce traces that are foreseen by the protocol. Their notion of agent
interoperability entails weak conformance - as described by Endriss in
Section 6.2.3 - at least. They make use of temporal logic operators like◯ for the next operator and ◊ for the eventually one.
A protocol is described by the following components:
• action laws (ALag); these represent the effects of execution of ac-
tions on the state.
• causal laws (CLag); these represent dependencies between fluents.
• precondition laws (PLag); these represent conditions about when
an action can run.
They, also, define an initial state that provides the initial values for all
fluents.
The criterion which is used for deciding whether the protocol run is a
good one or not is whether all commitments - used in the same way as
in Section 6.2.1 - are fulfilled or not. The protocol itself is composed by
the constituent protocols via synchronous composition and the benefit of
using temporal logic (more specifically Dynamic Linear Time Temporal
Logic) is that infinite protocols can be represented. In fact, all protocols
are considered to run infinitely by setting the agent to perform a special
operation noop that has no effect on the running of the protocol.
Every agent participating in the protocol will have a choice function,
through which it will be making the choice of which move to select at
any given state. The notion of interoperability used is the same as in
the other approaches - one of the participating agents should be able to
send a message and another one should be able to receive it.
The notion of conformance is built on top of that of interoperability.
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The agents will have to be interoperable and the runs that the protocol
composition will produce should all be runs allowed by the protocol P.
Finally, for an agent a to be conformant with a protocol P the following
three requirements have to be met:
1. the agent should be interoperable with the other agents that take
part in the protocol, i.e., no deadlocks should be possible, no sit-
uation in which the agent supposed to be making a move cannot
make one;
2. correctness - any runs produced are actual runs of the protocol. In
other words, if the agent can send messages that are not allowed by
the protocol, then these messages should not be sent as they will
create paths outside of the protocol (even if another agent happens
to be able to understand and receive the message). This means
that an agent can select any message as long as it is supported by
the protocol (consistent with the idea that the agent needs not be
able to entertain all outgoing messages, but at least one of them).
3. completeness - any message that an agent chooses to send and
is allowed by the protocol, the agent(s) that communicate with
should be able to receive it. In other words, the agent should be
able to do at least all the receptions that the protocol prescribes
(doing more is not a problem, as if the agents are interoperable,
no message not supported by the protocol will be uttered). This
is consistent with the idea that the agent can be able to receive
more messages than the protocol allows for. If the other agents
participating in the protocol are interoperable, there will not be a
case where a message not expected will be uttered.
The test of whether the agents are interoperable or not is based on
moving from a Bu¨chi automaton to a finite automaton that is checked
against the existence of at least one alive state, i.e., a state that lies on a
path to a final state. That state also belongs to the original automatonM and the cut-down version has at least one outgoing message that
is a valid choice according to the protocol. Furthermore, the tests for
correctness and completeness will happen in a similar way but this time
looking at two different automata. The first one is the protocol where the
participants are the role specifications. The second one is the automaton
where the ith agent, whose properties we are checking, has been replaced
by the specification of the agent itself rather than its role specification.
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The protocol itself can be composed from a number of protocols via
synchronous composition.
6.2.5.1 Comparison
The benefit of this approach is that it can represent protocols with in-
finite (non-terminating) paths. In fact, all protocols are considered to
run infinitely by setting the agent to perform a special operation noop
at the final state of the protocol. This is something that can easily be
replicated in our approach by introducing the noop at the terminating
states of the protocol, although it will not make any difference with
regards to the agent’s competency classification or its ability to join a
society.
The notion of interoperability used is the same as in the other ap-
proaches. At each state, at least one agent can send and at least one
can receive. This would correspond to a Competent under Adversity (or
even fully competent) agent in our approach.
6.3 Protocol Decomposition
6.3.1 Desai et al.
In [30], Desai et al. identify the dangers of moving from the global view of
a choreography (or protocol) to a local view of a single role (or agent) in
either web service or multi-agent systems applications. This is important
as the shift of viewpoint and the respective limitations on what the web
service (or agent) can observe might mean that in the isolated agent
view, there might be not enough information to implement their role
specification in the choreography (or protocol). As an example, they
provide the rule α⇒ β where α and β are known to roles ρ1 and ρ2 but
not to role ρ3. If ρ3 is supposed to send message β, then it will not be
possible to send the message as it will not have knowledge of α. As a
result, certain constraints need to be put in place so that this will not
happen.
These constraints are as follows (every rule will be of the form α ⇒ β
with α been the antecedent and β been the consequent):
• for any rule other than the beginning of the protocol, every prepo-
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sition on the consequent of the rule should be part of another rule’s
antecedent (so that no rule can be used without been asserted be-
fore);
• every proposition in any rule’s head should be reachable from the
beginning of the protocol (so that it can be used as an enabler for
a message exchange without deadlocks);
• for every rule of the protocol and every proposition α in the body
of the rule, there should be a proposition β in the head such that
if a role ρ initiates β, then it should send or receive α as well. In
other words, the occurrence of β would mean that the same role
is able to observe α as well.
Because of these properties, there will be no missing information for any
of the roles (since each time a role will have to decide whether to send
a message or not, it will be able to verify all the information it needs
to make the decision). As a result, all protocols will be enactable, i.e.,
there will be no case where any of the protocol roles will have to make a
decision about which path to take and not know the truth value of any
of the conditions.
Furthermore, since they look at protocols as distributed entities and as
a composition of roles, they provide an algorithm for deriving a role
skeleton, i.e., the local view of the interaction that a role will have of
the protocol including its own message exchanges. As their description
of protocols is based on commitments, the role will need to know the
messages it can send and receive, as well as any facts that enable them
and lead to the creation (or discharge) of commitments. The main idea
in the algorithm for working out the role skeleton for a certain role is
that if the role does not have knowledge of the immediate proposition
needed to make a decision as to how to proceed, it should be possible
to backtrack and find another one that leads with certainty to the one
been examined, i.e. if the role needs to know α but it does not, then the
role should go back in history and find β so that the role knows it and
β → α.
The process for deriving the skeleton of a role in this process is as follows:
• find all messages that role ρ is sending or receiving and save them
in a set S;
• the rules for sending a message m ∈ S would involve checking if a
number of propositions α hold or not. This means that the role
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in question should be able to observe these propositions (e.g. if a
shipping agent cannot observe - or be notified - that payment has
been made it cannot ship the goods to the customer). As a result,
we have to look for another proposition α′ that the role knows
about and its observance will definitely lead to occurrence of α.
This would involve looking at all the protocol rules that generate
the proposition α and looking at what the role in question knows
that, if added to the knowledge base, it will guarantee occurrence
of the proposition α.
6.3.1.1 Comparison
The algorithm by Desai et al. works as the protocol is supposed to be en-
actable. However, in the case it is not there are no steps in the algorithm
to remedy the situation. Furthermore, it does not take into account any
branching structure of the resulting protocol and just goes back until
a suitable match is found, resembling a τ⋆α bisimulation process. We
do not assume that and provide algorithms for repairing the protocol
(see Section 4.3) if that is not the case. The algorithm they propose
does take into account the branching structure of the protocol. This
is because when looking for the proposition β if there is a branch that
knowledge of β could lead to α or γ, it would not meet our requirements.
We require that knowledge of β leads with certainty to knowledge of α
and it would not be possible to conclude that in the previous case.
6.3.2 Bouaziz
Bouaziz [18] uses XML and XSD schemas to describe a protocol ontology
and views role as a component that can be fully specified by the Role
Profile and Role Behaviour elements, as specified in [17].
A role is represented in a meta-model by its profile and behaviour. The
behaviour comprises of the allowed actions it can assume. In terms of
describing an action, we will need to specify its type, data field, a set of
input events and the output events.
In this model, an action will be executed only if an event occurs. More-
over, the new state of the role will be determined by looking at the
relevant transition in the meta-model. Bouaziz accommodates condi-
tional transitions, i.e., transitions with different effects depending on
certain conditions.
130
In order to provide a full description of a role in the form of an XML
document, the following process is used:
1 find all actions from the protocol that involve role R - either in-
coming or outgoing messages;
2 for every action from the set created in step 1:
(a) find the current node in the role XML document and create
a new node with a new element;
(b) if the action activates the initial state in the role schema, then
this element becomes the initial element.
(c) if the action activates the final state in the role schema, then
this element becomes the final element;
(d) append the node just created to the current node;
(e) find all actions that succeed action a;
(f) while the set created in the previous step is not empty
i. fetch the next element a′;
ii. find the current node and create a new node that contains
a transition from a to a′;
iii. append that node as a child node to the current one;
(g) create a new node in the role schema with the role states;
(h) find the role state from the protocol ontology that activates
action a;
(i) create a new state node with the information and append it
to the current node.
First, the actions relating to the role in question are compiled. The
authors check to see whether each action from the set containing the
role actions activate the initial (final) state, so that they can be placed
as the top (bottom) element in the role XML description.
6.3.2.1 Comparison
Step 2b of the algorithm for etxracting the role skeleton is equivalent to
our bisimulation algorithm setting as initial state of the new automaton
the equivalent state of the initial state of the original automaton (same
for the final state). Also, the role schema will contain actions that
the role in question is not directly involved in as in step 2e we are
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just selecting all actions succeeding action a from the protocol ontology,
rather than the set of actions that the role is involved in. Only if the
protocol is not enactable, additional knowledge will have to be inserted.
6.3.3 Blanc and Haumerlain
Blanc and Haumerlain [99] tackle the issue of generating a role skele-
ton for the purposes of separating the participatory from the strategic
part of the agent. In their approach, a moderator agent will regulate all
interactions between the agents engaged in the course of the protocol.
They raise the issue of the agent been overloaded with big protocols if
all the information is provided, and suggest the separation of knowledge
in two different aspects. These would be the strategic aspect which is
generated by the agent itself and consists of generating a strategy for
the protocol (e.g. in an auction how should the agent bid) and the par-
ticipation aspect that is about the agent actually participating in the
protocol. The Participation component handles the protocol conversa-
tion, so that the agent’s strategy can actually be realised. This is the
aspect that the moderator agent will be seeing and interacting with as
it will be receiving its utterances.
They define a protocol in terms of the following components:
• variables making up the conversation objective or characterising
its state with respect to the objective;
• roles the agents can assume in the protocol;
• types of intervention the agents can use in a conversation ;
• initial state of the conversation;
• the final state of the conversation;
• casting constraints - these are the requirements that the agent
should fulfill to take on the role in that protocol;
• behaviour constraints that specify when an agent can carry out an
intervention.
The authors appoint a moderator agent to be an arbitrator for a conver-
sation, once it begins. This means that every protocol run will need a
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new instance of the moderator agent that will be overlooking the conver-
sation and making sure that all moves are in accordance with the rules of
the protocol. Effectively, the moderator acts as an umpire making sure
that actions taken would follow the rules of the protocol. Furthermore,
it will decide whether a conversation has ended or not, thus terminating
the protocol.
In terms of the actual protocol run, each agent is represented by a par-
ticipation component. This component will have the responsibility of
choosing amongst the protocol rules, those that implement best the
agent’s strategy. Every participation in a protocol will require a new
instance of the participation component. The authors also look at the
issues behind the agent’s selection - why the agent would choose to par-
ticipate in one conversation and not another.
This means that in order to study the behaviour of the agent, we need
to look at the participation component. It is represented as a transition
system and every time a choice is made, the result is sent back from the
moderator.
The task in hand, now, is to extract the rules relevant to the strategy of
the agent from the protocol rules. The first step will be to get anything
related to the role from the protocol rules (these are messages that the
role in question is either the sender or amongst the recipients). How-
ever, as the participation component will be implementing a particular
strategy set by the strategy component, some rules although pertinent
to the role should not be included in it (e.g. if a purchase protocol gives
the option of paying using either Visa or Mastercard and the strategy
of the agent says that Visa should always be preferred, then there is no
reason for the participation component to know about the Mastercard
option - strategy dictates that it will never be uttered).
The protocol rules are defined as a Petri Net [76]; in order to retrieve
the rules pertinent to the role, we replace any actions in which the role
is not involved with . The idea is that every state in the Petri net will
be characterised by a marking, i.e., the number of tokens on each place
of the Petri net. This way we do not look to places and transitions as
the building blocks of the net, but to the changes they bring to token
distribution.
The following steps are, then, applied to the resulting Petri Net for
producing the final role transition system:
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• the initial markings will make up the initial state and the transition
relation is an empty set (∅);
• apply the algorithm Graphe with the first argument been an empty
list and the second one been the initial state.
The Graphe algorithm works as follows:
1 if the second argument M is equal either to the first item of
the list representing the first argument (as in this case we will
have the formation of an -loop) or it has already been looked at
(M1 = {µ1, µ2,⋯, µn} and M = µ1 or M ∈M1), then unify M with
the corresponding M1 (as we use the Petri Net’s markings as the
criterion for deciding on the states, if the state in question has the
same markings, then it is the same state) and exit;
2 if the state represents a dead transition, i.e., a transition that takes
you nowhere, then we are ignoring it and exiting the algorithm.
Even if the participation component selected this move, no change
is going to happen to the course of the protocol;
3 in any other case find all t such that M
tÐ→M ′
(a) for each t identified in step 3
i. if the label of the marking is not , λ(t) ≠ , i.e., it is
pertinent to the role we are looking at, then add the
resulting marking as a new state and add the transition
to the transitions set. Then, go back to the top and
re-run the Graphe algorithm;
ii. if that is not the case, then add M to the list of states
reached by an  transition and re-run the Graphe algo-
rithm with M ′ as the second argument and the first ar-
gument will comprise of all the states previously making
the first argument with the addition of M.
6.3.3.1 Comparison
Blank and Haumerlain in [99] produce a role skeleton that might not
include all the actions pertinent to the role. This is the case as the
strategic aspect of the agent might discard some actions not fitting the
agent’s strategy. If, for example, the agent’s role can make a payment
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using Paypal or Visa and its strategy dictates a preference for card
payments, then the action of paying by Paypal will not be included in
the role skeleton.
They represent actions not involving the role (after the initial filtering
by the strategic aspect) with . This is equivalent to the τ actions in our
framework.
In the Graphe algorithm they use markings as the equivalence criterion.
If two states have the same markings, then they are the same. It is a
similar concept to bisimulation, in which we demand equivalence over a
relation R.
Finally, their method seems to be similar to τ⋆α bisimulation. They are
merging all -transitions, as they bring no change to the markings of a
state.
6.3.4 Giordano et al.
Giordano et al. [43] consider the representation of a local view (or role
skeleton), as they look at the alphabet of each agent (Σi) separately.
They are specifically interested in the actions that agent i can under-
stand (send or receive). Any other action taken in the protocol will
have a local equivalent that might be the empty action if the agent in
question is not involved in it, either as a sender or a receiver. Also, the
way that the local view of the agent is constructed is essentially by the
use of τ⋆α bisimulation, as any actions not relevant to the agent are dis-
carded. This leads to problems, especially for protocols with a branching
structure as it is not taken at all into consideration (see Section 4.2.3).
6.4 Summary of Competence Checking and
Role Skeleton approaches
Table 6.1 summarises the approaches mentioned in Sections 6.2 and 6.3
regarding the concepts of competence viewed in the domains of Multi-
Agent Systems and Web Services Choreography and Orchestration in
terms of the approach used for representing the protocol as well as for
its support for protocol decomposition:
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Name of the ap-
proach
Protocol Rep-
resentation
Method
Different Degrees
of Competence
Role Skeleton
Singh et al.
Transition Sys-
tems & Tempo-
ral Logic
✓ ✓
Baldoni et al.
Finite State Au-
tomata
✓ 7
Endriss et al.
Deterministic
Finite State
Automata
✓ ✓
Alberti et al.
Abductive Logic
Programming
✓ 7
Giordano et al. Temporal Logic ✓ ✓
Table 6.1: Comparison of different approaches to competence
As we can see, a number of ways have been used to represent proto-
cols accommodating all different types, i.e., finite and infinite protocols.
Furthermore, all approaches introduce a way of distinguishing between
different types of agents on the basis of their ability to cope with the pro-
tocol. The term competence is not used in any of the works; instead the
authors use terms such as conformance, interoperability and coverage.
In the papers, however, they are used in the same way to look into what
part of the protocol the agent can cover on the basis of the messages it
can exchange. A subset of the approaches, also, use information from
the agent’s strategy in order to ensure that any additional moves that
might be present in their strategy will not cause problems and will not
be selected instead of a move that the protocol would allow. Finally, a
few identify the need for a local view of the protocol rules by the agent,
a role skeleton as it is called.
6.5 Protocol description languages for ap-
proaches supporting competence/pro-
tocol decomposition
6.5.1 Desai et al.
The way that Desai et al. represent protocols in [30] resembles our
game-based representation in Section 3.6. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3 we
only looked at cases where the last move was the only constraint on the
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state of the game, e.g. a reply move follows a request one. However,
other constraints on the state of the game (e.g. the running price of
an auction) can be easily accommodated by appropriate holds events.
We are basing the protocol representation on the concept of validity of
moves so that any constraints can be expressed (either on the last move
or, in general, on the state of the game). As an example, we can use as
a constraint the running price on an item in an auction; if it is above a
threshold, the next bigger bid wins the item.
A move will be deemed valid as long as the properties specified are true
(valid(M1) ← property1 ∧ property2 ∧ . . . ∧ propertyn). A set of values
from the properties will identify a state. The authors express the same
properties in the form of commitments. A move might create - or dis-
charge - a commitment and the protocol proceeds on the basis of existing
commitments. This representation can be more flexible in dealing with
exceptions, i.e., moves that are not prescribed by the protocol but do not
break the commitments. The only requirement is that no commitments
are broken in the course of the interaction. On the other hand, it could
be the case that although no commitment is broken, there might be
other problems, e.g. insufficient resources or access privileges. If that is
the case, then the protocol will freeze, or the violation could be flagged
and not allowed through a commitment operation.
6.5.2 Bouaziz
The behaviour comprises of the allowed actions a role can assume. These
correspond to the available actions component in our framework. In
terms of describing an action, one needs to specify:
• its type (this corresponds to the name of the action in the game-
based framework);
• data field (no direct correspondence in our approach, but it could
be incorporated if we allow for the name of the action to be pa-
rameterised);
• a set of input events (representing the constraints to the valid
predicate in our approach); and the
• output events (depending on their nature, these could be either the
effects of the action or a set of initiates and terminates events).
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In this model, an action will be executed only if an event occurs. The
possible sequence of actions that can follow a role action will be deter-
mined by looking at the relevant transition in the meta-model. In our
model, there is no direct correspondence as that would involve revealing
actions which are not actions of the role in question. Bouaziz accom-
modates conditional transitions, i.e., transitions with different effects
depending on certain conditions. Our model can accommodate this by
adding rules to effects predicates. Also, if the next move depends not
only on the previous one but in parameters of the message itself - e.g.
the value of the bid, we can represent it by adding further constraints
to the valid predicate.
6.5.3 Blanc and Haumerlain
They define a protocol in terms of the following components:
• variables making up the conversation goal(s) or characterising its
state with respect to the goal(s) (in our approach, these are the
states of the LTS);
• roles the agents can assume in the protocol (same in our approach);
• types of intervention the agents can use in a conversation (these
are the actions of the agent);
• initial state of the conversation (the initial values of certain pred-
icates captured by initially statements);
• the final state of the conversation (final values of predicates cap-
tured in the terminating conditions of the protocol);
• casting constraints - these are constraints relating to role conflict
or any other constraints relating to the agent playing the role in
the protocol (e.g. the auctioneer cannot be a bidder in the same
auction or a bidder participating in an auction should have a min-
imum credit rating). Our approach does not consider role conflict,
but this forms part of future work. The remaining constraints
can be expressed as part of the social qualifications information
that the agent has to provide when applying for membership to a
society;
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• behaviour constraints that specify when an agent can carry out an
intervention. These are represented by valid move predicates in
the game-based approach.
The authors appoint a moderator agent to be an arbitrator for a con-
versation, once it begins. This means that every protocol run will need
a new instance of the moderator agent that will be overlooking the con-
versation and making sure that all moves are in accordance with the
rules of the protocol (essentially this is the umpire role in [104]). Ef-
fectively, the moderator plays the role of the valid component in the
game-based framework. Furthermore, it will decide whether a conversa-
tion has ended or not, a role assumed by the terminating conditions in
our framework.
In order to study the behaviour of the agent, we need to look at the
participation component. It is represented as a transition system and
an action on behalf of it equates to a select statement in our framework.
Moreover, the result sent back from the moderator is the equivalent of
an effects statement.
6.5.4 Baldoni et al.
In [7], the authors restrict their attention to protocols that can be rep-
resented by Finite State Automata. These protocols can easily be de-
scribed by our approach as we are using the same representation.
In this case, the alphabet Σ will correspond to actions, s0 will be the
initial state, the transition function δ will be the effects relationship,
states can be represented as a sequence of valid moves and the final
state(s) F will correspond to the final state component.
6.5.5 Giordano et al.
In [43], there is a correspondence between the components they use to
describe a protocol and our approach:
• action laws (ALag): these represent the effects of execution of ac-
tions on the state. In our theory, we use the effects predicate.
• causal laws (CLag): these represent dependencies between fluents.
In our model these are represented by terminates or initiates pred-
icates.
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• precondition laws (PLag): these represent conditions about when
an action can run. We use them as components of valid predicates.
• initial state that provides the initial values for all fluents: this
corresponds to our initially predicate.
Every agent participating in the protocol has a choice function, which
is equivalent to the select statements in our approach.
Finally, there is no direct computational equivalent of translating the
logical formulae used in DLTL into a program, although for finite proto-
cols (protocols with finite runs that do terminate) their expressive power
is the same as our game-based approach. These protocols can, however,
be converted in a Bu¨chi automaton.
6.6 Roles & Skills
A role is viewed as a restriction on what an agent (or an actor, in general)
can do in a given situation, namely the expected behaviour within a given
context [13]. As a concept, it has been exhaustively used in an number of
areas in Computing: an example is the field of Agent-Oriented Software
Engineering (AOSE) dealing with how to engineer societies of agents
where access to resources and coordination between member agents are
important issues. There are methodologies that focus mainly on the
agent level [100, 101], describing mainly the agent setup. On the other
hand, we have methodologies that try to develop an integrated approach
that can be used in both the analysis and design stages of the system
[20, 22, 29, 44, 49, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58, 80, 81, 83, 100, 101, 117–122].
Finally, there are methodologies that promote the use of formal tools
and techniques for the design of agent organisations such as role algebra
[51]. Another field where role theory has proven popular with respect to
defining access to resources is in the field of Databases, where role-based
access control policies are specified [69].
In some methodologies (e.g. Gaia [119, 122] and MaSE [20, 29, 49, 58,
117, 118]) the concepts of role (or compound role, where a number of roles
are composed to form a more complex one) and social position are taken
to be the same, however there are objections to this. Skarmeas [100]
differentiates between the two. The former is a computational concept
that relates to groupings of roles that an agent needs to assume, while
the latter is a social construct that encompasses features like culture,
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respect and so on. It describes more the perception that other member
agents have for the given agent rather than simply the role that it has to
assume. The majority of the methodologies, also, do not look in depth
at the notion of skill and in some of them (e.g. Prometheus [83]), there
is no distinction between what needs to be done (roles) and how it is
going to be done (skills or competencies).
Table 6.2 summarises the different approaches mentioned so far, in terms
of their support for the concepts of role, skill and protocol as well as the
definition of a role. We should note here that most of these works refer
to full methodologies for developing mutli-agent systems and, as such,
outside the scope of this work.
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Name Role Skill Protocol Remarks
Gaia
[119, 122]
✓ ✓ ✓ Role is seen as a 1st class entity and equates to social position. It isdefined in terms of responsibilities (≃ skills), permissions, activities
and protocols.
MaSE
[20, 29, 49,
58, 117, 118]
✓ ✓ ✓
Roles are mapped to one or more system goals and are attached
to agent classes . The skills are similar to the concept of simple
messages in tasks and protocols are present in the form of conver-
sations. However, skills are defined within the roles.
Skarmeas
[100, 101]
✓ ✓ ✓
Skarmeas is mainly looking at case studies of office environments.
Skills can be thought of as simple, i.e. atomic, tasks - they can
not be further broken down into smaller (simpler) tasks. Protocols
can be related to contracts & there is no analytical definition of
role (maybe as the approach is geared towards implementation).
However, the concept is present in the approach and a number of
different types of roles are considered.
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Name Role Skill Protocol Remarks
Kendall
[53–56]
✓ ✓ ✓
Skills can be related to the agent’s actions for achieving a goal &
protocols can be linked to co-ordination. A role is described by the
role model which it is made of, responsibilities, collaborator roles,
external interfaces for access to resources, relationship to other role
models, expertise of the agent (skill evaluation), co-ordination and
collaboration as well as how fast the agent can learn about the en-
vironment and the actions required for achieving its goal (≃ skills).
However, all descriptions are in natural language.
RoMAS
[120, 121]
✓ ✓ 7
Skills are defined as behaviours bound to the agent. The concept
of role is defined in the Z language as a set of goals, attributes
and services. The importance of protocols is recognised (in [120] it
seems to be represented by use cases as there is no reference to it
by name). There is no formal definition as the paper focuses on the
definition of agents, role and role organisations.
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Name Role Skill Protocol Remarks
SODA [80,
81]
✓ ✓ ✓
SODA is a full life-cycle methodology for engineering agents, agent
societies and agent environments. Roles are associated with tasks.
A task is defined by responsibilities, competencies (≃ skills) and
resources (although at the analysis stage only the responsibilities
item is defined). The protocols are defined in interaction models.
Roles are mapped to agent classes at the design stage.
Prometheus
[83]
✓ ✓ ✓
This is a full life-cycle methodology as well. Roles are defined in
terms of functionalities, i.e., by the following attributes: name,
short natural language descriptor, list of relevant percepts, data
used, data produced and interactions with other functionalities.
These are been assigned to agent classes at the architectural de-
sign state. Skills are present as agent capabilities, described by a
name, input events, events produced, natural language descriptor,
interactions with other capabilities and reference to data read and
written by the capability. Protocols are described as interaction
protocols at the Architectural Design stage.
144
Name Role Skill Protocol Remarks
TROPOS
[22, 44]
✓ ✓ ✓
TROPOS is a full life-cycle methodology as well. The concept of
role is covered by that of actor and the concept of capability is
close to that of skill (also the individual actions from the agent’s
plan). Protocols can be represented by AUML Agent Interaction
Diagrams in the detailed design phase [21].
ZEUS [51] ✓ ✓ ✓
ZEUS views an agent society as a collection of agents. The role
is defined as a position, along with a set of characteristics (each
of them has a set of attributes). These characteristics are: role
model(s) that it belongs to (≃ protocol(s)), goals/responsibilities,
tasks (≃ skills), capabilities/privileges and performance character-
istics. The exchange of messages happens according to interaction
protocols.
Table 6.2: Comparison of different AOSE approaches
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In our research, we focus on the concept of role within Multi-Agent
Systems applications and, more specifically, in the context of interaction
protocols. In this context the messages than an agent can utter depends
on the role it is assuming and the state of the protocol that it is in.
Once the role is described, we will need to look at the communicative acts
of the agent within the context of the protocol. These communicative
acts will determine the competence of the participating agents.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we considered different approaches to ours, concerning
the concepts of competence and protocol-to-role decomposition. The fo-
cus was on assessing the agent’s ability to join an artificial society on
the basis of the conversations it might engage in given its communicative
skills. Approaches in this area seem to be using the term conformance
to describe different degrees of competence. There is also the require-
ment that agents who are found to be conformant to a protocol, need
to be able to use that effectively. As a result, interactions between the
agents are engineered in order to ensure that only conversations that do
not lead to deadlocks can occur. This has the benefit of ensuring that
there would be no problematic runs when the protocol executes at the
expense of requiring the agent to reveal its private strategy which might
not always be possible (or desirable).
On the other hand, our approach does not guarantee interoperability.
It focuses on verifying that the agents can hold a conversation without
making any claims that they will indeed have one. Furthermore, the
idea of using the concept of bisimulation for breaking up a protocol into
roles has not received much attention and was used in its simplest form
(τ⋆α) under the assumption that the design of the protocol is correct.
There are, however, a number of open issues regarding extensions of
the research, most notably subgames. These are discussed in the follow-
ing chapter, along with a short evaluation of the work and concluding
remarks.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Further
Work
7.1 Introduction
This chapter briefly evaluates and summarises the research conducted
in this work. It covers the game-based approach to evaluate an agent’s
competence to join an artificial agents society and the process followed
to provide it with an enactable protocol description if it is allowed entry.
Furthermore, we describe possible extensions and future directions of the
concepts developed in the thesis.
7.2 Overall Evaluation
The way we use computers in applications such as those envisaged by
ubiquitous computing raises a number of issues regarding how we design,
specify and implement the interactions between people, devices and ser-
vices. More specifically, there are important issues of how to structure
the interactions and how do we provide access to the various services on
offer.
We propose to organise the services around the concept of semi-open
artificial agent societies. These are defined on the basis of the protocols
they make available, which specify the rules of interaction as well as the
roles participating in them. The agents, if interested in the protocol(s),
apply for admittance to the society. They are admitted if they are
competent users of the societal protocol(s) for the role(s) they apply for,
either by been able to enact the full protocol or by been able to enact
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part of it, with or without the need for cooperation by the other agent
participants.
We use the game-based metaphor as our conceptual framework because
it is an intuitive way of describing interactions and most (if not all)
protocol designers or end users are familiar with it. The representation
framework resulting from the games metaphor is a game-based represen-
tation of the protocols. Every move in the protocol is treated as a move
made in the context of a game with a number of constraints attached to
it. This ensures it can be made at that state of the interaction, i.e., it is
a valid move. The effects of the move are applied to the current state
of the game to produce the new state and, unless it is a terminating
state, the interaction continues in the same way. There is no winner or
looser as in the traditional sense of a game, just the end of a business
transaction.
As we look at protocols as games, we need a representation and imple-
mentation framework for the state of the game, which will integrate well
with that for the protocol. In this work, we use the Event and Situa-
tion Calculi both as a representation framework and an implementation
framework to describe the evolution of the state.
We should note the seamless integration between the different implemen-
tation frameworks for the protocol (game) and state (Event & Situation
Calculi). We can keep the representation of the protocol the same, while
changing the representation of the state from Event Calculus to Situa-
tion Calculus (or destructive assignment or commitments or any other
state representation). This makes the approach modular and any other
implementation framework for the evolution of the state can be chosen
and used instead. All that is required to integrate it with the game-
based representation of protocols is to rewrite the holds events so that
they use the new state representation. In [102] the update of the state is
done by destructive assignment, i.e., by assert and retract clauses. We
could have followed this approach, explicitly adding (removing) infor-
mation about what holds in the game, but that would have rendered
our approach non-declarative.
Furthermore, the choice of Event and Situation Calculi was based on
our choice of seeking executable specifications (Normal Logic Programs
that can produce executable specifications). For this reason we provided
our own version of the Event and Situation Calculi specified as Normal
Logic Programs. We did not employ any other formalism (e.g. modal or
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temporal logic) as we focused on using a specification which is directly
executable.
In addition, the formal framework defined in Section 3.3 is methodolog-
ical, easily extensible and facilitates the addition of extra game moves.
This can be done by:
• adding the action to the available actions (A) component of the
protocol definition;
• adding the moves that this action is involved in to the moves (M )
component;
• specifying the states for which the moves will be valid and adding
them to the valid actions (V ) component;
• updating the effects relationship, i.e., specifying what state the
agent finds itself in after executing the move. This is done by
updating the effects (E ) relationship.
Our approach does not currently deal with complex interactions in the
form of subgames. This affects the modularity of the protocols we can
run it on as each protocol has to specify the full interactions between the
participants and we can not make use of smaller protocols as building
blocks. We plan to address this as part of our future work.
Furthermore, as our focus is on specifications that are directly exe-
cutable, we did not employ formalisms with potentially higher expres-
sivity, e.g., modal logic. However, the employed formalism is proven
sufficient for the protocols we are addressing as well as for the high-level
view of interactions that we are employing.
The two representations that we use for protocols, i.e., the game-based
and the LTS one are strongly related and share the key concepts of the
framework, e.g., the notions about available and valid moves. In ad-
dition, for small protocols or protocols whose FSP specification can be
provided, a direct conversion between the two representations is possi-
ble. This fully unifies the whole process for assessing the agent’s com-
petence and providing it with the information it needs to enact its role
in the protocol. For protocols with more states, or for protocols with no
FSP representation there is no tool support at the moment, making the
transition from one representation to the other time-consuming. This
will be dealt with in our future work, as a number of ideas is explored
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regarding how to convert from a logic-based representation to an LTS
representation.
The concept of bisimulation is well studied in a number of different areas,
e.g., modal logic, calculus of communicating systems, formal verification
and as a means of checking equivalence between transition systems. A
number of tools, both commercial and open source, exist that can fully
automate the process. The CADP1 and mCRL2 2 are probably the two
most notable examples. As a large number of protocols in the area
of E-Commerce and Multi-Agent Systems can be described using Finite
State Automata or formalisms that can eventually be transformed into a
transition system, bisimulation is a good approach for minimising them.
It is, also, a suitable approach when treating a role as a component that
has to fit within a larger system - a protocol or a choreography, and we
need to make sure that substituting the protocol with the bisimulated
role will produce the same overall behaviour. In addition, as we are
interested in the behavioural part of the societal components, transition
systems are a well established mechanism for describing it. Behavioral
(bisimulation) equivalences are usually employed to perform reasoning
on LTS and determine their equivalence. The approaches for deriving
the role skeleton for an agent that were reviewed in Section 6.3 use
concepts very similar to bisimulation, but most of them make no direct
reference to the concept.
7.3 Evaluation of the research aims
In this section, we review and evaluate the research aims of the work.
(RA 1) The first aim of the research was to establish a framework based
on the games metaphor that will represent protocols in an artificial
agent society and will use social concepts in this representation,
namely the concepts of role and skills.
This aim was fully achieved by the games framework described
in Section 3.3. The game is represented as an LTS and one of
the components of the description is R that represents the roles
participating in the protocol.
We treat protocols as first-class entities in which agents will have
to participate assuming one of the roles that the protocol makes
1http://www.inrialpes.fr/vasy/cadp/
2http://www.mcrl2.org/mcrl2/wiki/index.php/Home
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available. The protocol is defined as a set of messages passing
between the participants, where each message will be characterised
by a sender, a number of recipients and a move (the content of
the message). The move component will comprise a skill of the
agent, i.e. an utterance that it can send or understand. The
representation of the move could be enhanced to include various
parameters relevant to the message (e.g. the price of an auctioned
item on which the agent bids as well as its id) or, even, the level
at which the agent possesses the skill (e.g. an agent might be able
to send call-for-bids message, but not in encrypted form).
(RA 2) The second aim dealt with the provision of a computational frame-
work for assessing the application of an agent wishing to join an
artificial agent society. This is achieved by the computational ver-
sion of the LTS for the representation of protocols and follows
closely the framework of [102].
The protocol is represented as a game/2 predicate in Prolog,
which we initially check if it is in a terminating state or not. If it
is, the game ends and the result is returned. If not, the next valid
move is chosen, its effects are assumed and we follow the cycle
again to check if that move terminated the game.
It amounts to verifying the runs that the agent can produce on the
basis of its competency profile are all the possible runs the proto-
col prescribes (in the case of fully competent agents) or the runs
to meet the minimum requirements set by the Authority Agent
(for Competent under Adversity or Competent under Co-operation
agents). The current framework works well for atomic - i.e., with-
out subgames, games but it would be interesting to extend it to
introduce a specification for compound games that include sub-
games. In this richer framework, we would be able to express con-
straints like label some sub-protocols as essential or some others
as indifferent. It will also provide a more abstract and fine-grained
way of representing protocols as well as help building a library of
protocols that can be re-used and form more complex ones through
the process of composition.
(RA 3) The provision of a framework for decomposing the protocol into
smaller ones that contain the minimal amount of information per-
taining to all of its roles was the next aim of the work. As the
representation of the protocol is that of an LTS, we chose to use
the concept of bisimulation for breaking the protocols.
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Every action that the role does not “understand”, i.e. it is neither
the sender nor amongst the recipients of the message, is replaced by
a silent (τ) action. Branching bisimulation is run on the resulting
LTS and, if no τ actions remain or those that remain do not make
the protocol non-enactable, the role skeleton LTSs are generated.
In the light of the previous aim, it would be interesting to look
at the properties of compound protocols. As an example, if an
agent is found to be competent, would the role skeleton that it
should receive be the product (with the appropriate constraints
in place) of the role skeleton of the protocols that make up the
compound one? Or, the inverse question, if the agent is found to
be competent in the smaller constituent protocols, can we gather
that it will be competent in the compound one as well?
(RA 4) The final aim refers to ways of repairing a protocol in the case
that is not enactable. In this case, we will need to give certain
roles access to additional information than the one they already
have - they will need to be added as recipients to certain messages
that they do not know about in the current implementation of the
protocol.
We present three different approaches to repairing protocols, rang-
ing from repairing every move that relates to a state that is the
originator of a silent (τ) action to repairing only selected τ moves
and only if they are causing the protocol to be non-enactable. This
significantly reduces the volume of additional information that the
agent assuming the role receives, a very important property for
protocols containing sensitive information.
Again, it would be interesting to research the case of compound
protocols. If repairs are made on the constituent protocols, will
the composition of the repaired protocols be the same protocol as
if we took the original compound protocol and repaired it?
7.4 Thesis Summary
In this thesis, we looked at the various phases that an agent has to
go through when applying for a position in an artificial agent society.
This application will be driven by its need to fulfill a goal - resources
which are available within the society in consideration - and its societal
life cycle (if admitted) will be divided in three phases. These would be
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application, evolution whilst a member of the society and exiting the
society. We do not look at the processes of how the agent evolves once
in the society or how it leaves it (whether having its goal fulfilled or been
expelled from it) in detail other than simply sketching how they should
be processed in terms of activities. UML activity diagrams are used for
this purpose.
Instead, we concentrate on the part where the agent applies for entry and
provides the society’s Authority Agent with its communication skills,
i.e., the communicative acts that it can understand and engage in. This
forms the competency profile of the agent, which is then incorporated It
does not provide any other aspect of its personal strategy, only that it
can understand certain messages and it is able of sending or receiving
them. We then present an algorithm with the use of which the agent’s
competency can be assessed both in cases where we focus on changes
of the global state (with the use of Situation Calculus) as well as in
cases where concurrency is a domain requirement (with the use of Event
Calculus). The choice of Event Calculus is done on the basis that it is a
natural way of representing time, although versions of Situation Calculus
that can deal with time and concurrent moves have been developed. The
Situation Calculus and Event Calculus frameworks (used to describe the
state of the protocol) are combined with the game representation of the
protocol (used to present the protocol evolution) in order to describe
how it evolves from its initial state to a terminating one. The evolution
happens through selection of a series of valid moves from the moves
that the protocol makes available by checking constraints on the current
state of the game to ensure the agent can make the move. The move
will, in turn, change the state of the protocol. The changes are assumed
via effects rules and a check is made to see if the game has reached a
terminating state or not. If not, the same process is followed again.
In the case studies considered in Chapter 5, we look at both acyclic
and cyclic protocols, as well as cases where the protocol might involve
more than a single instance of the same role (e.g. an auction with two
bidders). The conditions we impose on a move for it to be valid in
these examples refer to the last move made in the game, leaving out any
additional constraints relating to other elements of the game state. We
can add more constraints to a move by extending the valid predicate.
The Authority Agent of the society will use these descriptions (as well
as the initial set-up of the protocol) in order to make the decision of
whether to allow entry to the applicant agent or not, on the basis of
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the competence requirements of the society. In other words, the
Authority Agent will have a set S of paths that the applicant agent will
need to be able to follow and generate the paths Q that it can assume on
the basis of its competence profile. If Q ⊆ P , then the agent is accepted
into the society.
Assuming the agent is accepted into the society, the next step is to con-
sider what kind of information to provide it with. The full protocol
might be too big to be treated by the agent or there could be security
concerns for which we do not wish to reveal the whole protocol. Thus,
the best solution is to provide the applicant agent with exactly the in-
formation that it needs to participate in the protocols prescribed by the
role(s) it subscribes to. In other words, we need a new protocol that can
simulate the behaviour of the original one minus the unknown actions
to the agent. These would comprise the messages that the agent is not
involved in, either as a sender or as a recipient.
As our initial game-based approach is resulting into an LTS for repre-
senting the different paths that the protocol execution can take, we want
an LTS that simulates the original one discarding (possibly) the actions
that the agent is not engaged in. Effectively, we want two LTSs that
one simulates the other; thus, we employ bisimulation to achieve the
reduction by looking at the τ⋆α and branching bisimulation equivalence
relations. The first one is unsuitable as it does not take into account the
branching structure of the protocol. It reduces all sequences of unknown
actions before a known one, without reasoning about the effects this will
have, while the latter reduces only those unknown actions that do not
break the branching structure. We represent the protocol in the form
of an LTS, which is translated into a Prolog program for the implemen-
tation. The unknown actions are substituted by silent ones (τ) and the
branching bisimulation algorithm is run on the resulting protocol. The
resulting protocol should have no silent actions or those present should
not affect the outcome by creating non-enactable branching structures.
These are structures where the agent has a choice of taking two actions
but not the knowledge to decide on what to do.
By the use of bisimulation, we can also check if a protocol decomposition
into role behaviours for a protocol containing multiple role instances of
the same role is correct or not. If it is, then the LTSs that we produce for
those instances should be bisimilar, as they represent the same role, only
different instances. This is assuming the protocol does not differentiate
between different role instances, but prescribes the same behavior for all
of them.
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7.5 Further Research
7.5.1 Framework Extension
A number of possibilities exist regarding the extension of the work pre-
sented here both at the theoretical and the implementation levels - we
present them in relevance with the issues mentioned in Chapter 1.
The first issue to consider concerning the game-based representation
of the competence framework is that of protocol representation in the
competence assessment and role allocation phases. At the moment, the
protocol representation for checking whether the agent will be admitted
to the society and decomposing the protocol to its role(s) are different
(although they are different viewpoints of looking at the same informa-
tion). A better approach would be to have a unique representation or a
way of converting between the two. This is the case as some protocols
(e.g. chess) are easier to describe through valid moves, as the state space
is huge whereas others (e.g. netbill) can easily be described using their
entire state space.
One way of doing that could be to decide on a set of properties that
will uniquely characterise a state (in the chess protocol, this could be
the positions of the various pieces on the chess board). Once the set of
properties is decided, we use these values in the valid predicate to decide
on the next state. The value of the next state will be the collective value
of all these properties. This will give us the LTS representation needed
for running the bisimulation algorithm.
If we have an FSP model of the protocol roles, another way of dealing
with the same issue is to compose and convert them into a format that
is accepted by the protocol predicate in our approach. This will be
done using the steps in the preparation phase in Section 5.5.3.
The concept of subgames [104] could, also, be explored in the repre-
sentation of protocols for the application phase when the agent requests
access to an artificial agent society as it allows for higher modularity
and granularity when describing protocols. As an example, if we look
at a protocol describing a Dutch auction and the result is a tie, then
the auctioneer will need to run another auction that follows the English
auction format to decide the winner. These are two separate protocols
that can exist independently of one another, but in this context one can
be embodied in the other. This is an example of a sub-protocol that
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can only start at a specific point in the current protocol and has to
complete before returning to the main protocol and the main protocol
cannot terminate if the sub-protocol does not terminate. On the other
hand, if the agent is involved in a number of auctions running at the
same time independently of one another, then the moves can interleave.
This means that they can be executed in any order and we can get in
and out of the different sub-protocols at will. The termination of one of
the protocols might have implications for the others, e.g. if the agent
is bidding for a similar item in all running auctions, or not, e.g. if the
bids are placed for different items. This change in representation will
not affect the bisimulation algorithm as it can be applied to any tran-
sition system - in fact, for non-interleaving protocols, we might be able
to run bisimulation separately on the protocols involved. It will, also,
allow us to run multiple instances of the same protocol (with the neces-
sary amendments in the computational representation, e.g. the addition
of an id to be able to differentiate between different runs of the same
protocol).
The work presented in this thesis could, also, be extended in new di-
rections to cover issues that were not considered here. A question that
we did not look at in this work has been the case of a conditional re-
ply from the society to the agent. Our model needs to be augmented
to cover conditional criteria on which to base the agent’s admission to
the society. As an example, the society might consider that an agent
accepted for a role involving protocols p1, p2, . . . , pn shall be able to do
all moves in p1, reach certain terminating states of p2 and we are not
concerned with what it can do for pn. Alternatively, this issue can be
resolved by on the spot training of the agent, i.e., ad hoc addition of the
missing protocol rules to its knowledge base.
The second and third phase of the agent’s life cycle within the society will
involve activities like revising its status and (possibly) dynamic update of
the protocols and roles it will be involved in. In our current approach, the
assignment of roles to the agent is done in a static way at entry time. We
need a way of modelling the dynamic re-assignment of roles, including
dealing with any potential role conflicts that might arise. This issue
has been tackled to some extent in [100], but in a centralised way with
an agent acting as a database of all other member agents abilities and
roles. Any request for a particular service could be redirected through
that agent. This is an approach that is computationally expensive and
error-prone as a failure of the database agent will result in a complete
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failure of the whole system.
We could, also, look into how our approach can be enriched and what
is the minimum extra set of information that needs to be requested in
order to ensure and enforce competence between agents when they are
found in the same society. At the moment, our test is solely based on
the skills of the agents, but we do not look at the element of their private
strategies. As an example, we might have two agents who both have the
skill to greet, but that is only invoked if the agent is greeted first by
another agent. If these two agents are put together in a society, their
engagement would end up in a deadlock situation in which no agent can
(or wants to) make a move.
The idea of linking the skills of the agent with part of its selection
strategy in order to classify it with regards to a competence level is
present in [35]. However, the authors look at a specific class of protocols
(shallow). We intend to look at this as part of further work.
Another area of improvement could be the phase where the agent gets
the protocol pertinent to its role. The agent could get a personalised
version of its role LTS rather than the generic role description. At the
moment, we are using branching bisimulation on the original protocol
ignoring any paths that the agent might not be able to make because of
insufficient skills or because these paths are not in its individual maximal
strategy. In this, after deploying the equation in Section 3.9 to compute
its maximal strategy, the resulting LTS for the role could be further
pruned to take that into account.
As an example, consider an agent A with the following set of skills
Ag(Skills) = {order, acceptorder} participating in the protocol in Fig-
ure 7.1.
s6s0 s1 s2 s3
s4 s5
m:initiatepay:{g}m:acceptorder:{c}c:order:{m}
c:pay:{g}
m:ship:{c}
m:cancelpay:{g}
Figure 7.1: Order protocol
On the basis of the protocol rules and the agent’s competencies, it is
competent under co-operation. At the moment, the agent will receive
a role protocol that contains actions pay and ship, which it cannot un-
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derstand. A better approach would be to combine the protocol decom-
position algorithm along with the agent’s maximal strategy algorithm.
This will provide it with a protocol that will contain actions and paths
that it can reach ruling out the problematic ones either due to agent’s
incompetence or not been part of the agent’s maximal strategy.
7.5.2 Technical Improvements
An issue with the Prolog representation of the process at the moment
is that we need to calculate the truth value of a number of properties
through holds and happens predicates repeatedly. In that process the
same predicates would be called over and over again as the game pro-
gresses. The current implementation does not account for any caching
or saving the information in any way and this can prove to be a per-
formance bottleneck for big and complex protocols. An approach for
tackling this issue could be to use a Prolog with abilities of caching and
tabling results, like XSB-Prolog [108, 114]. We could, also, look at ver-
sions of Event Calculus that are designed to run with better efficiency
[23].
The protocol predicate will need to be extended to include the struc-
tural relations between the top-level protocol and its sub-protocols.
Also, the definition of a number of initiates and terminates
predicates will need to change in order to account for the fact that
some moves might be starting a new subgame or that moves can be
made outside the subgame’s context even if it is still active. Finally,
all protocol-relating predicates will need to carry an id as they will be
evaluated in multiple instances of protocol runs.
158
Bibliography
[1] Marco Alberti, Federico Chesani, Marco Gavanelli, Evelina
Lamma, Paola Mello, and Paolo Torroni. Security protocols verifi-
cation in abductive logic programming: A case study. In Oguz
Dikenelli, Marie Pierre Gleizes, and Alessandro Ricci, editors,
ESAW, volume 3963 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
106–124. Springer, 2005. ISBN 3-540-34451-9.
Cited on page(s): 124
[2] Marco Alberti, Anna Ciampolini, Marco Gavanelli, Evelina
Lamma, Paola Mello, and Paolo Torroni. A social ACL semantics
by deontic constraints. In Vladimı´r Mar´ık, Jo¨rg P. Mu¨ller, and
Michal Pechoucek, editors, Multi-Agent Systems and Applications
III, 3rd International Central and Eastern European Conference
on Multi-Agent Systems, CEEMAS 2003, Prague, Czech Repub-
lic, June 16-18, 2003, Proceedings, volume 2691 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 204–213. Springer, 2003. ISBN 3-540-
40450-3.
Cited on page(s): 124
[3] Marco Alberti, Marco Gavanelli, Evelina Lamma, Federico
Chesani, Paola Mello, and Marco Montali. An abductive frame-
work for a-priori verification of web services. In Annalisa Bossi
and Michael J. Maher, editors, Proceedings of the 8th Interna-
tional ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Principles and Practice of
Declarative Programming, July 10-12, 2006, Venice, Italy, pages
39–50. ACM, 2006. ISBN 1-59593-388-3.
Cited on page(s): 124, 125
[4] Marco Alberti, Marco Gavanelli, Evelina Lamma, Paola Mello,
and Paolo Torroni. Specification and verification of agent interac-
tion using social integrity constraints. In LCMAS’03: Logic and
Communication in Multi-Agent Systems, volume 85(2) of Elec-
tronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, pages 94–116. El-
159
sevier, 2004.
Cited on page(s): 109, 124
[5] Alexander Artikis and Jeremy Pitt. A formal model of open
agent societies. In AGENTS ’01: Proceedings of the fifth inter-
national conference on Autonomous agents, pages 192–193. ACM,
New York, NY, USA, 2001. ISBN 1-58113-326-X.
Cited on page(s): 17, 18
[6] A. Badica and C. Badica. Formalizing agent-based english auctions
using finite state process algebra. Journal of Universal Computer
Science, 14(7):1118–1135, 2008.
Cited on page(s): 96
[7] Matteo Baldoni, Cristina Baroglio, Alberto Martelli, and Viviana
Patti. Verification of protocol conformance and agent interoper-
ability. In Francesca Toni and Paolo Torroni, editors, CLIMA VI,
volume 3900 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 265–
283. Springer, 2005. ISBN 3-540-33996-5.
Cited on page(s): 109, 114, 120, 139
[8] Matteo Baldoni, Cristina Baroglio, Alberto Martelli, and Viviana
Patti. A priori conformance verification for guaranteeing interop-
erability in open environments. In Asit Dan and Winfried Lamers-
dorf, editors, Service-Oriented Computing - ICSOC 2006, 4th In-
ternational Conference, Chicago, IL, USA, December 4-7, 2006,
Proceedings, volume 4294 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 339–351. Springer, 2006. ISBN 3-540-68147-7.
Cited on page(s): 119
[9] Matteo Baldoni, Cristina Baroglio, Alberto Martelli, and Viviana
Patti. Reasoning about interaction protocols for customizing web
service selection and composition. Journal of Logic and Algebraic
Programming, 70(1):53–73, 2007.
Cited on page(s): 121
[10] Matteo Baldoni, Cristina Baroglio, Alberto Martelli, Viviana
Patti, and Claudio Schifanella. Verifying protocol conformance
for logic-based communicating agents. In Joa˜o Alexandre Leite
and Paolo Torroni, editors, CLIMA V, volume 3487 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 196–212. Springer, 2004. ISBN
3-540-28060-X.
Cited on page(s): 109, 117, 121
160
[11] Matteo Baldoni, Cristina Baroglio, Alberto Martelli, Viviana
Patti, Claudio Schifanella, Laura Torasso, and Viviana Mascardi.
Personalization, verification and conformance for logic-based com-
municating agents. In Flavio Corradini, Flavio De Paoli, Emanuela
Merelli, and Andrea Omicini, editors, WOA 2005: Dagli Oggetti
agli Agenti. 6th AI*IA/TABOO Joint Workshop ”From Objects
to Agents”: Simulation and Formal Analysis of Complex Sys-
tems, 14-16 November 2005, Camerino, MC, Italy, pages 177–183.
Pitagora Editrice Bologna, 2005. ISBN 88-371-1590-3.
Cited on page(s): 118, 121
[12] Bernhard Bauer, Jo¨rg P. Mu¨ller, and James Odell. Agent UML: A
formalism for Specifying Multiagent Interaction. In Paolo Cinan-
carini, Cristiano Castelfranchi, and Michael Wooldridge, editors,
Agent-Oriented Software Engineering, pages 91–103. Springer–
Verlag, Berlin, 2001.
Cited on page(s): 4
[13] B. J. Biddle. Recent developments in role theory. Annual Review
of Sociology, 12(1):67–92, 1986.
Cited on page(s): 140
[14] Bruce J. Biddle. Role Theory: Concepts & Research. John Wiley
& Sones, January 1979. ISBN 978-0471072157.
Cited on page(s): 20
[15] Stefan Blom, Wan Fokkink, Jan Friso Groote, Izak van
Langevelde, Bert Lisser, and Jaco van de Pol. µCRL: A toolset
for analysing algebraic specifications. In CAV’01: Proceedings of
the 13th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification,
volume 2102 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 250–254.
Springer-Verlag, Paris, France, July 2001.
Cited on page(s): 92
[16] Benedikt Bollig. Formal Models of Communicating Systems: Lan-
guages, Automata and Monadic Second-Order Logic. Texts in The-
oretical Computer Science. An EATCS series. Springer, 1st edition,
October 2006. ISBN 978-3540329220.
Cited on page(s): 22
[17] Wassim Bouaziz. Une Ontologie de Protocoles pour la Coordi-
nation de Syste`mes Distribue´s. In Journe´es Francophones sur
les Ontologies (JFO), Sousse, Tunisie, 18/10/07-20/10/07, pages
161
231–246. Centre de Publication Universitaire, Octobre 2007.
Cited on page(s): 130
[18] Wassim Bouaziz and Eric Andonoff. Dynamic execution of coor-
dination protocols in open and distributed multi-agent systems.
In Anne H˚akansson, Ngoc Thanh Nguyen, Ronald L. Hartung,
Robert J. Howlett, and Lakhmi C. Jain, editors, Agent and Multi-
Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications, Third KES Inter-
national Symposium, KES-AMSTA 2009, Uppsala, Sweden, June
3-5, 2009. Proceedings, volume 5559 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 609–618. Springer, 2009. ISBN 978-3-642-01664-6.
Cited on page(s): 130
[19] Jeffrey M. Bradshaw. An introduction to software agents, pages
3–46. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 1997. ISBN 0-262-
52234-9. URL http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?
id=267985.267993.
Cited on page(s): 2, 16, 17
[20] Frances M. T. Brazier, Catholijn M. Jonker, and Jan Treur. Prin-
ciples of compositional multi-agent system development. In Pro-
ceedings of the 15th IFIP World Computer Congress, WCC’98,
Conference on Information Technology and Knowledge Systems,
IT&KNOWS’98, pages 347–360. Press, 1998.
Cited on page(s): 140, 142
[21] Paolo Bresciani, Anna Perini, Paolo Giorgini, Fausto Giunchiglia,
and John Mylopoulos. A knowledge level software engineering
methodology for agent oriented programming. In AGENTS ’01:
Proceedings of the fifth international conference on Autonomous
agents, pages 648–655. ACM, 2001. ISBN 1-58113-326-X. URL
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/375735.376477.
Cited on page(s): 145
[22] Paolo Bresciani, Anna Perini, Paolo Giorgini, Fausto Giunchiglia,
and John Mylopoulos. Modeling early requirements in tropos:
A transformation based approach. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, 2222:151–168, 2002. ISSN 0302-9743.
Cited on page(s): 140, 145
[23] Luca Chittaro and Angelo Montanari. Efficient handling of
context-dependency in the cached event calculus. In Proc. of
TIME’94 - International Workshop on Temporal Representation
162
and Reasoning, pages 103–112, 1994.
Cited on page(s): 158
[24] Amit K. Chopra and Munindar P. Singh. Producing compliant in-
teractions: Conformance, coverage, and interoperability. In Mat-
teo Baldoni and Ulle Endriss, editors, Declarative Agent Languages
and Technologies IV, 4th International Workshop, DALT 2006,
Hakodate, Japan, May 8, 2006, Selected, Revised and Invited Pa-
pers, volume 4327 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
1–15. Springer, 2006. ISBN 3-540-68959-1.
Cited on page(s): 109, 110, 112
[25] Benjamin Cox, J. D. Tygar, and Marvin Sirbu. Netbill security
and transaction protocol. In Proceedings of the 1st conference
on USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 1, vol-
ume 1, page 6. USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, July
1995. URL http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=
1267185.1267191.
Cited on page(s): 29, 35, 89
[26] Paul Davidsson. Emergent societies of information agents. In
Matthias Klusch and Larry Kerschberg, editors, Proceedings
of the 4th International Workshop on Cooperative Information
Agents IV, The Future of Information Agents in Cyberspace, vol-
ume 1860 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 143–
153. Springer-Verlag, London, UK, July 2000. ISBN 3-540-
67703-8. URL http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?
id=647785.735565.
Cited on page(s): 17
[27] Paul Davidsson. Categories of artificial societies. In Proceed-
ings of the Second International Workshop on Engineering So-
cieties in the Agents World II, Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 1–9. Springer-Verlag, London, UK, July 2001. ISBN
3-540-43091-1. URL http://portal.acm.org/citation.
cfm?id=645380.651127.
Cited on page(s): 3, 20, 22
[28] Paul Davidsson and Stefan Johansson. On the potential of norm-
governed behavior in different categories of artificial societies.
Computational and Mathematical Organisational Theory, 12(2-
3):169–180, 2006. ISSN 1381-298X (print version), 1572-9346
163
(electronic version). URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/
s10588-006-9542-x.
Cited on page(s): 18
[29] Scott A. DeLoach. Multiagent systems engineering: A methodol-
ogy and language for designing agent systems. In Proceedings of
Agent-Oriented Information Systems ’99 (AOIS ’99), pages 45–57.
Heidelberg, Germany, 14–15 June 1999 1999.
Cited on page(s): 140, 142
[30] Nirmit Desai, Ashok U. Mallya, Amit K. Chopra, and Munindar P.
Singh. Interaction protocols as design abstractions for business
processes. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 31(12):
1015–1027, 2005.
Cited on page(s): 128, 136
[31] Frank Dignum and Mark Greaves. Issues in Agent Communica-
tion: An Introduction. In Issues in Agent Communication, pages
1–16. Springer–Verlag, London, UK, 2000. ISBN 3-540-41144-5.
Cited on page(s): 23
[32] V. Dignum, J-J. Meyer, H. Weigand, and F. Dignum. An
organizational-oriented model for agent societies. In G. Linde-
mann, D. Moldt, M. Paolucci, and B. Yu, editors, Proceedings
of International Workshop on Regulated Agent–Based Social Sys-
tems: Theories and Applications (RASTA’02), pages 31–50. Ham-
burg, Germany: University of Hamburg, 16 July 2002.
Cited on page(s): 19
[33] J. E. Doran. The archaeology of artificial societies. In Proceedings
of the AISB’00 Symposium on Starting from Society - The Appli-
cation of Social Analogies to Computational Systems, pages 15–21.
UK: AISB, Birmingham,UK, April 2000. ISBN 1 902956 13 8.
Cited on page(s): 18
[34] Ulle Endriss. Temporal logics for representing agent communi-
cation protocols. In Frank Dignum, Rogier M. van Eijk, and
Roberto A. Flores, editors, AC, volume 3859 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 15–29. Springer, 2006. ISBN 978-3-540-
68142-7.
Cited on page(s): 126
[35] Ulrich Endriss, Wenjin Lu, Nicolas Maudet, and Kostas Stathis.
Competent agents and customising protocols. In Andrea Omicini,
164
Paolo Petta, and Jeremy Pitt, editors, ESAW, volume 3071 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 168–181. Springer, 2003.
ISBN 3-540-22231-6.
Cited on page(s): 78, 84, 157
[36] Ulrich Endriss, Nicolas Maudet, Fariba Sadri, and Francesca Toni.
Aspects of protocol conformance in inter-agent dialogue. In AA-
MAS, pages 982–983. ACM, 2003. ISBN 1-58113-683-8.
Cited on page(s): 121, 123
[37] Ulrich Endriss, Nicolas Maudet, Fariba Sadri, and Francesca Toni.
Protocol conformance for logic-based agents. In Georg Gottlob and
Toby Walsh, editors, IJCAI-03, Proceedings of the Eighteenth In-
ternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Acapulco,
Mexico, August 9-15, 2003, pages 679–684. Morgan Kaufmann,
2003.
Cited on page(s): 121, 123
[38] Ulrich Endriss, Nicolas Maudet, Fariba Sadri, and Francesca Toni.
Logic-based agent communication protocols. In F. Dignum, editor,
Advances in agent communication, volume 2922, pages 91–107.
Springer Verlag, 2004. ISBN 3-540-20769-4.
Cited on page(s): 121, 123
[39] Thomas Erl. Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA): Concepts,
Technology, and Design. Prentice Hall PTR, Upper Saddle River,
NJ, USA, August 12, 2005. ISBN 0131858580.
Cited on page(s): 2
[40] Kathi Fisler and Moshe Y. Vardi. Bisimulation minimization in an
automata-theoretic verification framework. In Ganesh Gopalakr-
ishnan and Phillip J. Windley, editors, FMCAD, volume 1522 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 115–132. Springer, 1998.
ISBN 3-540-65191-8.
Cited on page(s): 63
[41] Martin Fowler. UML Distilled: A Brief Guide to the Standard
Object Modeling Language. Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing
Co., Inc., Boston, MA, USA, 3 edition, 2003. ISBN 0321193687.
Cited on page(s): 3
[42] Dov M. Gabbay, Ian Hodkinson, and Mark Reynolds. Temporal
logic (vol. 1): mathematical foundations and computational as-
pects. Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, NY, USA, 1994.
165
ISBN 0-19-853769-7.
Cited on page(s): 126
[43] Laura Giordano and Alberto Martelli. Verifying agents’ confor-
mance with multiparty protocols. In Michael Fisher, Fariba Sadri,
and Michael Thielscher, editors, CLIMA IX, volume 5405 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pages 17–36. Springer, 2008.
ISBN 978-3-642-02733-8.
Cited on page(s): 126, 135, 139
[44] Fausto Giunchiglia, John Mylopoulos, and Anna Perini. The tro-
pos software development methodology: processes, models and
diagrams. In AOSE’02: Proceedings of the 3rd international con-
ference on Agent-oriented software engineering III, pages 162–173.
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2003. ISBN 3-540-00713-X.
Cited on page(s): 140, 145
[45] Robert Goldblatt. Logics of time and computation. Center for the
Study of Language and Information, Stanford, CA, USA, 1987.
ISBN 0-937073-12-1.
Cited on page(s): 126
[46] Vaishali Goradia, Bob Mowry, Porlin Kang, Michelle Panjwani,
David Lowe, Alexander Somogyi, Patrick Magruder, Thomas Wag-
ner, David McNeil, Catherine Yang, William Arms, Marvin Sirbu,
and Doug Tygar. Netbill 1994 prototype. TR 1994-11, Informa-
tion Networking Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, 1994.
Cited on page(s): 29, 35, 89
[47] Stephane Grumbach. DATALOGrew: DATALOG with rewrit-
ing rules. In Cinquie`mes Journe´es Bases de Donne´es Avance´es
(BDA), 26-28 Septembre 1989, Gene`ve, Suisse (Informal Proceed-
ings), pages 87–108. INRIA, 1989.
Cited on page(s): 23
[48] Bryan Horling and Victor Lesser. A survey of multi-agent organi-
zational paradigms. Knowl. Eng. Rev., 19(4):281–316, 2004. ISSN
0269-8889.
Cited on page(s): 19
[49] Carlos Angel Inglesias, Mercedes Garijo, and Jose´ Centeno-
Gonza´lez. A survey of agent-oriented methodologies. In Jo¨rg P.
Mu¨ller, Munindar P. Singh, and Anand S. Rao, editors, ATAL,
166
volume 1555 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 317–
330. Springer, 1998. ISBN 3-540-65713-4.
Cited on page(s): 140, 142
[50] A. C. Kakas, R. A. Kowalski, and F. Toni. Abductive Logic
Programming. Journal of Logic and Computation, 2(6):719–770,
1993.
Cited on page(s): 124
[51] Anthony Karageorgos, Simon Thompson, and Nikolay Mehand-
jiev. Semi-automatic design of agent organisations. In SAC
’02: Proceedings of the 2002 ACM symposium on Applied com-
puting, pages 306–313. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2002.
ISBN 1-58113-445-2. URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/
508791.508853.
Cited on page(s): 140, 145
[52] Krishna Kavi, David C. Kung, Hitesh Bhambhani, Gaurav Pan-
choli, and Marie Kanikarla. Extending UML for modeling and
design of multi-agent, May 3–10, 2003.
Cited on page(s): 3
[53] Elizabeth A. Kendall. Partitioning goals with roles. In Serge De-
meyer and Jan Bosch, editors, ECOOP Workshops, volume 1543
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 240–241. Springer,
1998. ISBN 3-540-65460-7.
Cited on page(s): 140, 143
[54] Elizabeth A. Kendall. Role model designs and implementations
with aspect-oriented programming. In Proceedings of the Confer-
ence on Object-Oriented Programming, Systems, Languages, and
Applications, pages 353–369, 1999. ISBN 1-58113-238-7 (ACM),
0-201-48561-3 (Addison Wesley Longman).
Cited on page(s): 143
[55] Elizabeth A. Kendall. Role modeling for agent system analysis,
design, and implementation. In ASA/MA, pages 204–218. IEEE
Computer Society, Octomber 1999. ISBN 0-7695-0340-3.
Cited on page(s): 140, 143
[56] Elizabeth A. Kendall. Agent software engineering with role mod-
elling. In Paolo Ciancarini and Michael Wooldridge, editors,
AOSE, volume 1957 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
167
163–170. Springer, 2000. ISBN 3-540-41594-7.
Cited on page(s): 140, 143
[57] Bakhadyr Khoussainov and Anil Nerode. Automata Theory and
its Applications. Progress in Computer Science and Applied Logic
(PCS). Birkhaˇuser Boston, 1st edition, June 2001. ISBN 978-
0817642075.
Cited on page(s): 22
[58] David Kinny, Michael P. Georgeff, and Anand S. Rao. A method-
ology and modelling technique for systems of BDI agents. In Pro-
ceedings of MAAMAW 1996, pages 56–71, 1996.
Cited on page(s): 140, 142
[59] Christos Kloukinas, George Lekeas, and Kostas Stathis. From
agent game protocols to implementable roles. In EUMAS 08, Sixth
European Workshop on Multi-Agent Systems, Bath, UK, pages 1–
15, December 2008.
Cited on page(s): 14
[60] R. Kowalski and M. Sergot. A logic-based calculus of events. New
Generation Computing, 4(1):67–95, 1986.
Cited on page(s): 45, 47
[61] Robert Kowalski and Fariba Sadri. The situation calculus and
event calculus compared. In Proceedings of the 1994 Interna-
tional Symposium on Logic programming, ILPS ’94, pages 539–
553. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 1994. ISBN 0-262-
52191-1. URL http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?
id=200616.200660.
Cited on page(s): 46
[62] Robert A. Kowalski and Fariba Sadri. Reconciling the event cal-
culus with the situation calculus. Journal of Logic Programming,
31(1–3):39–58, April – June 1997.
Cited on page(s): 46
[63] Peep Ku¨ngas and Mihhail Matskin. Web services roadmap: The
semantic web perspective. In AICT/ICIW, page 130. IEEE Com-
puter Society, 2006. ISBN 0-7695-2522-9.
Cited on page(s): 2
[64] Mark V. Lawson. Finite automata. In Dimitrios Hristu-Varsakelis
and William S. Levine, editors, Handbook of Networked and Em-
168
bedded Control Systems, pages 117–144. Birkha¨user, 1st edition,
2005. ISBN 0-8176-3239-5.
Cited on page(s): 22
[65] George Lekeas and Kostas Stathis. An agent development frame-
work based on social positions. In SMC (6), pages 5461–5466.
IEEE, 2004. ISBN 0-7803-8566-7.
Cited on page(s): 14
[66] George K. Lekeas and Kostas Stathis. Agents acquiring re-
sources through social positions: An activity-based approach. In
O. de Bruijn and K. Stathis, editors, Proceedings of the 1st Inter-
national Workshop on Socio-Cognitive Grids. Santorini, Greece,
June 2003.
Cited on page(s): 4, 14
[67] Hector J. Levesque, Fiora Pirri, and Raymond Reiter. Foundations
for the situation calculus. Electron. Trans. Artif. Intell, 2:159–178,
1998.
Cited on page(s): 35
[68] Nathaniel Love, Timothy Hinrichs, David Haley, Eric Schkufza,
and Michael Genesereth. General game playing: Game description
language specification. Technical Report March 4 2008, Stanford
University, 2008.
Cited on page(s): 23
[69] Emil Constantin Lupu. A Role-Based Framework For Distributed
Systems Management. PhD thesis, Department of Computing, Im-
perial College of Technology, Science and Medicine, United King-
dom, 2000.
Cited on page(s): 140
[70] N.A˜. Lynch and M.R˜. Tuttle. Hierarchical correctness proofs
for distributed algorithms. Technical Report MIT/LCS/TR-387,
MIT, 1987.
Cited on page(s): 115
[71] Ashok U. Mallya and Munindar P. Singh. An algebra for commit-
ment protocols. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 14
(2):143–163, 2007.
Cited on page(s): 110
169
[72] J. McCarthy and P. J. Hayes. Some philosophical problems from
the standpoint of artificial intelligence. pages 26–45, 1987. ISBN
0-934613-45-1.
Cited on page(s): 35, 38, 40
[73] R. Milner. A Calculus of Communicating Systems. Springer-Verlag
New York, Inc., Secaucus, NJ, USA, 1982. ISBN 0387102353.
Cited on page(s): 63, 64
[74] R. Milner. Communication and concurrency. Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA, 1989. ISBN 0-13-115007-3.
Cited on page(s): 63
[75] Laurent Mounier. Verification Methods For Behavioral Specifica-
tions. PhD thesis, L’ Universite` Joseph Fourier - Grenoble I, 1992.
Cited on page(s): 63
[76] T. Murata. Petri nets: Properties, analysis and applications. Pro-
ceedings of the IEEE, 77(4):541–580, April 1989. ISSN 0018-9219.
Cited on page(s): 133
[77] Paul Muschamp. An introduction to web services. BT Technology
Journal, 22(1):9–18, January 2006.
Cited on page(s): 2, 8
[78] Hyacinth S. Nwana. Software agents: An overview. Knowledge
Engineering Review, 11(3):205–244, 1996.
Cited on page(s): 2, 16
[79] James Odell, H. Van, Dyke Parunak, and Bernhard Bauer. Ex-
tending UML for agents. In Gerd Wagner, Yves Lesperance, and
Eric Yu, editors, Proc. of the Agent-Oriented Information Sys-
tems Workshop at the 17th National conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence, pages 3–17. AOIS Workshop at AAAI 2000, Austin, TX,
August 2000.
Cited on page(s): 3, 4
[80] Andrea Omicini. From objects to agent societies: Abstractions and
methodologies for the engineering of open distributed systems. In
Antonio Corradi, Andrea Omicini, and Agostino Poggi, editors,
WOA 2000: Dagli Oggetti agli Agenti. 1st AI*IA/TABOO Joint
Workshop ”From Objects to Agents”: Evolutive Trends of Software
Systems, 29-30 May 2000, Parma, Italy, pages 29–34. Pitagora
170
Editrice Bologna, 2000. ISBN 88-371-1195-9.
Cited on page(s): 140, 144
[81] Andrea Omicini. SODA: Societies and infrastructures in the anal-
ysis and design of agent-based systems. In Paolo Ciancarini and
Michael Wooldridge, editors, AOSE, volume 1957 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 185–193. Springer, 2000. ISBN 3-540-
41594-7.
Cited on page(s): 140, 144
[82] Andrea Omicini, Paolo Petta, and Robert Tolksdorf, editors. En-
gineering Societies in the Agents World II, Second International
Workshop, ESAW 2001, Prague, Czech Republic, July 7, 2001,
Revised Papers, volume 2203 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence. Springer, 2001. ISBN 3-540-43091-1.
Cited on page(s): 2, 17
[83] Lin Padgham and Michael Winikoff. Prometheus: a methodology
for developing intelligent agents. In AOSE’02: Proceedings of the
3rd international conference on Agent-oriented software engineer-
ing III, pages 174–185. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2003.
ISBN 3-540-00713-X.
Cited on page(s): 140, 141, 144
[84] David Park. Concurrency and automata on infinite sequences. In
Peter Deussen, editor, Theoretical Computer Science, volume 104
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 167–183. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, 1981. 10.1007/BFb0017309.
Cited on page(s): 63
[85] Simon Parsons. Knowledge in action: Logical foundations for
specifying and implementing dynamical systems by raymond re-
iter, mit press, 0-262-18218-1, 448 pp. Knowledge Eng. Review,
20(4):431–432, 2005. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S0269888906210749.
Cited on page(s): 35
[86] Javier Pinto and Raymond Reiter. Reasoning about time in the sit-
uation calculus. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell, 14(2-4):251–268, 1995.
Cited on page(s): 46
[87] Javier A. Pinto. Temporal Reasoning in the Situation Calculus.
Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Computer Science, University
171
of Toronto, Toronto, 1994.
Cited on page(s): 46
[88] Jeremy Pitt, Lloyd Kamara, and Alexander Artikis. Interaction
patterns and observable commitments in a multi-agent trading sce-
nario. In AGENTS ’01: Proceedings of the fifth international con-
ference on Autonomous agents, pages 481–488. ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 2001. ISBN 1-58113-326-X.
Cited on page(s): 3
[89] Jeremy Pitt and Abe Mamdani. A protocol-based semantics for an
agent communication language. In IJCAI ’99: Proceedings of the
Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
pages 486–491. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco,
CA, USA, 1999. ISBN 1-55860-613-0.
Cited on page(s): 23
[90] Jeremy Pitt, Abe Mamdani, and Patricia Charlton. The open
agent society and its enemies: a position statement and research
programme. Telematics and Informatics, 18(1):67–87, 2001.
Cited on page(s): 2, 17
[91] Alferes Renwei, R. Li, and Moniz Pereira. Concurrent actions and
changes in the situation calculus. In Hector Geffner, editor, Proc.
of IBERAMIA 94, pages 93–104. McGraw-Hill, March 25 1994.
Cited on page(s): 46
[92] Davide Sangiorgi. On the origins of bisimulation and coinduc-
tion. ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst., 31:15:1–15:41, May
2009. ISSN 0164-0925. URL http://doi.acm.org/10.
1145/1516507.1516510.
Cited on page(s): 63
[93] Bastin Tony Roy Savarimuthu, Martin K. Purvis, Marcos De
Oliveira, and Maryam Purvis. Towards secure interaction in agent
societies. In PST, pages 143–148, 2004.
Cited on page(s): 17
[94] Christoph Schroth and Till Janner. Web 2.0 and SOA: Converging
concepts enabling the internet of services. IT Professional, 9(3):
36–41, 2007.
Cited on page(s): 2
172
[95] Murray Shanahan. Event calculus planning revisited. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, 1348:390–402, 1997. ISSN 0302-9743.
Cited on page(s): 45
[96] Murray Shanahan. Solving the frame problem - a mathematical
investigation of the common sense law of inertia. Artificial Intel-
ligence. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 1997. ISBN
978-0-262-19384-9. I-XXXIV, 1-407 pp.
Cited on page(s): 45
[97] Murray Shanahan. The event calculus explained. In Artificial
Intelligence Today, pages 409–430. 1999.
Cited on page(s): 45, 47
[98] Murray Shanahan. The ramification problem in the event calcu-
lus. In Dean Thomas, editor, Proceedings of the 16th International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-99-Vol1), pages
140–146. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, S.F., July 31 – August 6
1999.
Cited on page(s): 45
[99] Christophe Sibertin-Blanc and Nabil Hameurlain. Participation
components for holding roles in multiagent systems protocols. In
Marie Pierre Gleizes, Andrea Omicini, and Franco Zambonelli, ed-
itors, ESAW, volume 3451 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 60–73. Springer, 2004. ISBN 3-540-27330-1.
Cited on page(s): 132, 134
[100] Nikolaos Skarmeas. A framework for multi-agent modelling and
office automation. In Leon Sterling, editor, Proceedings of the
Second International Conference on Applications of Prolog, pages
517–526, April 1994.
Cited on page(s): 140, 142, 156
[101] Nikolaos Skarmeas. Organizations through roles and agents. In
International Workshop on the Design of Cooperative Systems
(COOP’95), Antibes-France, pages 185–194, November 1995.
Cited on page(s): 140, 142
[102] Kostas Stathis. Game–based development of interactive systems.
PhD thesis, Department of Computing, Imperial College London,
November 1996.
Cited on page(s): 38, 148, 151
173
[103] Kostas Stathis. Towards a game-based architecture for develop-
ing complex interactive components in computational logic. In
A. Brogi and P. Hill, editors, Proceedings of the First International
Workshop on Component-based Software Development in Compu-
tational Logic (COCL98). Pisa, Italy, September 19, 1998.
Cited on page(s): 24, 35
[104] Kostas Stathis. A game-based architecture for developing inter-
active components in computational logic. Journal of Functional
and Logic Programming, 2000(5):1–27, 2000.
Cited on page(s): 2, 9, 24, 35, 49, 139, 155
[105] Kostas Stathis, George Lekeas, and Christos Kloukinas. Compe-
tence checking for the global E-service society using games. In
Gregory M. P. O’Hare, Alessandro Ricci, Michael J. O’Grady, and
Oguz Dikenelli, editors, ESAW, volume 4457 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 384–400. Springer, 2006. ISBN 978-3-
540-75522-7.
Cited on page(s): 14, 31, 38, 121
[106] Kostas Stathis and Marek J. Sergot. Games as a metaphor for
interactive systems. In Martina Angela Sasse, Jim Cunningham,
and Russel L. Winder, editors, BCS HCI, pages 19–33. Springer,
1996. ISBN 3-540-76069-5.
Cited on page(s): 23, 24, 35
[107] Andrew S. Tanenbaum. Distributed Systems: Principles and
Paradigms. Prentice Hall PTR, Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA,
2nd edition, October 2006. ISBN 0132392275.
Cited on page(s): 2
[108] XSB Team. Xsb prolog project on sourceforge. Online. URL
http://xsb.sourceforge.net/. visited 21 May 2010.
Cited on page(s): 158
[109] Francesca Toni and Kostas Stathis. Access-as-you-need: A com-
putational logic framework for accessing resources in artificial so-
cieties. In Paolo Petta, Robert Tolksdorf, and Franco Zambonelli,
editors, ESAW, volume 2577 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 126–140. Springer, 2002. ISBN 3-540-14009-3.
Cited on page(s): 1, 3
[110] Kristof Van Belleghem, Marc Denecker, and Danny De Schreye.
Combining situation calculus and event calculus. In ICLP, pages
174
83–97, 1995.
Cited on page(s): 46
[111] Robert Jan (Rob) van Glabbeek and W. Peter Weijland. Branch-
ing time and abstraction in bisimulation semantics. Journal of the
ACM (JACM), 43(3):555–600, 1996.
Cited on page(s): 64, 65, 66, 119
[112] Mahadevan Venkatraman and Munindar P. Singh. Verifying com-
pliance with commitment protocols. Autonomous Agents and
Multi-Agent Systems, 2(3):217–236, 1999.
Cited on page(s): 112, 113
[113] D. Vergamini. Verification by means of observational equivalence
on automata. Report 501, Institut National de Recherche en In-
formatique et en Automatique (INRIA), Sophia-Antipolis, France,
Valbonne Cedex, March 1986.
Cited on page(s): 63
[114] D. S. Warren. Memoing for logic programs. Communications of
the ACM, 35(3):93–111, 1992.
Cited on page(s): 158
[115] Marc Weiser. The world is not a desktop. ACM Interactions, 1
(1):7–8, November 1994. ISSN 1072-5520.
Cited on page(s): 1
[116] Mark Weiser. The computer for the 21st century. SIGMOBILE
Mob. Comput. Commun. Rev., 3(3):3–11, 1999. ISSN 1559-1662.
URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/329124.329126.
Cited on page(s): 1
[117] Mark F. Wood. Multiagent systems engineering: A methodol-
ogy for analysis and design of multiagent systems. MSc Thesis,
AFIT/GCS/ENG/00M-26, 2000.
Cited on page(s): 140, 142
[118] Mark F. Wood and Scott A. DeLoach. An overview of the multi-
agent systems engineering methodology. In Paolo Ciancarini and
Michael Wooldridge, editors, AOSE, volume 1957 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 207–222. Springer, 2000. ISBN 3-540-
41594-7.
Cited on page(s): 140, 142
175
[119] Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R. Jennings, and David Kinny. The
gaia methodology for agent-oriented analysis and design. Au-
tonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 3:285–312, 2000. ISSN
1387-2532.
Cited on page(s): 140, 142
[120] Q. Yan, L.J. Shan, and X.J. Mao. Romas: A role-based modelling
method for multi-agent system. In Jian Ping Li, Jing Zhao, Jim-
ing Liu, Ning Zhong, and John Yen, editors, Proceedings of the
2nd International Conference on Active Media Technology (World
Scientific Publishing), pages 156–161. Chongqing, PR China, May
29–31, 2003.
Cited on page(s): 140, 143
[121] Qi Yan, XinJun Mao, and ZhiChang Qi. Modelling distributed
agent systems with RoMAS. Sozionik aktuell, 4(3):46–55, Septem-
ber 2003. ISSN 1617-2477.
Cited on page(s): 140, 143
[122] Franco Zambonelli, Nicholas R. Jennings, and Michael
Wooldridge. Developing multiagent systems: The Gaia
methodology. ACM Transactions on Software Engineering
and Methodology, 12(3):317–370, July 2003. ISSN 1049-331X.
Cited on page(s): 140, 142
176
Appendix A
Prolog Code for the Situation
Calculus Representation
1 :- use_module(library(lists)).
2 :- use_module(library(system)).
3
4 % Frame axioms
5 holds(sit(Name,Id,[]),F):-
6 initially(F,sit(Name,Id,[])).
7 holds(sit(Name,Id,[Move|Moves]),F):-
8 effect(F,Move,sit(Name,Id,Moves)).
9 holds(sit(Name,Id,[Move|Moves]),F):-
10 holds(sit(Name,Id,Moves),F),
11 \+ abnormal(F,Move,sit(Name,Id,Moves)).
12
13
14 % What holds initially at s0
15 initially(role_of(kostas,initiator),sit(query,s0,[])).
16 initially(role_of(george,client),sit(query,s0,[])).
17
18 % Available Moves
19 available(sit(query,_,_),select(_,query,_)).
20 available(sit(query,_,_),select(_,inform,_)).
21 available(sit(query,_,_),select(_,failure,_)).
22 available(sit(query,_,_),select(_,refuse,_)).
23 available(sit(query,_,_),select(_,notunderstood,_)).
24
25 %Effect axioms
26 effects(sit(Name,Id,Ms),M,sit(Name,Id,[M|Ms])).
27
28 effect(last_move(M), M, sit(query,_,_)).
29
30 % Abnormality conditions in various situations
31 abnormal(last_move(M_old), M_new, sit(_, _, _)).
32
33 % What players can do
34 can(sit(query, _, _), select(john,query,_)).
35 can(sit(query, _, _), select(paul,inform,_)).
36 can(sit(query, _, _), select(paul,failure,_)).
37 can(sit(query, _, _), select(paul,refuse,_)).
38 can(sit(query, _, _), select(paul,notunderstood,_)).
39
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40 % run it as game(sit(query,s0,[]),R).
41 game(Sit, Result):-
42 terminating(Sit, Result).
43 game(Sit, Result):-
44 \+ terminating(Sit, _),
45 valid(Sit,Move),
46 effects(Sit,Move,NewSit),
47 game(NewSit, Result).
48
49 % terminating conditions
50 terminating(Sit, Sit):-
51 holds(Sit,last_move(select(_,X,_))),
52 member(X, [inform,failure,refuse,notunderstood]).
53
54 valid(Game, Move):-
55 available(Game, Move),
56 legal(Game, Move),
57 can(Game, Move).
58
59 legal(sit(query,Id,N), select(P1, query,_)):-
60 holds(sit(query,Id,N),role_of(P1,initiator)),
61 \+ holds(sit(query,Id,N),last_move(_)).
62 legal(sit(query,Id,N), select(P1,inform,_)):-
63 holds(sit(query,Id,N),role_of(P1,client)),
64 holds(sit(query,Id,N),last_move(select(_,query,_))).
65 legal(sit(query,Id,N), select(P1, failure,_)):-
66 holds(sit(query,Id,N),role_of(P1,client)),
67 holds(sit(query,Id,N),last_move(select(_,query,_))).
68 legal(sit(query,Id,N), select(P1,refuse,_)):-
69 holds(sit(query,Id,N),role_of(P1,client)),
70 holds(sit(query,Id,N),last_move(select(_,query,_))).
71 legal(sit(query,Id,N), select(P1,notunderstood,_)):-
72 holds(sit(query,Id,N),role_of(P1,client)),
73 holds(sit(query,Id,N),last_move(select(_,query,_))).
Listing A.1: Situation Calculus Prolog Program
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Appendix B
Prolog Code for the Event
Calculus Representation
1 :- use_module(library(lists)).
2 :- use_module(library(system)).
3
4 holds(sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn), P):-
5 0 =< Tn,
6 initially(sit(N,Id,Ti,Ni), P),
7 \+ clipped(P, sit(N,Id,Ti,Ni), sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn)).
8 holds(sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn), P):-
9 happens(E, Ti, Ni, Nn),
10 Ti < Tn,
11 initiates(E, P, sit(N,Id,Ti,Ni)),
12 \+ clipped(P, sit(N,Id,Ti,Ni), sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn)).
13
14 clipped(P, sit(N,Id,Ti,_), sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn)):-
15 happens(Estar, Tj, Nj, Nn),
16 Ti < Tj,
17 Tj < Tn,
18 terminates(Estar, P, sit(N,Id,Tj,Nj)).
19
20 happens(at(En,Tn), Tn, [at(En,Tn)|Sn], [at(En, Tn)|Sn]).
21 happens(at(Ei,Ti), Ti, [at(Ei,Ti)|Si], [at(_, _)|Sn]):-
22 happens(at(Ei, Ti), Ti, [at(Ei,Ti)|Si], Sn).
23 happens(E, Tn, [at(En, Tn)|Sn], [at(En, Tn)|Sn]):-
24 member(E, En).
25 happens(E, Ti, [at(Ei,Ti)|Si], [at(_, _)|Sn]):-
26 happens(E, Ti, [at(Ei,Ti)|Si], Sn).
27
28 effects(sit(Name, Id, T, N),at(Es,T),sit(Name,Id,NewT,[at(Es,T)|N])):-
29 T >= 0,
30 NewT is T + 1.
31
32 % run it as game(sit(auc,s0,0,[]),R).
33 game(Sit, Result):-
34 terminating(Sit, Result).
35 game(Sit, Result):-
36 \+ terminating(Sit, _),
37 Sit = sit(_,_,_,Nar),
38 writelist([->, Nar],nl),
39 assume(valid(Sit, Move), Sit, Move, Episode),
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40 effects(Sit, Episode, NewSit),
41 game(NewSit, Result).
42
43 assume(Valid, sit(N,Id,T,Ns), E, at(Es,T)):-
44 findall(E, Valid, All),
45 sublist(Es, All),
46 acceptable(sit(N,Id,T,Ns), Es).
47
48 acceptable(Sit, Es):-
49 \+ cyclic(Sit, Es).
50
51 cyclic(sit(_,_,T,Ns), Es):-
52 member(select(P,bid,_), Es),
53 happens(select(_,cfp,_), Ti, _, Ns),
54 Ti =< T,
55 happens(select(P,bid,_), Tj, _, Ns),
56 happens(select(P,bid,_), Tk, _, Ns),
57 Tj < Ti,
58 Tk < Ti,
59 \+ Tj = Tk.
60
61 valid(sit(N,Id,T,Es), M):-
62 available(sit(N,Id,T,Es), M),
63 legal(sit(N,Id,T,Es), M),
64 can(sit(N,Id,T,Es), M).
65
66 incompatible(select(P, bid,_), C):-
67 member(select(P, nobid,_), C).
68 incompatible(select(P, nobid,_), C):-
69 member(select(P, bid,_), C).
70
71 initially(sit(auc,s0,0,[]), role_of(john, auctioneer)).
72 initially(sit(auc,s0,0,[]), role_of(paul, bidder)).
73 initially(sit(auc,s0,0,[]), role_of(chris, bidder)).
74
75 terminating(sit(auc,Id,T,N), sit(auc, Id, T, N)):-
76 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N), last_moves([select(_,X,_)])),
77 member(X, [adjudicate,withdraw]).
78
79 initiates(at(Es, T), last_moves(Es), sit(auc,_,T,_)).
80 terminates(at(_, T), last_moves(_), sit(auc,_,T,_)).
81
82 available(sit(auc,_,_,_),select(_,start,_)).
83 available(sit(auc,_,_,_),select(_,cfp,_)).
84 available(sit(auc,_,_,_),select(_,bid,_)).
85 available(sit(auc,_,_,_),select(_,adjudicate,_)).
86 available(sit(auc,_,_,_),select(_,withdraw,_)).
87
88 legal(sit(auc,Id,T,N), select(P1, start,_)):-
89 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,auctioneer)),
90 \+ holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),last_moves(_)).
91 legal(sit(auc,Id,T,N), select(P1,cfp,_)):-
92 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,auctioneer)),
93 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P1,start,_)])).
94 legal(sit(auc,Id,T,N), select(P1,cfp,_)):-
95 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,auctioneer)),
96 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),last_moves(Es)),
97 once(member(select(P,bid,_), Es)),
98 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),role_of(P,bidder)).
99
100
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101 legal(sit(auc,Id,T,N), select(P1, bid,_)):-
102 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,bidder)),
103 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,cfp,_)])),
104 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),role_of(P2,auctioneer)).
105 legal(sit(auc,Id,T,N), select(P1,withdraw,_)):-
106 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,auctioneer)),
107 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),last_moves([])),
108 (
109 \+ happens(select(Pi,bid,_), Ti, Ni, N)
110 ;
111 (once(happens(select(Pi,bid,_), Ti, Ni, N)),
112 happens(select(Pj,bid,_), Ti, Ni, N),
113 \+ Pi=Pj
114 )
115 ).
116 legal(sit(auc,Id,T,N), select(P1,adjudicate,_)):-
117 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,auctioneer)),
118 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),last_moves([])),
119 once(happens(select(Pi,bid,_), Ti, Ni, N)),
120 forall(
121 (holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),role_of(Pj,bidder)), \+ (Pj = Pi))
,
122 \+ happens(select(Pj,bid,_), Ti, Ni, N)
123 ).
124 legal(sit(auc,Id,T,N), select(P1,adjudicate,_)):-
125 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,auctioneer)),
126 holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),last_moves([])),
127 once(happens(select(Pi,bid,_), Ti, Ni, N)),
128 forall(
129 (holds(sit(auc,Id,T,N),role_of(Pj,bidder)), \+ (Pj = Pi))
,
130 \+ happens(select(Pj,bid,_), Ti, Ni, N)
131 ).
132
133 can(sit(auc, _, _, _), select(john,start,_)).
134 can(sit(auc, _, _, _), select(john,cfp,_)).
135 can(sit(auc, _, _, _), select(john,adjudicate,_)).
136 can(sit(auc, _, _, _), select(john,withdraw,_)).
137 can(sit(auc, _, _, _), select(paul,bid,_)).
138 can(sit(auc, _, _, _), select(chris,bid,_)).
139
140 forall(G1, G2):-
141 \+ (call(G1),
142 \+ call(G2)).
143
144 combinations(List, [H|T]):-
145 append([H|T], _, List).
146 combinations(_, []).
147
148 writelist([],nl):-nl,!.
149
150 writelist([],sl):-!.
151
152 writelist([H|B],L):-
153 write(H),
154 write(’ ’),
155 !,
156 writelist(B,L).
157
158 sublist([H | T], [H | U]):-
159 initialsublist(T, U).
181
160 initialsublist([], L).
161 initialsublist([H | T], [H | U]):-
162 initialsublist(T, U).
Listing B.1: Prolog Program for Event Calculus Representation
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Appendix C
Prolog Code for Bisimulation
1 :- use_module(library(lists)).
2 :- use_module(library(system)).
3 :- set_prolog_flag(double_quotes,string).
4 % allow the redefinition of the role_def predicate.
5 :- dynamic role_def/3.
6 % load the file with the protocol information.
7 :-consult(’protocolfile.pl’).
8
9 % run it as protocol_to_roles(auction,[], Z).
10 protocol_to_roles(Name, BisimulatedList, FinalProtocol):-
11 protocol(Name,Roles,States,_,_,_,_,_,OriginalProtocol),
12 create_aut(Roles, Name,OriginalProtocol, States),
13 shell("./runbisimulation"),
14 process_roles(Roles, Name, OriginalProtocol, NewProtocol,BisimulatedList),
15 protocol_to_roles_internal(Roles,NewProtocol,NewBisimulatedList,FinalProtocol,
16 States,Name),
17 count(FinalProtocol, Y),
18 max_list(States, MaxV),
19 MaximumValue is MaxV + 1,
20 append([des(0, Y, MaximumValue)], FinalProtocol, LastProtocol),
21 write_list_to_file(protocol, LastProtocol),
22 !.
23
24 protocol_to_roles_internal(Roles, FinalProtocol, RoleList,FinalProtocol,_,_):-
25 \+ RoleList = [],
26 !.
27 protocol_to_roles_internal(Roles,InitialProtocol,BisimulatedRoleList,FinalProtocol,
28 States,Name):-
29 shell("./cleanup"),
30 create_aut(Roles, Name, InitialProtocol, States),
31 shell("./runbisimulation"),
32 process_roles(Roles, Name, InitialProtocol, NewProtocol, UpdatedList),
33 \+ BisimulatedRoleList = [],
34 \+ BisimulatedRoleList = UpdatedList,
35 protocol_to_roles_internal(Roles,NewProtocol,UpdatedList,NewUpdatedList,FinalProtocol,
36 States,Name).
37
38 process_roles([], _, EndProtocol, EndProtocol, NewList).
39 process_roles([RoleOne|RoleRest],Name,Protocol,NewProtocol,EndBisimRoleList):-
40 process_role(Name,Protocol,RoleOne,NewRoleOneList,NewWholeProtocol),
41 append(NewRoleOneList,[],BisimListOne),
42 !,
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43 process_roles(RoleRest,Name,NewWholeProtocol,NewProtocol,NewListRest),
44 append(BisimListOne,NewListRest,EndBisimRoleList).
45
46 process_role(ProtocolName, ProtocolTransitions,Role,NewRoleList,NewProtocol):-
47 atom_concat(’bb’,Role,NewRole),
48 read_content_file(NewRole,RoleTransitionList),
49 process_role_transitions(ProtocolTransitions,Role,RoleTransitionList,NewRoleList,
50 NewProtocol).
51
52 process_role_transitions(Final, _, [], _, Final):-!.
53 process_role_transitions(Protocol,Role,[RoleTransitionListOne|RoleTransitionListRest],
54 NewRoleProtocol,FinalProtocol):-
55 process_role_transitions_one(Protocol,Role,RoleTransitionListOne,NewRoleProtocolOne,
56 InterimProtocol),
57 process_role_transitions(InterimProtocol,Role,RoleTransitionListRest,NewRoleProtocolRest,
58 FinalProtocol),
59 append(NewRoleProtocolOne, NewRoleProtocolRest, NewRoleProtocol).
60
61 process_role_transitions_one(Protocol, Role, Transition, [],Protocol):-
62 Transition = des(_,_,_).
63 process_role_transitions_one(Protocol, Role,Transition,Transition],Protocol):-
64 Transition = (InitialState, (Role, Action, Receiver), FinalState).
65 process_role_transitions_one(Protocol,Role,Transition,[Transition],Protocol):-
66 Transition = (InitialState, (Sender, Action, Role), FinalState).
67 process_role_transitions_one(Protocol,Role,Transition,[Transition],Protocol):-
68 Transition = (InitialState, (Sender, Action, Receivers), FinalState),
69 is_list(Receivers),
70 member(Role, Receivers).
71 process_role_transitions_one(Protocol,Role,Transition,NewRoleTransition,NewProtocol):-
72 repair_transition(Protocol, Role, Transition, NewRoleTransition,Protocol).
73
74 backwards_tau_transitions(State, TransitionList, AllStateList):-
75 calculate_incoming_list_transitions(TransitionList,State,IncomingListTransitions),
76 process_incoming_list_transitions([IncomingListTransitionsOne|IncomingListTransitionsNext],
77 AllStateList).
78
79 process_incoming_list_transitions([IncomingListTransitionsOne|IncomingListTransitionsNext],
80 States,RoleTransitionList):-
81 process_incoming_list_transitions_one(IncomingListTransitionsOne,State1,
82 RoleTransitionList),
83 process_incoming_list_transitions(IncomingListTransitionsRest,StatesRest,
84 RoleTransitionList),
85 append(State1, StatesRest, States).
86 process_incoming_list_transitions([], [], []).
87
88 process_incoming_list_transitions_one(TransitionOne,StateOne,TransitionList):-
89 Transition1 = (InitialState, ’tau’, FinalState),
90 backwards_tau_transitions(InitialState, RoleTransitionList,AllStates).
91
92 repair_transition(Protocol, Role, Transition, NewRoleTransition,NewProtocol):-
93 Transition=(InitialState,tau,FinalState),
94 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions(Protocol,InitialState,ListOfTransitions),
95 fix_transitions(Protocol,ListOfTransitions,Role,NewRoleTransition,NewProtocol).
96
97 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions([], _, []).
98 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions([ProtocolOne|ProtocolRest],StateOne,ListOfTransitions):-
99 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions_state_one(ProtocolOne,StateOne,ListOfTransitionsOne),
100 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions(ProtocolRest,StateOne,ListOfTransitionsRest),
101 append(ListOfTransitionsRest, ListOfTransitionsOne, ListOfTransitions).
102
103 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions_state_one([], _, []).
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104 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions_state_one(ProtocolOne,State,[ProtocolOne]):-
105 ProtocolOne = (State, (_, _, _), _).
106 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions_state_one(ProtocolOne,State,[ProtocolOne]):-
107 ProtocolOne = (State, tau, _).
108 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions_state_one(ProtocolOne, State,[]):-
109 ProtocolOne = (X, (_, _, _), _),
110 \+ X = State.
111 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions_state_one(ProtocolOne,State,[]):-
112 ProtocolOne = (X, tau, _),
113 \+ X = State.
114
115 calculate_incoming_list_transitions([], _, []).
116 calculate_incoming_list_transitions([ProtocolOne|ProtocolRest],StateOne,ListOfTransitions):-
117 calculate_incoming_list_transitions_state_one(ProtocolOne,StateOne,ListOfTransitionsOne),
118 calculate_incoming_list_transitions(ProtocolRest,StateOne,ListOfTransitionsRest),
119 append(ListOfTransitionsRest, ListOfTransitionsOne, ListOfTransitions).
120
121 calculate_incoming_list_transitions_state_one([], _, []).
122 calculate_incoming_list_transitions_state_one(ProtocolOne,State,[ProtocolOne]):-
123 ProtocolOne = (_, (_, _, _), State).
124 calculate_incoming_list_transitions_state_one(ProtocolOne,State,[ProtocolOne]):-
125 ProtocolOne = (_, tau, State).
126 calculate_incoming_list_transitions_state_one(_, _, []).
127
128 find_problematic_tau_actions(Role,RoleTransitionList,
129 [ListOfTransitionsOne|ListOfTransitionsRest],
130 ProblematicTransitions):-
131 find_problematic_tau_actions_one(Role,RoleTransitionList,ListOfTransitionsOne,
132 ProblematicTransitionsOne),
133 find_problematic_tau_actions(Role,RoleTransitionsList,ListOfTransitionsRest,
134 ProblematicTransitionsRest),
135 append(ProblematicTransitionsOne,ProblematicTransitionsRest,ProblematicTransitions).
136
137 find_problematic_tau_actions_one(Role,RoleTransitionList,RoleList,Transition,[Transition]):-
138 Transition = (InitialState, ’tau’, FinalState),
139 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions(RoleTransitionList,FinalState,OutGoingTransitionsList),
140 member(Transition1, OutGoingTransitionsList),
141 Transition1 = (FinalState, (Role, Action1, Receiver1), NewFinalState1),
142 Transition2 = (InitialState, (Role, Action2, Receiver2), NewFinalState2),
143 \+ Action1 = Action2.
144 find_problematic_tau_actions_one(Role,RoleTransitionList,RoleList,Transition,[Transition]):-
145 Transition = (InitialState, ’tau’, FinalState),
146 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions(RoleTransitionList,FinalState,OutGoingTransitionsList),
147 member(Transition1, OutGoingTransitionsList),
148 Transition1 = (FinalState, (Role, Action1, Receiver1), NewFinalState1),
149 Transition2 = (InitialState, (Role, Action2, Receiver2), NewFinalState2),
150 \+ Receiver1 = Receiver2.
151 find_problematic_tau_actions_one(Role,RoleTransitionList,RoleList,Transition,[Transition]):-
152 Transition=(InitialState,’tau’,FinalState),
153 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions(RoleTransitionList,FinalState,OutGoingTransitionsList),
154 member(Transition1, OutGoingTransitionsList),
155 Transition1=(FinalState,(Role,Action1,Receiver1),NewFinalState1),
156 member(Transition2, OutGoingTransitionsList),
157 Transition2 = (FinalState, ’tau’, NewFinalState2),
158 Transition3 = (NewFinalState2, (Role, Action2, Receiver2),NewFinalState2),
159 \+ Action1 = Action2,
160 \+ Receiver1 = Receiver2.
161 find_problematic_tau_actions_one(Role,RoleTransitionList,RoleList,Transition,[Transition]):-
162 Transition=(InitialState,’tau’,FinalState),
163 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions(RoleTransitionList,FinalState,OutGoingTransitionsList),
164 member(Transition1, OutGoingTransitionsList),
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165 Transition1=(FinalState,(Role,Action1,Receiver1),NewFinalState1),
166 member(Transition2, OutGoingTransitionsList),
167 Transition2 = (FinalState, ’tau’, NewFinalState2),
168 Transition3 = (NewFinalState2, (Role, Action2, Receiver2),NewFinalState2),
169 \+ Action1 = Action2.
170 find_problematic_tau_actions_one(Role,RoleTransitionList,RoleList,Transition,[Transition]):-
171 Transition=(InitialState,’tau’,FinalState),
172 calculate_outgoing_list_transitions(RoleTransitionList,FinalState,OutGoingTransitionsList),
173 member(Transition1, OutGoingTransitionsList),
174 Transition1=(FinalState,(Role,Action1,Receiver1),NewFinalState1),
175 member(Transition2, OutGoingTransitionsList),
176 Transition2 = (FinalState, ’tau’, NewFinalState2),
177 Transition3 = (NewFinalState2, (Role, Action2, Receiver2),NewFinalState2),
178 \+ Receiver1 = Receiver2.
179
180 repair_transition3(Protocol, Role, Transition,NewRoleTransition,NewProtocol):-
181 Transition = (InitialState, tau,FinalState),
182 equivalent_states(InitialState,ListOfStates,Role),
183 calculate_list_transitions(Protocol,ListOfStates,ListOfTransitions),
184 fix_transitions(Protocol,ListOfTransitions,Role,NewRoleTransition,NewProtocol).
185
186 repair_transition2(Protocol, Role, Transition,NewRoleTransition,NewProtocol):-
187 Transition = (InitialState, tau,FinalState),
188 equivalent_states(InitialState,InitialStateEquivalents,Role),
189 equivalent_states(FinalState,FinalStateEquivalents,Role),
190 calculate_list_transitions2(Protocol,InitialStateEquivalents,FinalStateEquivalents,
191 ListOfTransitions),
192 fix_transitions(Protocol,ListOfTransitions,Role,NewRoleTransitions,NewProtocol).
193
194 equivalent_states(OriginalState, ListOfStates, Role):-
195 atom_concat(’r’,Role,NewResultsFile),
196 read_content_file(NewResultsFile, AllEquivalentStates),
197 find_equivalent_states(OriginalState, AllEquivalentStates, ListOfStates).
198
199 find_equivalent_states(_, [], []).
200 find_equivalent_states(State, [ PairOne | PairRest], FinalList):-
201 find_equivalent_states_one(State, PairOne, FinalListOne),
202 find_equivalent_states(State, PairRest, FinalListTwo),
203 append(FinalListTwo, FinalListOne, FinalList).
204
205 % The results file is in the form (OriginalAut,BisimulatedAut)
206 find_equivalent_states_one(BisimulatedState,(OriginalState,BisimulatedState),
207 [OriginalState]):-
208 !.
209 find_equivalent_states_one(BisimulatedState, (AState, AnotherState), []).
210
211 calculate_list_transitions_one(ProtocolOne, State, [ProtocolOne]):-
212 ProtocolOne = (State, (Sender, Action, Receiver), FinalState),
213 !.
214 calculate_list_transitions_one(ProtocolOne, State, []).
215
216 calculate_list_transitions2([], _,_, []).
217 calculate_list_transitions2([ProtocolOne|ProtocolRest],InitialEquivalentStates,
218 FinalEquivalentStates, ListOfTransitions):-
219 calculate_list_transitions2_protocol_one(ProtocolOne,InitialEquivalentStates,
220 FinalEquivalentStates,ListOfTransitionsOne),
221 calculate_list_transitions2(ProtocolRest,InitialEquivalentStates,FinalEquivalentStates,
222 ListOfTransitionsRest),
223 append(ListOfTransitionsRest, ListOfTransitionsOne, ListOfTransitions).
224
225 calculate_list_transitions2_protocol_one([],_, _, []).
186
226 calculate_list_transitions2_protocol_one([ProtocolOne|ProtocolRest],InitialStateEquivalent,
227 FinalStateEquivalent,ListOfTransitions):-
228 calculate_list_transitions2_one(ProtocolOne,InitialListStates,FinalListStates,
229 TransitionsListOne),
230 calculate_list_transitions2_protocol_one(ProtocolRest,InitialListStates,FinalListStates,
231 NewTransitionList),
232 append(NewTransitionList, TransitionsListOne, ListOfTransitions).
233
234
235 calculate_list_transitions2_one(ProtocolOne,InitialStateList,FinalStateList,[ProtocolOne]):-
236 ProtocolOne = (State, tau, FinalState),
237 member(State, InitialStateList),
238 member(FinalState, FinalStateList),
239 !.
240
241 calculate_list_transitions2_one(ProtocolOne, _, _, []).
242
243 update_transitions(Protocol,[OriginalTransitionOne|OriginalTransitionRest],Role,
244 NewTempRoleProtocol):-
245 update_transitions_one(Protocol, OriginalTransitionOne,Role,TempProtocol),
246 update_transitions(Protocol,OriginalTransitionRest,Role,RestTempProtocol),
247 append(TempProtocol,RestTempProtocol , NewTempRoleProtocol).
248
249
250 fix_transitions(Protocol, [], _, _, Protocol).
251 fix_transitions(Protocol,[OriginalTransition|Rest],Role,NewRoleTransition,FinalProtocol):-
252 fix_transitions_one(Protocol,OriginalTransition,Role,NewRoleTransitionOne,InterimProtocol),
253 fix_transitions(InterimProtocol,Rest,Role,NewRoleTransitionRest,FinalProtocol),
254 append(NewRoleTransitionOne, NewRoleTransitionRest, NewRoleTransition).
255
256 fix_transitions_one(Protocol, (_, (_, _, Role),_), Role, _, Protocol).
257 fix_transitions_one(Protocol, (_, (Role, _, _),_), Role, _, Protocol).
258 fix_transitions_one(Protocol,OriginalTransitionOne,Role,NewTransition,InterimProtocol):-
259 OriginalTransitionOne=(InitialState,(Sender,Action,Receiver),FinalState),
260 is_list(Receiver),
261 \+ member(Role, Receiver),
262 append([Role], Receiver, NewReceiver),
263 sort(NewReceiver,SortedReceiver),
264 append([(InitialState,(Sender,Action,SortedReceiver),FinalState)],[],NewTransition),
265 delete(Protocol,OriginalTransitionOne,IntermediateProtocol),
266 append(IntermediateProtocol, NewTransition, InterimProtocol).
267
268 fix_transitions_one(Protocol, OriginalTransitionOne, Role, [], Protocol):-
269 OriginalTransitionOne =(InitialState,(Sender,Action,Receiver),FinalState),
270 is_list(Receiver),
271 member(Role, Receiver).
272
273 fix_transitions_one(Protocol,OriginalTransitionOne,Role,NewTransition,InterimProtocol):-
274 OriginalTransitionOne=(InitialState,(Sender,Action,Receiver),FinalState),
275 \+ is_list(Receiver),
276 append([Role], [Receiver], NewReceiver),
277 sort(NewReceiver,SortedReceiver),
278 append([(InitialState,(Sender,Action,SortedReceiver),FinalState)],[],NewTransition),
279 delete(Protocol,OriginalTransitionOne,IntermediateProtocol),
280 append(IntermediateProtocol, NewTransition, InterimProtocol).
281
282
283 write_list_to_file(FileName, [ListOne | Rest]):-
284 tell(FileName),
285 write_list_to_file_one(ListOne),
286 write_list_to_file_rest(Rest),
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287 told.
288
289 write_list_to_file_one(Content):-
290 Content = des(_, _, _),
291 write(Content),
292 nl.
293
294 write_list_to_file_one(Content):-
295 Content = (InitialState, (Sender, Message, Receiver), FinalState),
296 write(’(’),
297 write(InitialState),
298 write(’,\"(’),
299 write(Sender),
300 write(’,’),
301 write(Message),
302 write(’,’),
303 write(Receiver),
304 write(’)\",’),
305 write(FinalState),
306 write(’)’),
307 nl.
308
309 write_list_to_file_rest([]).
310
311 write_list_to_file_rest([RestOne | Remaining]):-
312 write_list_to_file_one(RestOne),
313 write_list_to_file_rest(Remaining).
314
315 read_content_file(File, List):-
316 open(File, read, Str),
317 list_of_terms(Str, List).
318
319
320 list_of_terms(Str, []):-
321 at_end_of_stream(Str) .
322 list_of_terms(Str, List):-
323 read_line_to_codes(Str,Codes),
324 string_to_list(String, Codes),
325 string_to_atom(String,Atom),
326 term_to_atom(Term, Atom),
327 list_of_terms(Str, NewList),
328 append([Term], NewList, List),
329 !.
330
331 create_aut([RoleHead | RoleTails], Name, Protocol, States):-
332 create_aut_one(RoleHead, Name, Protocol, States),
333 create_aut(RoleTails, Name, Protocol, States).
334 create_aut([], _, _,_):-!.
335
336 create_aut_one(X, Name, Protocol, States):-
337 pl2aut(Name,X,X, Protocol, States).
338
339 pl2aut(ProtocolName,Role,FileName, Protocol, States):-
340 count(Protocol,X),
341 count(States,Y),
342 tell(FileName),
343 write(’des(0,’),
344 write(X),
345 write(’,’),
346 write(Y),
347 write(’)’),
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348 nl,
349 check_transition(Protocol, Role, FileName),
350 change_filename(FileName).
351
352 change_filename(FileName):-
353 file_name_extension(FileName,aut,X),
354 rename_file(FileName,X).
355
356 check_transition([Head |Tails], Role, FileName):-
357 check_one(Head, Role, FileName),
358 !,
359 check_transition(Tails, Role, FileName).
360 check_transition([],_,_):-
361 told.
362
363 check_one(Transition, Role, FileName):-
364 Transition = (InitialState,Move, EndState),
365 Move = (Sender, _, _),
366 Role = Sender,
367 tell(FileName),
368 write(’(’),
369 write(InitialState),
370 write(’,"(’),
371 write(Move),
372 write(’)"’),
373 write(’,’),
374 write(EndState),
375 write(’)’),
376 nl.
377
378 check_one(Transition, Role, FileName):-
379 Transition = (InitialState,Move, EndState),
380 Move = (_, _, Receiver),
381 Role = Receiver,
382 tell(FileName),
383 write(’(’),
384 write(InitialState),
385 write(’,"(’),
386 write(Move),
387 write(’)"’),
388 write(’,’),
389 write(EndState),
390 write(’)’),
391 nl.
392
393 check_one(Transition, Role, FileName):-
394 Transition = (InitialState,Move, EndState),
395 Move = (_, _, Receiver),
396 member(Role,Receiver),
397 tell(FileName),
398 write(’(’),
399 write(InitialState),
400 write(’,"(’),
401 write(Move),
402 write(’)"’),
403 write(’,’),
404 write(EndState),
405 write(’)’),
406 nl.
407
408 check_one(Transition, Role, FileName):-
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409 Transition = (State1,_, State2),
410 tell(FileName),
411 NewTransition = (State1,’tau’,State2),
412 write(’(’),
413 write(State1),
414 write(’,"tau",’),
415 write(State2),
416 write(’)’),
417 nl.
418
419 count(List,N):-
420 length(List,N).
421
422 writelist([],nl):-nl,!.
423 writelist([],sl):-!.
424 writelist([H|B],L):-
425 write(H),
426 write(’ ’),
427 !,
428 writelist(B,L).
429
430 runaut(Name):-
431 protocol(Name,Roles,States,_,_,_,_,_,Protocol),
432 create_aut(Roles, Name, Protocol, States).
Listing C.1: Prolog Code For Bisimulation
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Appendix D
Event Calculus
Implementation for the Mail
Order Protocol
1 holds(sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn), P):-
2 0 =< Tn,
3 initially(sit(N,Id,Ti,Ni), P),
4 \+ clipped(P, sit(N,Id,Ti,Ni), sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn)).
5 holds(sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn), P):-
6 happens(E, Ti, Ni, Nn),
7 Ti < Tn,
8 initiates(E, P, sit(N,Id,Ti,Ni)),
9 \+ clipped(P, sit(N,Id,Ti,Ni), sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn)).
10
11 clipped(P, sit(N,Id,Ti,_), sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn)):-
12 happens(Estar, Tj, Nj, Nn),
13 Ti < Tj,
14 Tj < Tn,
15 terminates(Estar, P, sit(N,Id,Tj,Nj)).
16
17 happens(at(En,Tn), Tn, [at(En,Tn)|Sn], [at(En, Tn)|Sn]).
18 happens(at(Ei,Ti), Ti, [at(Ei,Ti)|Si], [at(_, _)|Sn]):-
19 happens(at(Ei, Ti), Ti, [at(Ei,Ti)|Si], Sn).
20 happens(E, Tn, [at(En, Tn)|Sn], [at(En, Tn)|Sn]):-
21 member(E, En).
22 happens(E, Ti, [at(Ei,Ti)|Si], [at(_, _)|Sn]):-
23 happens(E, Ti, [at(Ei,Ti)|Si], Sn).
24
25 effects(sit(Name,Id,T,N),at(Es,T),sit(Name,Id,NewT,[at(Es,T)|N])):-
26 T >= 0,
27 NewT is T + 1.
28
29 game(Sit, Result):-
30 terminating(Sit, Result).
31 game(Sit, Result):-
32 \+ terminating(Sit, _),
33 Sit = sit(_,_,_,Nar),
34 assume(valid(Sit, Move), Sit, Move, Episode),
35 effects(Sit, Episode, NewSit),
36 game(NewSit, Result).
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37 assume(Valid, sit(N,Id,T,Ns), E, at([Es],T)):-
38 findall(E, Valid, All),
39 sublist2(Es, All),
40 acceptable(sit(N,Id,T,Ns), [Es]).
41
42 acceptable(Sit, Es):-
43 \+ cyclic(Sit, Es).
44
45 cyclic(sit(mail_order, _, T, Ns), Es):-
46 Es=[select(paul,reorder,_)],
47 sublist([at([select(john,order,_)],_),
48 at([select(paul,reorder,_)],_),
49 at([select(john,order,_)],_)],Ns).
50
51 valid(sit(N,Id,T,Es), M):-
52 available(sit(N,Id,T,Es), M),
53 legal(sit(N,Id,T,Es), M),
54 can(sit(N,Id,T,Es), M).
55
56 incompatible(select(P, bid,_), C):-
57 member(select(P, nobid,_), C).
58 incompatible(select(P, nobid,_), C):-
59 member(select(P, bid,_), C).
60
61 initially(sit(mail_order,s0,0,[]), role_of(john, merchant)).
62 initially(sit(mail_order,s0,0,[]), role_of(paul, supplier)).
63
64 terminating(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N), sit(mail_order, Id, T, N)):-
65 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N), last_moves([select(P,X,_)])),
66 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N), role_of(P,supplier)),
67 member(X, [notify,refuse]).
68 terminating(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N), sit(mail_order, Id, T, N)):-
69 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N), last_moves([select(P,X,_)])),
70 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N), role_of(P,merchant)),
71 member(X, [withdraw]).
72
73 initiates(at(Es, T), last_moves(Es), sit(mail_order,_,T,_)).
74 terminates(at(_, T), last_moves(_), sit(mail_order,_,T,_)).
75
76 available(sit(mail_order,_,_,_),select(_,order,_)).
77 available(sit(mail_order,_,_,_),select(_,reorder,_)).
78 available(sit(mail_order,_,_,_),select(_,refuse,_)).
79 available(sit(mail_order,_,_,_),select(_,confirm,_)).
80 available(sit(mail_order,_,_,_),select(_,withdraw,_)).
81 available(sit(mail_order,_,_,_),select(_,accept,_)).
82 available(sit(mail_order,_,_,_),select(_,notify,_)).
83
84 legal(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N), select(P1, order,_)):-
85 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
86 \+ holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),last_moves(_)).
87 legal(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N), select(P1, order,_)):-
88 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
89 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,reorder,_)])),
90 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P2,supplier)).
91 legal(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N), select(P1,reorder,_)):-
92 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,supplier)),
93 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,order,_)])),
94 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P2,merchant)).
95 legal(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N), select(P1,confirm,_)):-
96 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,supplier)),
97 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,order,_)])),
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98 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P2,merchant)).
99 legal(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N), select(P1, refuse,_)):-
100 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,supplier)),
101 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,order,_)])),
102 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P2,merchant)).
103 legal(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N), select(P1, withdraw,_)):-
104 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
105 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,confirm,_)])),
106 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P2,supplier)).
107 legal(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N), select(P1, accept,_)):-
108 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
109 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,confirm,_)])),
110 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P2,supplier)).
111 legal(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N), select(P1, notify,_)):-
112 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,supplier)),
113 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,accept,_)])),
114 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,T,N),role_of(P2,merchant)).
115
116 can(sit(mail_order, _, _, _), select(john,order,_)).
117 can(sit(mail_order, _, _, _), select(john,withdraw,_)).
118 can(sit(mail_order, _, _, _), select(john,accept,_)).
119 can(sit(mail_order, _, _, _), select(paul,reorder,_)).
120 can(sit(mail_order, _, _, _), select(paul,confirm,_)).
121 can(sit(mail_order, _, _, _), select(paul,refuse,_)).
122 can(sit(mail_order, _, _, _), select(paul,notify,_)).
123
124 writelist([],nl):-nl,!.
125 writelist([],sl):-!.
126 writelist([H|B],L):-
127 write(H),
128 write(’ ’),!,
129 writelist(B,L).
130
131 sublist([H | T], [H | U]):-
132 initialsublist(T, U).
133
134 initialsublist([], _).
135 initialsublist([H | T], [H | U]):-
136 initialsublist(T, U).
137
138 sublist2(X, Y):-
139 member(X,Y).
140 sublist2([],[]).
Listing D.1: Event Calculus Representation for the Order Protocol
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Appendix E
Mail Order Protocol in
Situation Calculus
1 :- use_module(library(lists)).
2 :- use_module(library(system)).
3
4 holds(sit(Name,Id,[]),F):-
5 initially(F,sit(Name,Id,[])).
6 holds(sit(Name,Id,[Move|Moves]),F):-
7 effect(F,Move,sit(Name,Id,Moves)).
8 holds(sit(Name,Id,[Move|Moves]),F):-
9 holds(sit(Name,Id,Moves),F),
10 \+ abnormal(F,Move,sit(Name,Id,Moves)).
11
12 initially(role_of(john,merchant),sit(mail_order,s0,[])).
13 initially(role_of(paul,supplier),sit(mail_order,s0,[])).
14
15 available(sit(mail_order,_,_),select(_,order,_)).
16 available(sit(mail_order,_,_),select(_,confirm,_)).
17 available(sit(mail_order,_,_),select(_,refuse,_)).
18 available(sit(mail_order,_,_),select(_,withdraw,_)).
19 available(sit(mail_order,_,_),select(_,accept,_)).
20 available(sit(mail_order,_,_),select(_,notify,_)).
21
22 effects(sit(Name,Id,Ms),M,sit(Name,Id,[M|Ms])).
23
24 effect(last_move(M), M, sit(mail_order,_,_)).
25
26 abnormal(last_move(M_old), M_new, sit(_, _, _)).
27
28 can(sit(mail_order, _, _), select(john,order,_)).
29 can(sit(mail_order, _, _), select(john,withdraw,_)).
30 can(sit(mail_order, _, _), select(john,accept,_)).
31 can(sit(mail_order, _, _), select(paul,reorder,_)).
32 can(sit(mail_order, _, _), select(paul,confirm,_)).
33 can(sit(mail_order, _, _), select(paul,refuse,_)).
34 can(sit(mail_order, _, _), select(paul,notify,_)).
35
36
37 % run it as game(sit(mail_order,s0,[]),R).
38 game(Sit, Result):-
39 terminating(Sit, Result).
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40 game(Sit, Result):-
41 \+ terminating(Sit, _),
42 valid(Sit,Move),
43 effects(Sit,Move,NewSit),
44 game(NewSit, Result).
45
46 terminating(Sit, Sit):-
47 holds(Sit,last_move(select(_,X,_))),
48 member(X, [refuse,notify,withdraw]).
49
50 valid(Game, Move):-
51 available(Game, Move),
52 legal(Game, Move),
53 can(Game, Move),
54 \+ cyclic(Game, Move).
55
56 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
57 Move = select(paul,reorder,_),
58 sublist([select(john,order,_),select(paul,reorder,_),
59 select(john,order,_)],Moves).
60
61 legal(sit(mail_order,Id,N), select(P1, order,P2)):-
62 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
63 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),role_of(P2,supplier)),
64 \+ holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),last_move(_)).
65 legal(sit(mail_order,Id,N), select(P1,confirm,P2)):-
66 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),role_of(P1,supplier)),
67 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,order,P1))),
68 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),role_of(P2,merchant)).
69 legal(sit(mail_order,Id,N), select(P1, refuse,P2)):-
70 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),role_of(P1,supplier)),
71 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,order,P1))),
72 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),role_of(P2,merchant)).
73 legal(sit(mail_order,Id,N), select(P1, withdraw,P2)):-
74 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
75 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,confirm,P1))),
76 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),role_of(P2,supplier)).
77 legal(sit(mail_order,Id,N), select(P1, accept,P2)):-
78 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
79 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,confirm,P1))),
80 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),role_of(P2,supplier)).
81 legal(sit(mail_order,Id,N), select(P1, notify,P2)):-
82 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),role_of(P1,supplier)),
83 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,accept,P1))),
84 holds(sit(mail_order,Id,N),role_of(P2,merchant)).
85
86 sublist([H | T], [H | U]):-
87 initialsublist(T, U).
88
89 initialsublist([], _).
90 initialsublist([H | T], [H | U]):-
91 initialsublist(T, U).
Listing E.1: Situation Calculus Representation of the Order Protocol
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Appendix F
Prolog code in Situation
Calculus for a protocol with
loops
1 :- use_module(library(lists)).
2 :- use_module(library(system)).
3
4 holds(sit(Name,Id,[]),F):-
5 initially(F,sit(Name,Id,[])).
6 holds(sit(Name,Id,[Move|Moves]),F):-
7 effect(F,Move,sit(Name,Id,Moves)).
8 holds(sit(Name,Id,[Move|Moves]),F):-
9 holds(sit(Name,Id,Moves),F),
10 \+ abnormal(F,Move,sit(Name,Id,Moves)).
11
12 initially(role_of(john,merchant),sit(negotiation,s0,[])).
13 initially(role_of(paul,customer),sit(negotiation,s0,[])).
14
15 available(sit(negotiation,_,_),select(_,request,_)).
16 available(sit(negotiation,_,_),select(_,accept,_)).
17 available(sit(negotiation,_,_),select(_,refuse,_)).
18 available(sit(negotiation,_,_),select(_,challenge,_)).
19 available(sit(negotiation,_,_),select(_,justify,_)).
20 available(sit(negotiation,_,_),select(_,retract,_)).
21 available(sit(negotiation,_,_),select(_,authenticate,_)).
22 available(sit(negotiation,_,_),select(_,certify,_)).
23 available(sit(negotiation,_,_),select(_,notunderstood,_)).
24 available(sit(negotiation,_,_),select(_,inform,_)).
25 available(sit(negotiation,_,_),select(_,reject,_)).
26
27 effects(sit(Name,Id,Ms),M,sit(Name,Id,[M|Ms])).
28
29 effect(last_move(M), M, sit(negotiation,_,_)).
30
31 abnormal(last_move(M_old), M_new, sit(_, _, _)).
32
33 can(sit(negotiation, _, _), select(john,request,_)).
34 can(sit(negotiation, _, _), select(john,justify,_)).
35 can(sit(negotiation, _, _), select(john,retract,_)).
36 can(sit(negotiation, _, _), select(john,authenticate,_)).
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37 can(sit(negotiation, _, _), select(john,notunderstood,_)).
38 can(sit(negotiation, _, _), select(john,reject,_)).
39 can(sit(negotiation, _, _), select(paul,accept,_)).
40 can(sit(negotiation, _, _), select(paul,refuse,_)).
41 can(sit(negotiation, _, _), select(paul,challenge,_)).
42 can(sit(negotiation, _, _), select(paul,certify,_)).
43 can(sit(negotiation, _, _), select(paul,inform,_)).
44 % run it as game(sit(negotiation,s0,[]),R).
45 game(Sit, Result):-
46 terminating(Sit, Result),
47 !.
48 game(Sit, Result):-
49 \+ terminating(Sit, _),
50 valid(Sit,Move),
51 effects(Sit,Move,NewSit),
52 game(NewSit, Result).
53
54 terminating(Sit, Sit):-
55 holds(Sit,last_move(select(_,X,_))),
56 member(X, [refuse,accept,retract,reject]),
57 Sit = sit(_, _, Moves),
58 writelist([->,Moves],nl).
59
60 valid(Game, Move):-
61 available(Game, Move),
62 legal(Game, Move),
63 can(Game, Move),
64 \+ cyclic(Game, Move).
65
66 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
67 Move = select(paul,challenge,john),
68 sublist([select(john,justify,paul),select(paul,challenge,john),
69 select(john,justify,paul),select(paul,challenge,john)],
70 Moves).
71 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
72 Move = select(john,authenticate,paul),
73 sublist([select(paul,challenge,john),select(john,justify,paul),
74 select(paul,challenge,john),select(john,justify,paul)],
75 Moves).
76 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
77 Move = select(paul,challenge,john),
78 sublist([select(john,justify,paul),select(paul,certify,john),
79 select(paul,certify,john)],
80 Moves).
81 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
82 Move = select(paul,challenge,john),
83 sublist([select(john,justify,paul),select(paul,certify,john),
84 select(john,notunderstood,paul),select(paul,certify,john),
85 select(john,authenticate,paul),select(paul,challenge,john),
86 select(john,justify,paul)],
87 Moves).
88 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
89 Move = select(paul,challenge,john),
90 sublist([select(john,justify,paul),select(paul,inform,john),
91 select(john,notunderstood,paul),select(paul,inform,john),
92 select(john,authenticate,paul),select(paul,challenge,john),
93 select(john,justify,paul)],
94 Moves).
95 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
96 Move = select(paul,challenge,john),
97 sublist([select(john,justify,paul),select(paul,inform,john),
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98 select(john,notunderstood,paul),select(paul,certify,john)],
99 Moves).
100 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
101 Move = select(paul,challenge,john),
102 sublist([select(john,justify,paul),select(paul,certify,john),
103 select(john,notunderstood,paul),select(paul,inform,john)],
104 Moves).
105 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
106 Move = select(paul,challenge,john),
107 sublist([select(john,justify,paul),select(paul,certify,john),
108 select(john,notunderstood,paul),select(paul,certify,john),
109 select(john,notunderstood,paul),select(paul,inform,john)],
110 Moves).
111 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
112 Move = select(paul,certify,john),
113 sublist([select(john,notunderstood,paul),select(paul,certify,john),
114 select(john,notunderstood,paul),select(paul,certify,john)],
115 Moves).
116 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
117 Move = select(paul,inform,john),
118 sublist([select(john,notunderstood,paul),select(paul,inform,john),
119 select(john,notunderstood,paul),select(paul,inform,john)],
120 Moves).
121 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
122 Move = select(paul,challenge,john),
123 sublist([select(john,justify,paul),select(paul,inform,john),
124 select(john,authenticate,paul)],Moves).
125 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
126 Move = select(paul,challenge,john),
127 sublist([select(john,justify,paul),select(paul,certify,john),
128 select(john,authenticate,paul)],Moves).
129 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
130 Move = select(paul,certify,john),
131 sublist([select(john,notunderstood,paul),select(paul,inform,john),
132 select(john,notunderstood,paul)],Moves).
133 cyclic(sit(_,_,Moves), Move):-
134 Move = select(paul,inform,john),
135 sublist([select(john,notunderstood,paul),select(paul,inform,john),
136 select(john,notunderstood,paul)],Moves).
137
138 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,N), select(P1, request,P2)):-
139 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
140 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P2,customer)),
141 \+ holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),last_move(_)).
142
143 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,N), select(P1,accept,P2)):-
144 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P1,customer)),
145 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,X,P1))),
146 member(X, [request,justify]),
147 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P2,merchant)).
148 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,N), select(P1,refuse,P2)):-
149 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P1,customer)),
150 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,X,P1))),
151 member(X, [request,justify]),
152 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P2,merchant)).
153 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,N), select(P1, challenge,P2)):-
154 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P1,customer)),
155 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,X,P1))),
156 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P2,merchant)),
157 member(X, [request, justify]).
158 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,N), select(P1, retract,P2)):-
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159 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
160 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,challenge,P1))),
161 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P2,customer)).
162 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,N), select(P1, authenticate,P2)):-
163 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
164 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,challenge,P1))),
165 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P2,customer)).
166 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,N), select(P1, certify,P2)):-
167 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P1,customer)),
168 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,X,P1))),
169 member(X,[authenticate,notunderstood]),
170 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P2,merchant)).
171 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,N), select(P1, inform,P2)):-
172 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P1,customer)),
173 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,X,P1))),
174 member(X,[authenticate,notunderstood]),
175 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P2,merchant)).
176 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,N), select(P1, notunderstood,P2)):-
177 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
178 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,X,P1))),
179 member(X,[inform,certify]),
180 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P2,customer)).
181 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,N), select(P1, reject,P2)):-
182 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
183 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,X,P1))),
184 member(X,[inform,certify]),
185 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P2,customer)).
186 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,N), select(P1, justify,P2)):-
187 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
188 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),last_move(select(P2,X,P1))),
189 member(X,[challenge,inform,certify]),
190 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,N),role_of(P2,customer)).
191
192 sublist([H | T], [H | U]):-
193 initialsublist(T, U).
194 sublist([H | T], [A | U]):-
195 sublist([H | T], U).
196 sublist([], []):-
197 false.
198
199 initialsublist([], _).
200 initialsublist([H | T], [H | U]):-
201 initialsublist(T, U).
202
203 writelist([],nl):-nl,!.
204 writelist([],sl):-!.
205 writelist([H|B],L):-
206 write(H),
207 write(’ ’),!,
208 writelist(B,L).
Listing F.1: Situation Calculus Representation of the Order Protocol
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Appendix G
Prolog Code in Event
Calculus for a protocol with
loops
1 :- use_module(library(lists)).
2 :- use_module(library(system)).
3
4 holds(sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn), P):-
5 0 =< Tn,
6 initially(sit(N,Id,Ti,Ni), P),
7 \+ clipped(P, sit(N,Id,Ti,Ni), sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn)).
8 holds(sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn), P):-
9 happens(E, Ti, Ni, Nn),
10 Ti < Tn,
11 initiates(E, P, sit(N,Id,Ti,Ni)),
12 \+ clipped(P, sit(N,Id,Ti,Ni), sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn)).
13
14 clipped(P, sit(N,Id,Ti,_), sit(N,Id,Tn,Nn)):-
15 happens(Estar, Tj, Nj, Nn),
16 Ti < Tj,
17 Tj < Tn,
18 terminates(Estar, P, sit(N,Id,Tj,Nj)).
19
20 happens(at(En,Tn), Tn, [at(En,Tn)|Sn], [at(En, Tn)|Sn]).
21 happens(at(Ei,Ti), Ti, [at(Ei,Ti)|Si], [at(_, _)|Sn]):-
22 happens(at(Ei, Ti), Ti, [at(Ei,Ti)|Si], Sn).
23 happens(E, Tn, [at(En, Tn)|Sn], [at(En, Tn)|Sn]):-
24 member(E, En).
25 happens(E, Ti, [at(Ei,Ti)|Si], [at(_, _)|Sn]):-
26 happens(E, Ti, [at(Ei,Ti)|Si], Sn).
27
28 effects(sit(Name,Id,T,N),at(Es,T), sit(Name,Id,NewT,[at(Es,T)|N])):-
29 T >= 0,
30 NewT is T + 1.
31
32 game(Sit, Result):-
33 terminating(Sit, Result),
34 !.
35 game(Sit, Result):-
36 \+ terminating(Sit, _),
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37 Sit = sit(_,_,_,Nar),
38 assume(valid(Sit, Move), Sit, Move, Episode),
39 effects(Sit, Episode, NewSit),
40 game(NewSit, Result).
41
42 assume(Valid, sit(N,Id,T,Ns), E, at(Es,T)):-
43 findall(E, Valid, All),
44 member(Es, All),
45 acceptable(sit(N,Id,T,Ns),at(Es,T)).
46
47 acceptable(Sit,at(Es,T)):-
48 \+ cyclic(Sit,at(Es,T)).
49
50 cyclic_pattern([at(select(john,justify,paul),_),
51 at(select(paul,challenge,john),_),
52 at(select(john,justify,paul),_),
53 at(select(paul,challenge,john),_)],
54 select(paul,challenge,john)).
55 cyclic_pattern([at(select(paul,challenge,john),_),
56 at(select(john,justify,paul),_),
57 at(select(paul,challenge,john),_),
58 at(select(john,justify,paul),_)],
59 select(john,authenticate,paul)).
60 cyclic_pattern([at(select(john,justify,paul),_),
61 at(select(paul,certify,john),_),
62 at(select(paul,certify,john),_)],
63 select(paul,challenge,john)).
64 cyclic_pattern([at(select(john,justify,paul),_),
65 at(select(paul,certify,john),_),
66 at(select(john,notunderstood,paul),_),
67 at(select(paul,certify,john),_),
68 at(select(john,authenticate,paul),_),
69 at(select(paul,challenge,john),_),
70 at(select(john,justify,paul),_)],
71 select(paul,challenge,john)).
72 cyclic_pattern([at(select(john,justify,paul),_),
73 at(select(paul,inform,john),_),
74 at(select(john,notunderstood,paul),_),
75 at(select(paul,inform,john),_),
76 at(select(john,authenticate,paul),_),
77 at(select(paul,challenge,john),_),
78 at(select(john,justify,paul),_)],
79 select(paul,challenge,john)).
80 cyclic_pattern([at(select(john,justify,paul),_),
81 at(select(paul,inform,john),_),
82 at(select(john,notunderstood,paul),_),
83 at(select(paul,certify,john),_)],
84 select(paul,challenge,john)).
85 cyclic_pattern([at(select(john,justify,paul),_),
86 at(select(paul,certify,john),_),
87 at(select(john,notunderstood,paul),_),
88 at(select(paul,inform,john),_)],
89 select(paul,challenge,john)).
90 cyclic_pattern([at(select(john,justify,paul),_),
91 at(select(paul,certify,john),_),
92 at(select(john,notunderstood,paul),_),
93 at(select(paul,certify,john),_),
94 at(select(john,notunderstood,paul),_),
95 at(select(paul,inform,john),_)],
96 select(paul,challenge,john)).
97
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98 cyclic_pattern([at(select(john,notunderstood,paul),_),
99 at(select(paul,certify,john),_),
100 at(select(john,notunderstood,paul),_),
101 at(select(paul,certify,john),_)],
102 select(paul,certify,john)).
103 cyclic_pattern([at(select(john,notunderstood,paul),_),
104 at(select(paul,inform,john),_),
105 at(select(john,notunderstood,paul),_),
106 at(select(paul,inform,john),_)],
107 select(paul,inform,john)).
108 cyclic_pattern([at(select(john,justify,paul),_),
109 at(select(paul,inform,john),_),
110 at(select(john,authenticate,paul),_)],
111 select(paul,challenge,john)).
112 cyclic_pattern([at(select(john,justify,paul),_),
113 at(select(paul,certify,john),_),
114 at(select(john,authenticate,paul),_)],
115 select(paul,challenge,john)).
116 cyclic_pattern([at(select(john,notunderstood,paul),_),
117 at(select(paul,inform,john),_),
118 at(select(john,notunderstood,paul),_)],
119 select(paul,certify,john)).
120 cyclic_pattern([at(select(john,notunderstood,paul),_),
121 at(select(paul,inform,john),_),
122 at(select(john,notunderstood,paul),_)],
123 select(paul,inform,john)).
124
125 cyclic(sit(_,_,_,Ns),at(Es,T)):-
126 cyclic_pattern(CyclicPattern,Es),
127 sublist(CyclicPattern, Ns).
128
129 valid(sit(N,Id,T,Es), M):-
130 available(sit(N,Id,T,Es), M),
131 legal(sit(N,Id,T,Es), M),
132 can(sit(N,Id,T,Es), M).
133
134 initially(sit(negotiation,s0,0,[]), role_of(john, merchant)).
135 initially(sit(negotiation,s0,0,[]), role_of(paul, customer)).
136
137 terminating(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), sit(negotiation, Id, T, N)):-
138 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), last_moves([select(P1,X,_)])),
139 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), role_of(P1, merchant)),
140 member(X, [retract,reject]),
141 writelist([->,N],nl).
142 terminating(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), sit(negotiation, Id, T, N)):-
143 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), last_moves([select(P1,X,_)])),
144 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), role_of(P1, customer)),
145 member(X, [accept,refuse]),
146 writelist([->,N],nl).
147
148 initiates(at(Es, T), last_moves([Es]), sit(negotiation,_,T,_)).
149 terminates(at(_, T), last_moves(_), sit(negotiation,_,T,_)).
150
151 available(sit(negotiation,_,_,_),select(_,request,_)).
152 available(sit(negotiation,_,_,_),select(_,accept,_)).
153 available(sit(negotiation,_,_,_),select(_,refuse,_)).
154 available(sit(negotiation,_,_,_),select(_,justify,_)).
155 available(sit(negotiation,_,_,_),select(_,challenge,_)).
156 available(sit(negotiation,_,_,_),select(_,retract,_)).
157 available(sit(negotiation,_,_,_),select(_,authenticate,_)).
158 available(sit(negotiation,_,_,_),select(_,inform,_)).
203
159 available(sit(negotiation,_,_,_),select(_,certify,_)).
160 available(sit(negotiation,_,_,_),select(_,notunderstood,_)).
161 available(sit(negotiation,_,_,_),select(_,reject,_)).
162
163 can(sit(negotiation,_,_,_), select(john,request,_)).
164 can(sit(negotiation,_,_,_), select(john,justify,_)).
165 can(sit(negotiation,_,_,_), select(john,retract,_)).
166 can(sit(negotiation,_,_,_), select(john,authenticate,_)).
167 can(sit(negotiation,_,_,_), select(john,notunderstood,_)).
168 can(sit(negotiation,_,_,_), select(john,reject,_)).
169 can(sit(negotiation,_,_,_), select(paul,challenge,_)).
170 can(sit(negotiation,_,_,_), select(paul,accept,_)).
171 can(sit(negotiation,_,_,_), select(paul,refuse,_)).
172 can(sit(negotiation,_,_,_), select(paul,inform,_)).
173 can(sit(negotiation,_,_,_), select(paul,certify,_)).
174
175 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), select(P1, request,P2)):-
176 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
177 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),role_of(P2,customer)),
178 \+ holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),last_moves([_])).
179 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), select(P1, accept,P2)):-
180 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,customer)),
181 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,X,P1)])),
182 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), role_of(P2,merchant)),
183 member(X, [request,justify]).
184 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), select(P1, refuse,P2)):-
185 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,customer)),
186 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,X,P1)])),
187 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), role_of(P2,merchant)),
188 member(X, [request,justify]).
189 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), select(P1, justify,P2)):-
190 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
191 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,X,P1)])),
192 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), role_of(P2,customer)),
193 member(X, [inform,certify,challenge]).
194 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), select(P1, challenge,P2)):-
195 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,customer)),
196 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,X,P1)])),
197 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), role_of(P2,merchant)),
198 member(X, [request,justify]).
199 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), select(P1, retract,P2)):-
200 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
201 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,X,P1)])),
202 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), role_of(P2,customer)),
203 X = challenge.
204 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), select(P1, authenticate,P2)):-
205 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
206 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,X,P1)])),
207 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), role_of(P2,customer)),
208 X = challenge.
209 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), select(P1, certify,P2)):-
210 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,customer)),
211 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,X,P1)])),
212 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), role_of(P2,merchant)),
213 member(X, [authenticate, notunderstood]).
214 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), select(P1, inform,P2)):-
215 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,customer)),
216 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,X,P1)])),
217 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), role_of(P2,merchant)),
218 member(X, [authenticate, notunderstood]).
219
204
220 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), select(P1, notunderstood,P2)):-
221 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
222 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,X,P1)])),
223 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), role_of(P2,customer)),
224 member(X, [inform, certify]).
225 legal(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), select(P1, reject,P2)):-
226 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),role_of(P1,merchant)),
227 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N),last_moves([select(P2,X,P1)])),
228 holds(sit(negotiation,Id,T,N), role_of(P2,customer)),
229 member(X, [inform, certify]).
230
231 writelist([],nl):-nl,!.
232 writelist([],sl):-!.
233 writelist([H|B],L):-
234 write(H),
235 write(’ ’),!,
236 writelist(B,L).
237
238 sublist([H | T], [A |U]):-
239 sublist([H | T],U).
240 sublist([], []):-
241 false.
242 sublist([H | T], [H | U]):-
243 initialsublist(T, U).
244
245 initialsublist([], _).
246 initialsublist([H | T], [H | U]):-
247 initialsublist(T, U).
248
249 check_list([H | T], [H1 | T1]):-
250 check_list_one(H, H1),
251 check_list(T, T1).
252 check_list([H | T], [H1 | T1]):-
253 check_list([H | T], T1),
254 !.
255 check_list([],_):- !.
256
257 check_list_one(A, B ):-
258 A = B.
Listing G.1: Loops Protocol in Situation Calculus
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